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ABSTRACT

Ever since the 1997 Asian financial crisis which originated in Thailand, corporate
governance has captured the world’s attention, particularly in Thailand and other
emerging economies. This thesis contributes to the empirical evidence of ownership
structure and concentration from a governance perspective. Specifically, the thesis
explores the manner by which family control and institutional environment influence
corporate decision-making and other stakeholders. Focusing on Thailand’s financial
market, the thesis identifies different key dimensions of family control and undertakes
three studies regarding: (i) the relationship between family control and dividend
payment; (ii) the effect of family control on the cost of debt; and (iii) the association
between family ownership and firm value during times of political uncertainty.
Prior studies mainly focus on the family control-financial performance relationship
yet little is known about the channels through which controlling families affect firm
performance, particularly in emerging markets, which are characterized by weak legal
systems and poor corporate governance regulations. To better understand this
relationship, the first study examines the impact of family control on dividend payment.
Agency theory suggests that controlling families’ tendency to expropriate minority
shareholders can lead to inefficient use of free cash flow by reducing dividend payment.
The results show that family firms significantly pay lower dividends than non-family
firms. The effects are more pronounced when controlling families exert greater
v

ownership and have family members on the company boards. The effect of family
control on dividend payment also varies according to corporate governance mechanisms;
lower wedge and less free cash flow lead to higher dividend payment in family firms.
Based on an exogenous political event in Thailand, we address the endogeneity
concerns that exist between family control and dividend payment, and find that the
negative relationship between family control and dividend payment increases in times
of political uncertainty. This is due to the rent-seeking behavior related to establishing
connections with new politicians and/or their parties. Those findings support the view
that families are more likely to expropriate resources from their companies in emerging
markets due to the weak institutional and regulatory environments, and poor investor
protection systems in place.
The second study investigates the influence of family control on cost of debt in
Thailand. We analyse the incentives behind controlling families’ financing decisions
which help sustain their long-run survivability. Family firms in Thailand have lower
debt financing costs compared to non-family firms. The lower cost of external debt
financing predominates in highly profitable family firms insofar that these firms are
reputable and concerned with their long-term survival. Added to this, family firms
benefit from the strong and trustworthy relationships they established with creditors,
which help to alleviate information asymmetry in Thailand’s weak institutional
environment. Those results are robust to possible confounding effect of bank-connected
lending, possible endogeneity issues, different proxies for family control and control
variables, and the use of matched samples.
vi

Finally, as a number of studies investigate the impact of family ownership on firm
performance during normal periods, the third study examines the relationship between
family control and firm value during political uncertainty. Thailand’s constitutional
change arising from the 2014 coup d’état is used as an exogenous shock. What is
revealed here is the role of political uncertainty which can remove firms’ sense of
equilibrium and amplifies the implications of family control influencing a business’s
market value and use of resources. The results show that Thai family firms perform
poorly when compared to non-family firms, during the period of political uncertainty.
The effect is more pronounced when firms have high expected agency costs from
minority shareholders. Family firms delay their investments, hold less cash, pay smaller
dividends and have poorer access to debt financing sources when compared to nonfamily firms. The reductions in investment and financing activities may at least partially
account for their underperformance. This evidence is consistent with the view that
family control enhances firms’ survivorship by establishing political connections in
times of political uncertainty at the expense of minority shareholders.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction
A key financial variable in the business sector is ownership structure and
concentration. Controlling shareholders influence firms’ policies and values. Ownership
structure and concentration are also used as an internal governance mechanism which is
pertinent to firms’ corporate governance, especially in family firms. These types of
businesses share a common trait in many nations around the world (Claessens et al.
2000; Anderson & Reeb 2003; Kotlar et al. 2018; Williams Jr et al. 2018). In addition,
gross domestic product (GDP) growth and market capitalization are significantly
attributed to family firms (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006; Dyer
2018). Hence, the implications for family control play an important role in any economy.
For decades, both theoretical and empirical literature on family ownership structure
and its control have documented that as a controlling shareholder, families have control
over corporate decision-making which influences firm value. Controlling families are
different from other types of controlling shareholders since they are a homogeneous
group of individuals. Therefore, controlling families’ interests might be different from
those of other investors, for instance minority shareholders and creditors (Villalonga &
Amit 2006), which might lead controlling families to make corporate decisions based on
their vested interests. This phenomenon is typical of emerging countries where investor
protection is weak and corporate governance is underdeveloped (Claessens et al. 2000).
Theoretically, the relationship between controlling families and other investors
originates from the agency theory framework. Family control is expected to have two
opposite views on agency costs (Claessens et al. 2002). On the one hand, controlling
families might be concerned with firms’ survival. Family control is beneficial and
serves to monitor and control firms’ decisions are being taken in the best interests of all
1

investors. This effect can be referred to as “the survivorship view”, mitigating agency
costs. On the other hand, controlling families might apply their dominant position to
extract private benefits of control and expropriate other investors. Family control can be
detrimental and lead to an increase in agency costs. This effect can be referred to as “the
expropriation view”. The impact of family control on firms’ performance and decisions
depends on which effect dominates.
Typically, most prior studies on family firms have highlighted the implications of
family ownership structure for firm performance in developed markets such as the U.S.
economy where ownership is dispersed and investor protection laws are strong
(Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006; King & Santor 2008). Unlike family
firms in developed markets, controlling families in other international context,
particularly emerging markets, where ownership is concentrated, and investor protection
is weaker, usually involve family management, and they also enhance their power via
family business groups and affiliations in order to preserve the family empire. However,
there are weak findings on the role of family control in emerging markets. While prior
studies mainly focus on the effects of family ownership structure on firm performance
(Anderson & Reeb 2003; Dyer 2018; Fattoum-Guedri et al. 2018), investigations into
the channels affecting firm performance are sparse. For this reason, the empirical results
on the effect of family control on firm value and policies particularly in emerging
markets are inconclusive.
Recently there has been a dramatic increase in investment in developing countries,
while concurrently a number of economic crises have occurred in these markets. These
trends reflect the rising importance of emerging markets as an alternative investment
allocation, which is in part driven by global financial integration. Compared to
developed markets, emerging markets have different institutional environments in terms
2

of legal system, quality of governance, level of corruption as well as ownership
structure and concentration. Hence, these unique institutional environments in which
emerging markets operate have drawn significant interests amongst researchers to
examine their influence on firms’ behavior.
Thailand was the origin of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and its capital market as
one of the essential emerging markets in East Asia, is characterized by weak
institutional environment and poor governance. Thai family firms have existed for many
decades and they play a key role in the country’s economic development. Controlling
families preserve their family empire via direct and disproportional ownership structures
as well as family involvement in day-to-day management. They have worked to
establish their social connections and implemented control decisions and managerial
behavior. Equally, the government plays an active role in promoting economic
development. Unfortunately, Thai politics have been marked by a great deal of
corruption and intense political uncertainty between an unstable democracy and coups
d’état. With the lack of investor protection, Thai firms have operated in a weak
corporate governance environment with a high level of information asymmetry. These
institutional environments experienced by Thai businesses differentiate them from
family firms in other economies.
Consequently, by focusing on Thailand’s economy, this thesis seeks to fill this gap
in our knowledge by empirically investigating the agency conflicts between controlling
families and other investors such as minority shareholders and creditors. To
comprehend the behavior of family firms and their control of business decision-making,
three studies concerning the effect of family control on dividend payment and the cost
of debt as well as its impact on firm value influenced by the times of political
uncertainty, are provided. To generate greater insights on family control in firms’
3

decision-making, this thesis also examines three major dimensions of family control,
namely family ownership structure

1

, control-ownership wedge

2

and family

management3. This thesis chooses Thailand as a case study to understand how family
control works generally in emerging markets.
The empirical findings presented in this thesis demonstrate the impact of the unique
institutional environments on firms’ behavior and outcomes, and by evaluating the
quality of corporate governance and its implications these findings inform the
development of regulations and policies to resolve agency conflicts in emerging
countries such as Thailand. The next section provides a brief description of Thailand’s
institutional background.
1.2 Institutional background
1.2.1 Family businesses in Thailand
In Thailand, family firms have traditionally been the dominant type of business
corporations. They became more pronounced after the 1997 Asian financial crisis or the
Tom Yum Goong crisis, which started in Thailand and hugely undermined the
economies throughout the Asian region. Since then, most Thai family firms have
experienced financial difficulties, and they have restructured to be publicly traded on
the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) as a result of needing additional capital from
outsiders (Connelly et al. 2012). The SET thus became an important market for capital
financing by the corporate sector. This also assists family firms in contributing more

1

Family ownership structure is measured by two proxies. The first proxy is a family firm dummy defined
as the blockholders who are founder and/or family members by either blood or marriage
(Wiwattanakantang 2001; Villalonga & Amit 2006). Another proxy is family ownership which is defined
as the control rights held by controlling families (La Porta et al. 1999).
2
Control-ownership wedge is defined as the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of
controlling families (Claessens et al. 2002; Villalonga & Amit 2006; Lin et al. 2011).
3
Family management is defined as a chairman, CEO or director who are family members (Villalonga &
Amit 2006).
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than 25% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 33% of market
capitalization in the stock market in 2015. Additionally, in the sample employed in this
thesis, the number of family firms on the SET had increased substantially to 63% of
total listed firms by the end of 2015.
Compared to other types of shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders or a
collective of independent investors, Thai family firms possess unique characteristics. In
Thailand, blood ties and marriage are considered to be the most trustworthy form of
family connections. Hence, family members are heavily involved in management and
policy-making through being on boards as directors or CEOs, rather than employing
external professional managers (Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). In the sample employed in
this thesis, 96% of family firms have members who work on the board of directors or
management team in 2015. Also, controlling families have both economic goals for the
business and non-economic family goals (such as family harmony and social status).
This makes family firms different from other firms.
Additionally, in this nation most families have extended their business empires in
various industry sectors such as agriculture, food and beverage, automotive manufacture,
industrial materials, steel, construction materials, and commerce (Bertrand et al. 2008).
Controlling families maintain their influence of their firms directly by holding the bulk
of shares and/or indirectly through disproportional ownership structures. Interestingly,
the disproportional ownership structures via business groups leading to divergence
between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling families, can force controlling
families to pursue their own incentives. Due to the low level of investor protection and
corporate governance and high ownership concentration in Thailand, the property rights
of firms’ owners are weakly protected. Taken together, family control has the potential

5

to encourage expropriation activities. Thus, in family firms the agency conflict between
controlling shareholders and other investors is more severe (Villalonga & Amit 2006).
It should be noted that Thai family firms have operated since the end of the absolute
monarchy in 1932. In the sample employed in this thesis, family firms listed on the
SET are 30 years old, on average. Since institutional environment is weak and
corruption is prevalent, controlling families have sought to establish connections and
long-term relationship with banks (Charumilind et al. 2006) and powerful politicians
including traditional, bureaucratic and military elites (Polsiri & Jiraporn 2012) to obtain
better access to external financial resources and business opportunities which
consequently improve firm value. Therefore, Thai family firms are more likely to be
concerned about long-term survivorship and reputation. Based on the unique
characteristics of family firms in Thailand, it is worth examining the implications of
family control in Thailand.
1.2.2 Financial sector reform and ownership structure
Following the late 1990s Asian financial crisis, Thailand began a process of
economic policy reform to support economic growth and political stability. Since one of
the main causes of the crisis was the rapid expansion of companies through high levels
of debt, Thailand’s financial sector, which mainly consists of domestic commercial
banks and financial companies, became the main target of these reforms to reduce
businesses’ non-performing loans (NPLs). Before the crisis most domestic commercial
banks and financial companies were established by family groups. Therefore, lending
by financial institutions depends on family connections rather than how well a company
performed. This imprudent lending is mainly in the form of credit loans granted at low
interest rates or no collateral.

6

After the crisis, to increase corporate governance and the country’s stability, the
Bank of Thailand (BOT, the central bank in Thailand) implemented a series of reforms,
particularly in 1997 and 2004. According to the reforms in 1997, individual
shareholders were limited to owning shares for banks and financial companies at 5%
and 10%, respectively. Also, following the reforms in 2004, banks were required to
reduce their outstanding loans to connected companies otherwise they would be
required to have their senior executives surrender their company directorships if they
held more than 1% of the company’s equity. Taken together, those reforms increased
corporate governance and transferred the ownership of some Thai financial institutions
from families to other types of controlling shareholders such as foreigners or the
government. However, Thailand’s financial sector remains concentrated since the five
largest banks still account for about 69% of total assets in the banking system in 2015
(Bank of Thailand 2015). Thus, post-crisis, it is interesting to understand how the
changes of family control affect other investors, corporate policies and firms’ market
value.
1.2.3 Political uncertainty in Thailand
The importance of political uncertainty has been widely investigated in various
contexts around the world. In Thailand, politics have long been marked by intense
political uncertainty between an unstable democracy and coup d’état, in which the
military seizes control and replaces elected governments. Between 1932 and 2015, there
were 20 constitutions and 20 coups. Thailand has faced a series of prolonged political
crises and upheaval leading to a change in the political system, from constitution to
coup d’état, which affects economic growth and firms’ behaviors. These events have
proved to be very severe when it comes to the change in the constitution experienced by
the 2014 coup d’état. At least 28 people died and more than 700 were injured during
7

this period of political uncertainty.4 As a result, Thai economy declined and the gross
domestic product (GDP) fell by 2.1% in 2014.5
In Thailand, the government plays an active role in promoting economic
development. Since Thailand has weak economic fundamentals and legal system, firms’
decisions are influenced by events involving the government (Bunkanwanicha &
Wiwattanakantang 2009), not helped by the high degree of corruption in this nation.
According to Transparency International, in 2015 Thailand scored only 38 out of 100
(where 100 is ideal) on corruption, making it 76th out of 167 countries. As such, to
survive during times of political uncertainty, controlling families are more likely to
extracts firms’ resources at the expense of minority shareholders in order to establish or
reinforce existing political connections through their friendships and board nominations.
Thus, from this perspective, this thesis contends that political uncertainty provides an
exogenous shock which can attenuate endogeneity issues.
1.3 Aims and contributions
Ownership structure and concentration have received extensive attention in recent
research on corporate finance and governance since it is crucial to reform and develop
economies in emerging markets. Family control is the key factor to developing reliable
corporate governance. Regarding the importance of family control and its influence on
firms’ policies and market value, three studies are offered in this thesis and make
several key contributions to the literature on this topic.
The first study aims to investigate the effect of family control on dividend payment,
one of the significant policies that signal firm value and is used as an internal
governance mechanism to mitigate the agency costs associated with free cash flow

4
5

Time, http://time.com/108719/thai-army-declares-military-coup/ (May 22, 2014).
Time, http://time.com/4448655/thailand-constitutional-referendum/ (August 11, 2016).
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(Jensen & Meckling 1976; Isakov & Weisskopf 2015). There is a large body of
evidence on dividend policy in the presence of an agency problem between managers
and shareholders in ownership literature, especially in developed countries. However,
how dividend policy can be affected by agency conflict between controlling
shareholders and minority shareholders has not been fully explored, particularly in
family firms operating in emerging markets where investor protection is weak and
family control via family ownership structure and family management, is prevalent.
This study therefore extends the previous literature by examining the effect of family
control on dividend payment in emerging markets, and it seeks to answer the question:
does family control affect dividend policy? More generally, how are corporate decisions
made under conditions of family control affected by the unique environment in which
Thai listed firms operate? An investigation into the impact of family control on dividend
payment is deemed essential because this can reveal the importance of institutional
environment that can significantly affect the use of free cash flow, and conflicts of
interest between controlling families and minority shareholders in family firms.
Thus, it expands on the previous literature by examining the effect of family control
on dividend payment in emerging markets. It indicates that the weak institutional
environment in emerging markets has serious implications for family control, the
inefficient use of excess cash flow and lower dividend payment. An investigation into
the impact of family control on dividend payment is deemed essential because this can
reveal the importance of institutional environment increasing the conflicts of interest
between controlling families and minority shareholders in family firms.
To advance our comprehension of family control, the second study extends the
research to firms’ ability to access external debt financing. It relates to the agency
conflict between controlling shareholders and creditors. Due to the lack of an arm’s
9

length market-driven system, lending relationship and long-term affinities between
controlling families and creditors, this can bring benefits to family firms such as more
capital (Schwert 2018), longer investment horizons (Faccio 2010), more access to longterm debt (Charumilind et al. 2006) and better monitoring of managerial activities
(Fama & Jensen 1983). It is highly likely that established family firms which have
developed and expanded their businesses for many decades have also maintained longlasting and trustworthy relationships with banks to access debt funding as part of their
survival measures in the long run (Behr & Güttler 2007; Croci et al. 2011). While there
is a large literature focusing on leverage, loan collateral and debt maturity in emerging
markets (Shyu & Lee 2009; Liu et al. 2011; Díaz-Díaz et al. 2016; Pan & Tian 2016),
empirical evidence on the cost of debt from a governance perspective is sparse,
particularly in emerging markets like Thailand. Accordingly, this study adds to the
extant literature by examining the behavior of family firms and their decision-making
on the cost of debt and it addresses an important question on how do family control
influence the cost of debt? This study can provide greater insights into the influence of
family control on financing decisions in the corporate finance literature. The lending
relationship between controlling families and creditors affects access to external debt
financing.
Therefore, this thesis adds to the extant literature by examining the behavior of
family firms and their decision-making on the access of external debt financing. firms’
cost of debt financing. It documents the empirical evidence of lower cost of debt
resulting from family control. This reflects the fact that under the lack of an arm’s
length market-driven system family control is advantageous in securing external finance
at lower cost, stemming from their long-lasting relationships with creditors. These
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findings help us to understand the link between family ownership and firm performance
observed by previous studies.
The third study concerns the influence of political uncertainty on the relationship
between family control and firm value. Unexpected political uncertainty poses a threat
to the survivorship of family firms. In the face of political uncertainty family firms have
a propensity to enhance their firms’ survivorship by using internal firms’ resources to
establish or sustain political connections in times of political uncertainty at the expense
of minority shareholders. It is widely acknowledged that political connections can
provide firms with regulatory protection and financial assistance from the government
(Faccio 2010; Liu et al. 2013). Prior literature generally investigates the relationship
between family ownership structure and firm performance in normal periods but does
not account for dynamic periods of political uncertainty. This study fills this void in our
knowledge by investigating the value of family control on firm performance as well as
investment and financial activities based on Thailand’s constitutional change in the
wake of the 2014 coup d’état. Provided here are insights into the role of family control
by examining the net effect of family control on firm value during turbulent periods of
heightened political uncertainty. It also provides evidence on the incentive of
controlling families, and it enriches the literature regarding the important implications
for family ownership structure and agency theory with reference to the agency conflict
between controlling families and other investors.
Hence, this thesis confirms the importance of political uncertainty which can
influence the relationship between family firms and their market value. It considers the
effect of the constitutional change as an experiment in addressing the endogeneity
concerns and potential simultaneity bias between family control and firm value (Lins et
al. 2013; Beuselinck et al. 2017). This thesis suggests that during political uncertainty
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family firms perform poorly in contrast to non-family firms, and they delay their
investment and financial activities or decisions which are associated with greater
underperformance. It means that during the political uncertainty controlling families
enhance their businesses’ survival by establishing political connections at the expense
of other investors.
Overall, given the unique institutional environment of Thailand, this thesis provides
new evidence about the effects of family control on firms’ dividend payment and cost of
debt financing, and the influence of political uncertainty on the relationship between
family control and firm value. We will understand better the importance of corporate
governance regarding family control, and its implications for: firstly, investors who are
actively involved in the economy; and secondly, policy-makers who are responsible for
devising and enforcing regulations and mitigating agency problems in the context of
emerging markets like Thailand.
1.4 Structure of this thesis
This thesis consists of five chapters. The current chapter is a prelude to the research
topics covered in later chapters. It discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on
family control. Important key empirical features are emphasized and unique institutional
environment in emerging markets are discussed. Using a sample of hand-collected
ownership of Thai listed companies and considering the unique institutional setting of
countries like Thailand, three studies are developed in this thesis to provide empirical
evidence to support the argument that family control and institutional environment
significantly influence firms’ policies and performance.
Chapter 2 investigates the effect of family control on dividend payment. Family
control is common in many countries around the world, although with different
incentives and motivations. Existing research illustrates two opposite views that family
12

control is expected to be either beneficial or detrimental (Claessens et al. 2002). The
influence of institutional environment also affects the incentives of controlling families
and has implications for family control (La Porta et al. 2000a). It is argued that
controlling families as the largest shareholder tend to expropriate minority shareholders
and engage in reducing the dividend payment. The assumptions of both univariate
analysis and Tobit regression models are investigated in this study. The results are also
robust to alternative estimation methods (using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) and
random-effects methods), alternative sampling methods and alternative proxies of
family control, dividends and different control variables. As well, this study examines
whether the relationship between family control and dividend payment varies according
to financing constraints and/or political uncertainty. The resulting evidence is consistent
with the view that families are more likely to expropriate resources from their
companies in emerging markets due to the weak institutional/regulatory environment
and poor investor protection.
Chapter 3 examines the impact of family control on the cost of debt which reflects
another potential agency issue between controlling families and creditors. Prior studies
indicate the problems of firms’ ability to access external debt financing which is
required for their growth in emerging markets where an arm’s length market-driven
system is lacking. To evaluate the access of external debt financing, this study focuses
on the interest rate of all debt outstanding as an indicator of cost of debt. It conjectures
that the strong and trusting relationships between controlling families and their creditors
can help alleviate information asymmetry. Consequently, family control leads to the
lower cost of external debt financing which help sustain family firms’ long-term
survivorship. The assumptions of both univariate and multivariate analysis are applied
to draw the conclusions. The results are also robust to possible confounding effect of
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bank-connected lending, possible endogeneity issues, different proxies for family
control and control variables, and the use of matched samples. This study emphasizes
that family control is vital and can determine sustainable finance-related decisions.
Chapter 4 looks at the influence of political uncertainty on the role of controlling
families affecting firms’ market value (Pástor & Veronesi 2012; Baker & Bloom 2013).
Previous literature notes that this uncertainty might amplify the benefits or costs of
family control and also threaten the survival of family firms. This study thus
investigates the influence of family ownership structure on firm value during the
periods of heightened political uncertainty, particularly in the context of the change in
the constitution. It argues that in order to survive and flourish, family firms establish
political connections at the expense of other investors. As a result, family firms
underperform than non-family firms. This study also considers the influence of
controlling families on firm value when investors face different levels of expected
agency costs during political uncertainty since the inefficient use of firms’ resources by
controlling families can increase the agency cost of minority shareholders (Jensen &
Meckling 1976; Zhang & Cao 2016). It proposes that higher expected agency costs give
controlling families more incentives to extract firms’ resources so that their businesses
can continue trading.
This study further shows the reductions in investment and financing activities of
family firms during the political uncertainty in order to enhance the likelihood of firms’
survivorship. To draw a causal relationship between family control and firm value, this
study applies a number of empirical approaches. It considers the influence of the
constitutional change arising from the 2014 coup d’état as a natural experiment which
addresses the endogeneity concerns and potential simultaneity bias between family
control and firm value (Lins et al. 2013; Beuselinck et al. 2017). This study uses a
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difference-in-difference framework and control for firm fixed effects. It also applies a
matched sample approach by using the propensity score matching (PSM) method as
well as alternative measurements of family control, and control variables. Overall, this
study suggests that controlling families are more conservative during times of political
uncertainty, and focus their concerns on the survival of their family network.
Chapter 5 concludes and summarizes the thesis and the important implications.
Several suggestions are made regarding future studies surrounding this topic.
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Chapter 2: Family control and dividend policy in Thailand
2.1 Introduction
Dividends can be used as an internal governance mechanism to mitigate the agency
cost associated with excessive free cash flows (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Pindado et al.
2012; Isakov & Weisskopf 2015). The dividend decision-making of firms with
controlling shareholders can be different from that of widely held firms since
controlling shareholders have the power to impose their views on the board,
management and minority shareholders. The decisions therefore may be directed at
satisfying preferences of controlling shareholders but not maximizing firm value
(Johnson et al. 2000). Existing literature has focused on dividend policy in the presence
of the agency problem between managers and shareholders in widely held firms. In this
paper, we extend this literature by examining the dividend policy in the presence of an
equally important agency problem which is between the controlling shareholders and
minority shareholders in family firms where ownership concentration is prevalent (La
Porta et al. 2000b; Faccio & Lang 2002). Specifically, we focus on the influence of
family control on dividend policy of Thai listed companies which operate in a weak
institutional/regulatory environment with poor investor protection.
Family firms are expected to have different agency problems from those of nonfamily firms. Villalonga and Amit (2006) show that compared to other types of
shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders or co-founders, controlling families
have stronger incentives to monitor managers and thus mitigate the conflict of interests
between shareholders and managers. This raises another potential agency issue that can
beset relationships concerning controlling families and minority shareholders, since
controlling families may safeguard their personal incentives and use their power to
expropriate minority investors. As a result, the dividend policy made by controlling
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families may not maximize a firm’s market value, but instead encourage them to pursue
personal gains. Nevertheless, it has also been documented that controlling families are
concerned about reputation and the firms’ long-term survival (Anderson & Reeb 2003).
Accordingly, they pay higher dividends which lead to efficient use of free cash flows
and eliminate the expropriation concerns raised by other investors (Faccio et al. 2001).
Given the trade-off between the incentives for families to pursue their private benefits
and concerns about reputation and long-term survival, it remains an empirical question
on how family control exerts influence on dividend payment.
Given that family firms and their control have dominated many countries’
economic systems (La Porta et al. 1999; Pindado et al. 2012; De Massis et al. 2018),
studies have investigated the effects of family control on firm value and corporate
decisions from different perspectives (Anderson et al. 2009; Dawson et al. 2018; Kotlar
et al. 2018; Hearn & Filatotchev 2019). While most research focus on ownership
structure in developed markets (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Hu & Kumar 2004), research
on different dimensions of family control affecting dividend decision is rarely found in
the literature, especially in emerging markets where ownership concentration is
prevalent which further enhances family’s control (La Porta et al. 2000b). Compared to
developed economies, emerging economies are characterized by having underdeveloped
institutional environments, poor protections for minority investors and weak corporate
governance (La Porta et al. 2000a). These conditions suggest that family firms in these
countries may behave differently from their counterparts in developed markets, and
understanding why this is so can advance our knowledge about how institutional
environments shape companies’ behaviors, particularly that of family firms.
Taken together, the presence of controlling families motivates us to investigate the
importance of family control and expand on earlier works by examining two different
17

dimensions of family control, namely family ownership structure

6

and family

management 7 , and their respective effects on dividend policy. In particular, we
investigate how family control impacts companies’ dividend decisions in Thailand and
identify which theoretical prediction best describes it. We also highlight the weak
institutional environment in Thailand and the dominant role of family firms in Thai
economy.
Thailand provides an ideal setting for our investigation. First, family firms are
prevalent and have played a historical and important role in its economic growth. This
role became more pronounced after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Since then, most
Thai family firms have experienced financial difficulties, and they have restructured so
that they can survive and continue to be publicly traded as a result of additional capital
supplied by outsiders (Connelly et al. 2012). The number of family firms on the Stock
Exchange of Thailand (SET) has increased substantially. In particular, as reported in
Wiwattanakantang (2001), by the end of 1996 there were 155/270 (57.41%) listed firms
controlled by families, while at the end of 2015, there were 256/395 (64.81%) listed
family firms reported in our study. About (245/256) 95.70% of these family firms also
have family members as the board of directors. As reported in Forbes Thailand8, more
than 25% of Thailand’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth and 33% of market
capitalization of its listed companies are attributed to family firms. On average, these
family firms have been established and listed on the SET for more than 30 years. For
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Family ownership structure is measured by two proxies. Following Wiwattanakantang (2001) and
Villalonga and Amit (2006), we define the first proxy by a dummy variable which equals one for family
firms and zero for non-family firms. According to Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009), another proxy is family
ownership, which is calculated as the control rights held by the controlling families.
7
Family management is defined by a dummy variable which equals one when a family member acts as a
chairman, CEO or director and zero otherwise, according to Villalonga and Amit (2006).
8
Forbes Thailand, 2015, https://www.marketingoops.com/news/forbes-thailand-50-richest-2015/
(February 10, 2019)
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this reason, family firms in Thailand are very much concerned about their long-term
survival and market reputations.
Second, family firms may be involved in short-term private benefit and
expropriation of minority shareholders as Thailand is an emerging market economy
characterized by weak legal protection of investors and a high level of information
asymmetry. Connelly et al. (2012) point out that under Thailand’s weak legal and
regulatory enforcement environment, while family firms pay lip service to corporate
governance rules, they usually use their power to pursue private benefits through their
controlling positions via pyramidal structures or cross-holding. Nevertheless, how
family control influences corporate decision-making and performance in Thailand
remains unclear due to conflicting theoretical predictions.
In addition, over the decades, Thai family firms obtained government favors via
their political connections and/or business owners themselves seeking elections to top
offices (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang 2009; Polsiri & Jiraporn 2012). Both
Thai central and local governments play an active role in promoting economic
development. As a result, political connections are crucial in many economic activities.
The benefits of being politically connected have been documented by existing literature
via finance access and public policies favorable to political connected businesses
(Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang 2009; Faccio 2010). In contrast, it has been
argued that political connections are associated with the role of a ‘grabbing hand’ to
firms via favorable taxes, lax regulations or bribery (Frye & Shleifer 1997; Xu et al.
2016), which is more pronounced when a country’s corruption level is high (Caprio et
al. 2011). Thailand’s political system for many decades has suffered from instability
due to the vulnerability of its democratic system to military coup d’états, thereby
generating a great deal of political uncertainty. When external shocks emerge, the
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behavior of family firms can change dramatically (Lins et al. 2013). In this study, we
also explore the effects of family control on dividend payment during the periods of
political uncertainty brought about by the 2014 coup d’état. The institutional setting in
Thailand shares some common features with other emerging markets, and presents an
opportunity to study issues about family control in emerging markets, which will
contribute to the literature on business ownership structure.
Using a sample of 2,490 firm-year observations in Thailand from 2009 to 2015, we
find that family firms have lower dividend payment compared to non-family firms, and
this distinction is more pronounced when family firms have greater family ownership
and family members on company boards. These results indicate that controlling families
have incentives to expropriate minority shareholders, and use excess cash for their
private benefits, thus confirming the severity of agency problems in family firms in
Thailand. Our findings remain largely unchanged when we consider the use of stock
repurchase activity which can affect the distribution of cash dividend payment. The
results are also robust to using alternative estimation methods, alternative samples and
alternative measurements of family control, dividends and other control variables.
Moreover, the extraction of private benefits for the purpose of family control becomes
more costly when firms have higher market value. The thrust of our findings is further
supported by the observation that the negative relationship between family control and
dividend payment becomes stronger when firms have higher wedge, have more free
cash flows or face political uncertainty. An important implication of these results is that
maintaining higher wedge and less free cash flows can help to mitigate the agency
problems caused by family firms expropriating minority shareholders and leads to
higher dividend payments. Taken together, these results suggest that family firms are
likely to actively yet covertly expropriate minority shareholders, especially in less
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developed markets where protection for investors is weak and external monitoring is
ineffective.
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, while the
impact of family ownership on corporate governance has been examined extensively for
decades (La Porta et al. 1999; Faccio & Lang 2002), these studies tend to focus on the
relationship between family firms and performance, but do not examine the channels
through which firm performance is affected (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga &
Amit 2006; Connelly et al. 2012). To present a complementary perspective, this study
identifies dividend policy as such a channel. We document the empirical evidence of
lower dividend payment by Thai family firms, which is consistent with Mulyani et al.
(2016) and Attig et al. (2016) who examine dividend policy of family firms in Indonesia
and East Asia, respectively. In addition, we study the behavior of family firms during
the periods of unexpected political uncertainty experienced by the 2014 coup d’état. We
find that the negative relationship between family control and dividend payment
becomes stronger. This is possibly due to firms’ controlling families wanting to
establish political connections with government and other business elites. Thus, this
paper enriches the literature on the impact of controlling shareholders on corporate
dividend policy in family firms.
Secondly, this study provides further insights into the literature about family control.
Extending the study of Anderson and Reeb (2003), we highlight the effects of three
different dimensions of family control, namely family ownership structure and family
management. We find that the negative effects of family control on dividend payment
are more pronounced when controlling families exert larger ownership and have family
members on company boards. These can help us to better understand the association
between family control and dividend payout. Research on dividend policy in family
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firms is essential as it reflects the agency conflict between controlling families and
minority shareholders which is more severe in emerging markets. By examining the
relationship between family control and dividend payment, our study indicates that
family control matters and it is a significant cause for concern influencing the source of
returns for investors.
Lastly, prior studies investigating family ownership mainly focus on the U.S. and
other developed markets (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Adjaoud & Ben‐Amar 2010; Isakov
& Weisskopf 2015), while such an issue in emerging markets like Thailand has been
comparatively neglected. In particular, after the 1997 Asian financial crisis starting in
Thailand, listed companies on the Thai stock markets were required to comply with a
base standard of corporate governance and to disclose all necessary information leading
to higher levels of corporate responsibility such as the rights of shareholders, disclosure
and transparency, and the role of stakeholders. However, the Thai corporate governance
code is designed to adhere to a “comply or explain” basis thereby compelling firms to
explain in the annual report when they cannot meet the code’s requirements. Thus,
compared to developed markets, the level of investor protection and corporate
governance still remain low in the Thai stock market. Given the significant increase in
investment in developing countries recently and the emergence of a number of
economic crises concurrently, greater attention is devoted to examining the influence of
institutional setting in emerging markets on family firms’ behavior. The role played by
family firms in Thailand that have survived for an extended period of time and achieved
a dominant position in the Thai economy, deserves investigation. In doing so, this study
advances our understanding about how institutional environments shape the behavior of
family-run business owners, thus contributing to the literature on ownership structure,
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and benefitting market practitioners in resolving agency problems in emerging
economies.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly describes
the institutional background and ownership structure of family firms in Thailand.
Section 2.3 reviews the current and relevant literature on which the hypotheses are
established. Section 2.4 describes the data and methodology used in this study. Section
2.5 presents the empirical results and additional analyses, and section 2.6 concludes this
study.
2.2 Institutional background
2.2.1 Thai institutional background
Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which is known as the South East Asian
currency crisis or the Tom Yum Goong crisis, one that started in Thailand and hugely
undermined the economies throughout the Asian region, it was clear that the SET
became an important market for capital financing by the corporate sector. One of the
main causes of the crisis was the rapid expansion of companies through high levels of
debt and imprudent investment, which led to a large number of bankruptcies in Thailand.
The outcome is closely linked to poor corporate governance practices and a weak legal
environment. After the crisis, listed companies on the Thai stock markets were ordered
to comply with a base standard of corporate governance, for example the “Code of Best
Practices for Directors of Listed Companies” in 1999, the “Compass for Good
Corporate Governance” in 2002 and “The Principle of Good Corporate Governance” in
2006. The emergence of the basic standard of corporate governance led to higher levels
of corporate responsibility being established in a number of dimensions. These included,
but were not limited to, the rights of shareholders, disclosure and transparency, and the
role of stakeholders. Although companies are now required to comply with these
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obligations and disclose all necessary information, the Thai corporate governance code
is designed to adhere to a “comply or explain” basis thereby compelling firms to explain
in the annual report when they cannot meet the code’s requirements. Despite the
reforms, the level of investor protection and corporate governance still remains low and
there is a high degree of information asymmetry observed in the Thai stock market.
2.2.2 Emergence of family firms in Thailand
Family firms9 have been established for a long time in Thailand and expanded their
business interests dramatically since 1932. In our sample, the average period family
firms have been listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) is 30 years. Although
family firms are prevalent in Thailand for reasons of survival, the characteristics of such
firms particularly in terms of family control have changed significantly particularly in
the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis. Based on ownership structure in Thailand,
before the 1997 crisis, founding families usually exerted complete control of their
companies and how they were managed (Claessens et al. 2000). However, after 1997,
family firms went public because they urgently needed additional external capital and
restructured themselves (Connelly et al. 2012). Approximately 64.81% of Thai nonfinancial listed companies were family firms by the end of 2015.
From a cultural perspective, the relationship within family members through blood
ties and marriage is regarded as the most trustworthy in Thailand, particularly when
compared to external professional managers. In a weak legal environment and for the
highly concentrated ownership of publicly-traded family firms, Thai family firms are
characterized by family members being heavily involved in management and policy-

9

Family firms are important and contribute to the overall economy in Thailand. As reported in Forbes
Thailand, more than 25% of Thailand’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth come from family firms
and 33% of market capitalization of listed companies in Thailand.
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making through being on the board or CEOs (Wiwattanakantang 2001; Bunkanwanicha
et al. 2013). For example, about 95.70% of family firms have members who work as the
board of directors in 2015. These arrangements imply that families are more likely to
have enormous controlling power over listed companies and the board of directors is not
likely to be independent.
Based on the discussion of the institutional setting and family firm characteristics in
Thailand, it can be seen that the structure of family control is considered to be one of the
key factors for firms’ survival, particularly after the crisis.
2.3 Literature review and hypotheses development
2.3.1 Literature review
Family firms are pervasive and important for economic growth around the world
(La Porta et al. 1999; Setia‐Atmaja et al. 2009; Pindado et al. 2012; De Massis et al.
2018; Hearn & Filatotchev 2019). Theoretically, firms with controlling shareholders
reveal conflict of interests with other investors which is especially the case when
controlling shareholders are families (Villalonga & Amit 2006). However, how
controlling families affect firm policy remains controversial due to controlling families’
characteristics (Bertrand & Schoar 2006). On the one hand, controlling families may
use their power to expropriate other investors and extract for their private benefits
(Boubakri et al. 2010; Lin et al. 2011). On the other hand, controlling families are
concerned about their reputation and long-term survival, and thus place more emphasis
on the relationship with other investors and stakeholders (Anderson & Reeb 2003).
The extant literature shows that family control is beneficial due to family firms’
concern about their reputation for impartial treatment of minority shareholders and the
firms’ long-term survival (Anderson & Reeb 2003). Therefore, controlling families
have the incentive to monitor managerial activities which are associated with efficient
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use of free cash flows and maximizing firm value (Villalonga & Amit 2006). This
aspect of the family firm has led to greater insights into how dividends are utilized. This
evidence has been investigated and found in developed countries which are
characterised by strong legal protection and corporate governance regulations (SetiaAtmaja et al. 2009; Schmid et al. 2010; Yoshikawa & Rasheed 2010; Isakov &
Weisskopf 2015). La Porta et al. (2000b) propose an alternative model of dividend
payments and argue that, in the context of poor institutional regulation and weak
investor protection, firms use dividend payment as a trust-generation tool to establish
their reputation and allay expropriation. Guaranteed dividend payment can also force
managers to raise external sources of funds that are better monitored by owners who are
outsiders (Yoshikawa & Rasheed 2010). In addition, families who intend to maintain
their control over the firm in the long run are not interested in selling their shares, but
they tend to use dividends as a source of family income (Isakov & Weisskopf 2015).
However, there are costs associated with family control because of expropriation
and tunneling (Johnson et al. 2000). Due to the institutional environment of emerging
economies, these agency problems become more severe (Faccio et al. 2001; Connelly et
al. 2012; Vieira 2013; Attig et al. 2016; Mulyani et al. 2016). Controlling families have
strong incentives to expropriate minority shareholders, and use excess cash for their
private benefits, thus paying lower dividends (Vieira 2013; Attig et al. 2016; Mulyani et
al. 2016). Little previous literature has examined the impact of family control on
dividend payment in emerging markets. Faccio et al. (2001) document that compared to
Western Europe, dividend payment is lower in Asia. Mulyani et al. (2016) analyze a
sample of Indonesia firms and note that family firms pay smaller dividends and have
higher leverage than non-family firms. This finding is further confirmed by Attig et al.
(2016) who investigate a sample of companies from East Asian countries.
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It can be seen from the foregoing literature that whether family firms influence
dividend payout remains an important and relevant topic worthy of investigation,
particularly in emerging markets.
2.3.2 Hypotheses development
The effect of family firms on dividend payment in Thailand is more likely to rely
on the quality of institutional environment and the power of controlling families in the
firms. Compared to other types of controlling shareholders such as institutional
investors or investors who are independent and who curtail private benefits, controlling
families have strong incentives to expropriate outside investors (Villalonga & Amit
2006). The empirical evidence, particularly in emerging markets, further shows that the
incentives for controlling families to pursue their private benefits and expropriate
minority shareholders outweigh the concerns of reputation and long-term survival,
probably due to the weak institutional environment (Attig et al. 2016; Mulyani et al.
2016). Like other developing countries, Thailand has weak legal protection for minority
shareholders and a high level of ownership concentration. In addition, family firms are
prevalent and play an important role in Thailand since they have been established for a
very long time and expanded their businesses rapidly (Wiwattanakantang 2001). Taken
together, family firms are more likely to use free cash flow inefficiently and expropriate
minority shareholders by paying lower dividends. We therefore formulate the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Dividend payout is lower in family firms than in non-family firms.
In Thailand, it is important to note that relationship between family members
through blood ties and marriage is considered to be the most trustworthy
(Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). Controlling families also participate in the management
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of companies and exert a strong influence on the board, managers and minority
shareholders to control financial decisions, policymaking, and performance of the firms
(Claessens et al. 2002). Accordingly, this type of family management makes it unlikely
for the board of directors to be independent (Wiwattanakantang 2001). It has been
documented that due to the increase in the expected cost of monitoring managerial
activities by outsiders associated with the inefficient use of free cash flow and the
failure to maximize firm value, these expropriation activities via the high level of the
family management are more likely to cause more agency problems (Pindado et al.
2012; Vieira 2013). Overall, we contend that the agency problem between controlling
families and minority shareholders is predicted to be severe in Thai family firms. We
formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2. Dividend payout is lower in family firms when family members act as
chairman, CEO or directors.
2.4 Sample and methodology
2.4.1 Data and sample selection
We examine the impact of family control on dividend policy by using a sample of
listed firms in Thailand. In order to distribute dividends in Thailand, public listed firms
are governed by the Public Limited Companies Act B.E. 2535 (A.D. 1992) and the
Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535. There is, however, no regulation governing
dividends payout for privately owned firms. For this reason, only publicly listed
companies on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) are considered in this study. In
terms of paying dividends, the listed companies can distribute dividends by cash and/or
stock dividends; however, if the companies have accumulated losses, they are not
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permitted to pay out dividends.10 In addition, to avoid possible bias arising from the
GFC’s impact on our results, we study the sample period from 2009 to 2015. The data
are obtained from Bloomberg database for all companies listed on the SET. Our sample
excludes: firstly, companies with irregular financial reporting; and secondly, firms in
the finance industry since they have different accounting standards and leverage
arrangements.
After removing all missing observations, our final sample comprises 395 listed
firms and 2,490 firm-year observations. As this research focuses on family control, it is
important to obtain accurate information on family ownership structure and family
management. Thus, we consider both control rights and cash flow rights in our study.
The control rights and cash flow rights of the controlling families are hand-collected
from companies’ annual reports, which are obtained from SET Market Analysis and
Reporting Tool (SETSMARTS) provided by the SET. For a given company in its
annual report, the ownership data include shareholders with stakes of at least 0.5%.
Information on family control which lacks clarity is further verified and ascertained by
retrieving information from corporate homepages, newspaper articles and the
commercial register. Finally, we match the ownership data with firm accounting and
financial data.
2.4.2 Measurement of variables
2.4.2.1 Dividend policy
To measure dividend payment, we use the dividend per share (DPS) as a proxy
which is defined as the ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common shares

10

Thailand is a debt-dominated capital market. On the one hand, companies are more likely to smooth
dividend stream expected by shareholders. This requires companies to report earnings high enough to pay
dividends. On the other hand, managing earning upwards is costly because of tax consequences. Dividend
policy also depends on free cash flow and life-cycle of Thai companies (Fairchild et al. 2014).

29

outstanding. This measure is consistent with Fairchild et al. (2014), Floyd et al. (2015)
and Firth et al. (2016). We apply dividend per share because it can show the proportion
of income paid out to shareholders. For robustness checks on our results, we employ
two alternative measures of dividend payment. The first measure is dividend yield
(Dividend), which is defined as the common dividends paid divided by the market value
of equity, following Cao et al. (2017). We apply dividend yield to avoid the problems of
managerial manipulation and this measure reflects direct financial market information
given to investors. The second measure is the dividend payout ratio (Payout), which is
defined as the sum of cash dividends and repurchases divided by the market value of
equity, following Hu and Kumar (2004). We consider stock repurchases as another
option which can affect paying excess cash to shareholders because stock repurchases
are similar to dividends which are significantly sensitive to earnings (Von Eije &
Megginson 2008; Jiang et al. 2013), and can be used to adjust the level of ownership
structure within firms (Schulze et al. 2002).
2.4.2.2 Family control
According to Wiwattanakantang (2001) who pioneered the study of family
ownership in Thailand, we define a firm as a family-operated firm if a founder and/or
family member by either blood or marriage is the blockholder. This definition is also
consistent with that of Villalonga and Amit (2006). Together with, the legal system in
Thailand defines that shareholders need to hold at least a 75% stake to have absolute
voting power for important corporate decisions, thus, a shareholder who holds more
than 25% shares can have enough voting rights to control what the firm intends to do.
To ensure controlling families can exert effective control, we set 25% of the control
rights as the cut-off point of ownership, which is consistent with Wiwattanakantang
(2001). In the empirical analysis, we consider two types of family control, namely
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family ownership and family management, in order to directly assess how family
control affects dividend policy.
First, we measure family ownership by two proxies. The first proxy is Family,
which is a dummy variable equal to 1 for family firms and 0 for non-family firms.
Another proxy for family ownership is the control rights held by controlling families
(ControlR), following Setia‐Atmaja et al. (2009).
Another type of family control is family management, which is defined when a
family member acts as a chairman, CEO or board director (Villalonga & Amit 2006).
We use a dummy variable for family management (Family_CEO), which equals 1 for
family firms with a family member who is the chairman, CEO or board director and 0
otherwise.11
2.4.2.3 Control variables
Following the literature, we include a set of firm characteristics as control variables
that can potentially influence dividend policy. First, we control for a firm’s size.
Previous analyses have shown that when firms expand, they are more likely to pay
dividends (Adjaoud & Ben‐Amar 2010). Similar to Adjaoud and Ben‐Amar (2010), we
include Size which is defined as firm size and measured as the natural logarithm of firm
total assets. In the robustness check, we measure firm size by including Sale, which is
calculated as the natural log of firm total sales, following Isakov and Weisskopf (2015).
Second, firms which are more profitable tend to pay higher dividends (Fama &
French 1998; Adjaoud & Ben‐Amar 2010). We include two variables to measure a
firm’s profitability. ROA is defined as return on assets and measured as net income
divided by total assets, following Fama and French (1998). Another variable to measure

11

We focus on the presence of family members as chairman, CEO, or board directors, rather than other
senior executives due to the power and influence of corporate decision-making they have.
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profitability is Cycle which is measured as retained earnings divided by total equity,
following Adjaoud and Ben‐Amar (2010), and Cao et al. (2017).
Firms which grow rapidly may need more funds to invest in positive net present
value projects, and hence they tend to pay lower dividends (Adjaoud & Ben‐Amar 2010;
Cao et al. 2017). For this reason, we control for the growth opportunity of the firm
defined by the variable, Growth, which is measured as percentage change of total sales,
following Cao et al. (2017). In the robustness check, we replace Growth with Asset
which is another proxy for measure firms’ growth opportunities. Asset is defined as
percentage change of total assets, following Isakov and Weisskopf (2015).
Finally, we control for firm risk level, as riskier firms tend to pay lower dividends
(Firth et al. 2016). Here, we use Beta to measure the risk level, which is given by the
firm’s beta value that reflects systematic risk. The year dummy and industry dummy are
also included. 12 In addition, to mitigate potential problems of outliers and extreme
values, the control variables such as Cycle and Growth are winsorized at the 1% and
99% levels. The definitions for these variables, as well as all other variables used in this
study, are presented in Table 2.1.

12

The industry dummy is based on the industry classification of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET).
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Table 2. 1 Definitions of Variables
Variable name
Variable definition
Panel A: Dividend and ownership structure
Dividend per share (DPS)
Total cash dividend/ total number of common shares
outstanding
Dividend yield (Dividend)
Common dividends/ the market value of equity
Dividend payout ratio (Payout)
The sum of cash dividend and repurchases/ the market value of
equity
Family
Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms and 0 for non-family
firms
ControlR
The control rights held by the controlling families
Family_CEO
Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms that have a family
member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors, and
0 for family firms that do not have a family member as the
chairman, CEO or on the board of directors
Family 25-50%
Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms in which a member
holds between 25% and 50% of control rights, and 0 for family
firms in which a member holds between 25% and 50%
Family 50% or more
Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms in which a member
holds more than 50% of control rights, and 0 for family firms in
which a member holds more than 50%
Panel B: Firm characteristics
Firm size (Size)
Return on assets (ROA)
Cycle
Growth opportunity (Growth)
Beta
LnMB
Free cash flow (FCF)
Wedge
Asset growth (Asset)
Sale size (Sale)
Industry dummy
Panel C: Political uncertainty events
Political turnover (Turnover)

Natural logarithm of firm total assets
Net income/total assets
Retained earnings/total equity
Percentage change of total sales
Firm’s beta value reflecting systematic risk
Natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio
Free cash flow/total assets
Divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of
controlling shareholders
Percentage change of total assets
Natural logarithm of firm total sales
Dummy variable equals 1 for firms in a given industry and 0
otherwise
Dummy variable equals 1 when the local politician in a
province is newly appointed and 0 otherwise. If politicians took
office from January 1 to June 30, then the current year
represents the year they took office; if politicians took office
from July 1 to December 31, then the following year represents
the year they took office

2.4.3 Model specification
In order to test the relationship between family control and dividend policy, we first
develop and estimate the equation as follows:
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where i stands for the firm and t stands for the year. ε is the error term. The dependent
variable, DIVP, stands for the dividend policy of firm i in year t, and is proxied by DPS
which is dividend per share. For key explanatory variable Family_Control of firm i in
year t, we use four proxies including family firm (Family), family ownership (ControlR)
and family management (Family_CEO). Firm-specific control variables (Control) are
also included in the regression. These variables include Size, ROA, Growth, Cycle and
Beta which are discussed and defined in the previous section. Year dummy and industry
dummy are added to control for year-specific effect and industry-specific effect in this
model, respectively. The sample used in this study includes several firms that do not pay
dividends, so the dividend payout of those companies is censored at zero. In order to
examine the effects of family control on dividend policy when the dependent variable is
censored, we estimate Tobit regression models with the maximum likelihood estimation
method.
2.5 Empirical results
2.5.1 Summary statistics
Table 2.2 reports the distribution of the firms in our sample. As can be observed in
Table 2.2, the sample used in this study comprises 395 listed firms and 2,490 firm-year
observations. 60.32% of observations are family firms. Among them, there are 1,520
firm-year observations for family firms and 988 firm-year observations for non-family
firms. In addition, 96.67% of the family firms have a family member working as the
board of directors, CEO and/or chairman. Obviously, during the sample period, there
are a few changes in the levels of family control through family ownership structure and
family management in Thailand in each year. Also, among those firms that change their
ownership type, family members often retain their involvement in management
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decisions. These statistics indicate the prevalence of family firms in Thailand and the
significance of our study using that country’s firms.
Table 2. 2 Sample constituent and time-series analysis
This table reports sample constituents. Panel A shows the number of Thai public listed companies which
can be divided into family and non-family firms for each year. Panel B shows the percentage of Thai
public listed companies which can be divided into family and non-family firms for each year. Panel C
shows the percentage and the number of firms controlled by families who have members in management
positions for each year. Definitions of all variables are as shown in Table 2.1.
Year
2009
Panel A: Number of firm-year observations
1. Family firms
185
2. Non-family firms
126
Total
311

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Total

205
141
346

199
153
352

199
146
345

216
143
359

242
140
382

256
139
395

1,502
988
2,490

56.53
43.47

57.68
42.32

60.17
39.83

63.35
36.65

64.81
35.19

60.32
39.68

97.99

95.37

95.87

95.70

96.67

195

206

232

245

1,452

Panel B: Percentage of firm-year observations (%)
1. Family firms
59.49
59.25
2. Non-family firms
40.51
40.75

Panel C: Family management within family firms (N=1,502)
1. Percentage of family management
97.30
97.07 97.99
(%)
2. number of family management
180
199
195
(number of firm-year observation)

The summary statistics of the variables are presented in Table 2.3. Panel A shows
the mean (median) of the dividend per share is THB 0.92 (THB 0.16). This is slightly
higher than the mean dividend per share in Indonesia which is about MYR 0.069 or
THB 0.5913 as reported by Al-Twaijry (2007). The results in Panel A also demonstrate
the ownership structure in this sample. There are 2,490 firm-year observations in this
study. As can be seen, 60.32% of observations are family firms. The average control
rights are 29.30%, with a median value of 34.32%. Furthermore, about 58.31%
(1,452/2,490) of the sample and/or 96.67% of the family firms (which are 1,502 firmyear observations) have a family member working on the board of directors, or as CEO
and/or chairman. Panel B summarizes firm characteristics. The average firm size is 8.50,

13

MYR 1 to THB 7.4 Exchange rate on 18 Aug 2019.
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whereas the average ROA is 5.31%. Beta is about 0.77, on average, while on average
both the cycle and growth are about 9%. Panel C reports the proportion of sample firms
which are categorized as family and non-family firms. There are 1,502 family firm-year
observations which make up 60.32% of the total sample. This figure is slightly higher
than that reported by Wiwattanakantang (2001). For 988 non-family firm-year
observations, they make up the remaining 39.68% of the total sample. Meanwhile,
6.07% of firms are controlled by the government, 15.94% by foreign investors, and
0.68% by a group of people. Finally, 16.99% of firms are classified as widely held nonfamily firms.
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Table 2. 3 Summary statistics
This table reports summary statistics. DPS is the ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common
shares outstanding. Dividend is the ratio of common dividends to the market value of equity. Payout is the
ratio of the sum of cash dividends and repurchases to the market value of equity. Family is a dummy
variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held
by the controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have
a family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural
logarithm of firm total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Beta is the firm’s beta value
reflecting systematic risk. Cycle is the ratio of retained earnings to total equity. Growth is the percentage
change of total sales. LnMB is natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio. FCF is the ratio of free cash
flow to total assets. Wedge is the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling
shareholders. Asset is the percentage change of total assets. Sale is the natural logarithm of firm total sales.
Turnover is a dummy variable which equals one when the local politician is newly appointed and 0
otherwise. If politicians took office from January 1 to June 30, then the current year represents the year
they took office; if politicians took office from July 1 to December 31, then the following year represents
the year they took office. Definitions of all other variables are as shown in Table 2.1. For Family_CEO,
summary statistics are reported for the sample of firm-year observations within family firms, whereas in
the regressions, firm-year observations include total firms.
25th percentile

Median

75th
percentile

Standard
deviation

Panel A: Dividend and ownership structure
DPS (Bt)
2,490
0.919
Dividend (%)
2,490
3.314
Payout (%)
2,490
3.291

0.004
0.104
0.000

0.160
2.812
2.778

0.620
4.948
4.930

2.760
4.146
4.153

Family
ControlR (%)
Family_CEO

0.603
29.296
0.967

0
0
1

1
34.320
1

1
50.610
1

0.489
26.214
0.179

8.496
5.312
0.774
8.832
9.391
0.248
2.554
4.514
11.645
8.140
0.365

7.410
1.205
0.395
2.349
-7.394
-0.0964
-3.393
0
-1.696
7.130
0

8.263
5.248
0.715
10.237
4.691
0.155
2.835
0
5.971
8.099
0

9.393
9.753
1.130
18.278
16.496
0.520
9.098
0.331
16.016
9.100
1

1.493
9.564
1.088
20.524
40.256
0.529
10.133
10.227
29.103
1.680
0.481

Observation

2,490
2,490
1,502

Panel B: Firm characteristics
Size
2,490
ROA (%)
2,490
Beta
2,490
Cycle (%)
2,490
Growth (%)
2,490
LnMB
2,490
FCF (%)
2,490
Wedge (%)
2,490
Asset (%)
2,490
Sale
2,490
Turnover
2,490

Mean

Panel C: Number and percentage of firm-year observations in our sample
Number of firm-year
observations
1. Family firms
1,502
2. Non-family firms
988
2.1 Government
151
2.2 Foreign investor
397
2.3 Group
17
2.4 Widely held
423
Total
2,490

Percentage of total firm-year
observations
60.32%
39.68%
6.07%
15.94%
0.68%
16.99%
100%

Table 2.4 reports the results of the univariate test of key variables between family
and non-family firms. The results reveal that dividend per share (DPS), dividend yield
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(Dividend) and dividend payout ratio (Payout) are significantly lower in family firms
than those in non-family firms. Family firms also are significantly smaller in size (Size)
and have lower systematic risk (Beta) than non-family firms. Additionally, non-family
firms make significantly smaller profits (as measured by both ROA and Cycle) and have
less growth potential (as measured by Growth) than family firms.
Table 2. 4 Univariate analysis
This table reports the univariate analysis. DPS is the ratio of total cash dividends to total number of
common shares outstanding. Dividend is the ratio of common dividends to the market value of equity.
Payout is the ratio of the sum of cash dividends and repurchases to the market value of equity. Size is the
natural logarithm of firm total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Beta is the firm’s beta
value reflecting systematic risk. Cycle is the ratio of retained earnings to total equity. Growth is the
percentage change of total sales. Definitions of all other variables are as shown in Table 2.1. Robust tstatistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Non-family firms
(N=988)
Mean
1.283
3.493
3.464

Difference test
(t-value)

DPS (Bt)
Dividend (%)
Payout (%)

Family firms
(N=1,502)
Mean
0.679
3.196
3.178

Size
ROA (%)
Beta
Cycle (%)
Growth (%)

8.347
5.865
0.743
9.794
10.536

8.723
4.471
0.820
7.368
7.650

-0.376*** (-6.196)
1.394%*** (3.566)
-0.077* (-1.719)
2.426%*** (2.890)
2.886%* (1.751)

-0.604 Bt*** (-5.377)
-0.297%* (-1.749)
-0.286%* (-1.679)

2.5.2 Regression results
In this section, we conduct multivariate analysis by estimating equation (1) and
report the regression results in Table 2.5, in which the dependent variable is dividend
per share.14 As can be seen in columns 1 and 2, Thai listed firms pay lower dividends
when controlling families are present and when controlling families hold more shares.
In column 1, the estimated coefficient of Family is -0.475 and significant at the 1%

14

Correlations amongst the variables are not presented but are available from the authors upon request.
As expected, a firm’s dividend policy which is proxied by dividend per share has a negative correlation
with all two types of family control, these being family ownership structure (as proxied by Family and
ControlR) and family management (as denoted by Family_CEO).
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level (t-value is -3.44). In column 2, we also find that the estimated coefficient of
ControlR is -1.028 and significant at the 1% level (t-value is -4.01). Economically, a
one-standard-deviation increase in ControlR brings about 26.95 percentage points, or
29.32% decrease in dividend per share (DPS). The results in columns 1 and 2 support
our hypothesis H1 that family firms have lower dividends, indicating that controlling
families tend to have stronger incentives to pursue their own agendas and personal
advantages.
Column 3 shows that Thai family firms are associated with lower dividend payment
when family members act as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors. We
observe a statistically significant and negative coefficient of Family_CEO, which is 0.601 at the 1% level (t-value is -4.39). This finding supports our hypothesis H2, and
indicates that controlling families as senior/executive managers tend to transfer firms’
resources for their own private ends. Also, when we consider the subsamples of firms
with dividend payment separately in columns 4 to 6, the results are consistent with our
prior findings for full sample.15
Results for the control variables are generally consistent with the literature on
dividend policy (Adjaoud & Ben‐Amar 2010; Isakov & Weisskopf 2015; Mulyani et al.
2016). Especially, firms are prone to pay dividends when they are larger in size and
firms are less likely to pay dividends when they have potential growth opportunities and
when there is more systematic risk.

15

OLS model is used as an alternative model because a truncation bias does not exist for the subsamples
of firms with dividend payment. All results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 2. 5 Family control and DPS
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS equation using a panel Tobit regression for full sample
and OLS regression for subsample where dividend payment has non-zero values.. DPS is the ratio of total
cash dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Family is a dummy variable which equals
one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling
families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member
as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of firm
total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Beta is the firm’s beta value reflecting
systematic risk. Cycle is the ratio of retained earnings to total equity. Growth is the percentage change of
total sales. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in
this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample. Columns 4, 5 and 6 use the subsample
where dividend payment has non-zero values. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Family

DPS
Full sample
(1)
-0.475***
(-3.44)

ControlR

(2)

ROA
Beta
Cycle
Growth
Intercept
Industry
dummies
Year dummies
Log-likelihood
R2
Observations

Subsample
(4)
-0.705***
(-4.46)

-1.028***
(-4.01)

Family_CEO
Size

(3)

(5)

(6)

-1.538***
(-5.54)

0.406***
(8.36)
13.296***
(8.21)
-0.220***
(-3.68)
1.524*
(1.84)
-0.900***
(-4.54)
-3.627***
(-7.12)
Yes

0.401***
(8.26)
13.179***
(8.15)
-0.223***
(-3.73)
1.550*
(1.87)
-0.887***
(-4.49)
-3.569***
(-7.02)
Yes

-0.601***
(-4.39)
0.404***
(8.36)
13.290***
(8.23)
-0.220***
(-3.68)
1.531*
(1.85)
-0.894***
(-4.53)
-3.552***
(-7.02)
Yes

Yes
-5,059

Yes
-5,057

Yes
-5,055

2,490

2,490

2,490

0.321***
(6.55)
13.500***
(5.75)
-0.125
(-0.89)
-3.484***
(-3.18)
-0.577***
(-3.43)
-1.629***
(-3.45)
Yes

0.310***
(6.27)
13.323***
(5.73)
-0.128
(-0.91)
-3.448***
(-3.17)
-0.548***
(-3.26)
-1.519***
(-3.19)
Yes

-0.866***
(-5.53)
0.316***
(6.46)
13.412***
(5.72)
-0.124
(-0.90)
-3.436***
(-3.14)
-0.565***
(-3.35)
-1.526***
(-3.24)
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.0906
1,874

0.0948
1,874

0.0965
1,874

We also use alternative proxies of dividend policy based on market and accounting
measures of corporate performance to re-estimate the main equation, and report the
results in Table 2.6 for the full sample (in Panel A) and subsample of firms with
dividend payment separately (in Panel B). In particular, the results in columns 1 to 3 use
dividend yield as the dependent variable, and the results in columns 4 to 6 use the
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dividend payout ratio as the dependent variable.16 The results are qualitatively similar
for both the full samples and subsamples. Obviously, in Panel B of Table 2.6, we
examine the relationship between family control and dividend payment for the
subsamples of firms with dividend payment. In column 1 the estimated coefficient of
Family is -0.007 and is significant at the 1% level (t-value is -2.70). This result indicates
that family firms reduce their dividend yield probability by a 0.7 percentage point, or
0.16%, more than those of non-family firms. 17 In column 2, we also find that the
estimated coefficient of ControlR is -0.0.16 and is significant at the 1% level (t-value is
-3.55), which implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in ControlR decreases
dividend yield by 0.42 percentage points.18 Finally, column 3 shows that Thai family
firms are associated with lower dividend yield when family members work as the
chairman, CEO or sit as the board of directors. In column 3, we observe a negative
coefficient of Family_CEO (-0.006), which is statistically significant at the 5% level (tvalue is -2.52). This result suggests that family firms reduce their dividend yield
probability by a 0.6 percentage point, or 0.14%, more than those of non-family firms.
The estimated coefficients of the key variables in columns 4 to 6 are quite similar to
those in the first four columns. These findings suggest that the stock repurchases
component is very small. In this scenario, it is reasonable to infer that Thai companies
are more likely to disburse their free cash flows to their shareholders in the form of cash
dividends, rather than stock repurchases. Based on corporate governance, these findings
also reflect that family firms need not use stock repurchases to adjust the ideal level of
ownership structure.

16

OLS model is used as an alternative model because a truncation bias does not exist for the subsamples
of firms with dividend payment. All results are available from the authors upon request.
17
The standard deviation of Dividend for the subsamples is 4.247 and its mean is 4.403.
18
The standard deviation of ControlR for the subsamples is 26.086% and its mean is 30.176%.
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It can be seen in Table 2.2 that the levels of family control through family
ownership structure and family management remain nearly constant in most of the
family firms in Thailand. These findings are similar to the work of Chen (2013) who
examines the association between family ownership and share repurchase activities in
Taiwan. Their results indicate that family firms are less likely to repurchase stocks than
non-family firms. One explanation is that, in family firms, the older generations can
retain their ownership concentration and wealth for their descendants by transferring
their stocks and resources to their children (Schulze et al. 2002). Overall, the estimation
results are consistent for dividend payout. Taken together, our key variables of interests
are all negatively and significantly related to dividend yield and dividend payout ratio,
which are consistent with the results reported in Table 2.5. That is, family firms pay
lower dividends than non-family firms.
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Table 2. 6 Family control and alternative proxies of dividend policy
This table reports the estimation results of the Dividend and Payout equations using a panel Tobit
regression for full sample and OLS regression for subsample where dividend payment has non-zero
values. Dividend is the ratio of common dividends to the market value of equity. Payout is the ratio of the
sum of cash dividends and repurchases to the market value of equity. Family is a dummy variable which
equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the
controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a
family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Control variables are
included as follows: Size, ROA, Beta, Cycle and Growth. Definitions of all other variables are as shown in
Table 2.1. Panel A uses the full sample and Panel B uses the subsample where dividend payment has nonzero values. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels, respectively.
Dividend
(1)
Panel A: Full sample
Family
-0.004***
(-2.61)
ControlR

(2)

Control variables
Industry
dummies
Year dummies
Log-likelihood
Observations

Payout
(4)

(5)

(6)

-0.004***
(-2.58)
-0.010***
(-3.19)

Family_CEO
Intercept

(3)

-0.010***
(-3.18)

0.054***
(9.29)
Yes
Yes

0.054***
(9.40)
Yes
Yes

-0.004**
(-2.29)
0.053***
(9.21)
Yes
Yes

Yes
4,604
2,490

Yes
4,606
2,490

Yes
4,604
2,490

Panel B: Subsample with non-zero dividend payment
Family
-0.007***
(-2.70)
ControlR
-0.016***
(-3.55)
Family_CEO
-0.006**
(-2.52)
Intercept
0.084***
0.086***
0.083***
(11.37)
(11.37)
(11.47)
Control variables Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry
Yes
Yes
Yes
dummies
Year dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
R2
0.111
0.114
0.110
Observations
1,874
1,874
1,874

0.054***
(9.33)
Yes
Yes

0.055***
(9.45)
Yes
Yes

-0.004**
(-2.28)
0.054***
(9.26)
Yes
Yes

Yes
4,595
2,490

Yes
4,596
2,490

Yes
4,594
2,490

-0.007**
(-2.51)
-0.015***
(-3.34)

0.084***
(11.29)
Yes
Yes

0.085***
(11.27)
Yes
Yes

-0.006**
(-2.33)
0.083***
(11.39)
Yes
Yes

Yes
0.112
1,852

Yes
0.115
1,852

Yes
0.111
1,852

To understand the way in which family ownership exerts an influence on dividend
policy, we provide insights into the distribution of controlling families’ control rights in
Table 2.7. Family ownership concentration or the presence of controlling families may
influence dividend policy in different ways. We analyze whether the agency problems
operate uniformly across the different range of ownership levels by generating a dummy
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variable for Family 25-50% (Family 50% or more) which equals 1 for family firms that
a family member holds between 25-50% (50% or more) of control rights and 0
otherwise. Looking at column 1, we find that Thai family firms pay less dividends
across the different ranges of family ownership concentrations. The estimated
coefficients are -0.351 and -0.639 when families hold 25-50% and 50% or more of
control rights, respectively. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 5%
level (t-value is -2.25) for family control rights of 25-50% at the 1% level (t-value is 3.82) for control rights of 50% or higher, respectively.
These results show that when families own more shares as proxied by the
percentage of control rights, family firms pay lower dividends. These results further
support hypothesis H1. These results imply that controlling families can use their power
via their ownership structure to increase the risk of minority shareholders being
expropriated. Column 3 shows that the coefficient of the ControlR2 is not statistically
significant implying that dividends decrease linearly with the family ownership
structure. Taken together, these results are particularly important in the context of
Thailand, indicating that controlling families are found to pursue their private benefits
and expropriate minority shareholders by paying lower dividends. In the absence of an
internal corporate governance mechanism to curtail such behavior, the extent of
expropriation manifested through lower dividend payment is more pronounced in
companies when controlling families hold higher ownership.
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Table 2. 7 Family control and DPS with alternative measures of family ownership
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS equation using a panel Tobit regression. DPS is the
ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Family 25-50% is a dummy
variable which equals one for family firms in which a member holds between 25% and 50% of control
rights and 0 otherwise. Family 50% or more is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms in
which a member holds more than 50% of control rights and 0 otherwise. ControlR is the control rights
held by the controlling families. Size is the natural logarithm of firm total assets. ROA is the ratio of net
income to total assets. Beta is the firm’s beta value reflecting systematic risk. Cycle is the ratio of retained
earnings to total equity. Growth is the percentage change of total sales. Year dummy and industry dummy
are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2 and 3
use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Family 25-50%
Family 50% or more

DPS
(1)
-0.351**
(-2.25)
-0.639***
(-3.82)

ControlR

(2)

(3)

-1.028***
(-4.01)

-1.377*
(-1.70)
0.562
(0.45)
0.401***
(8.24)
13.205***
(8.16)
-0.223***
(-3.72)
1.548*
(1.87)
-0.887***
(-4.49)
-3.552***
(-6.97)
Yes
Yes
-5,057
2,490

ControlR2
Size
ROA
Beta
Cycle
Growth
Intercept
Industry dummies
Year dummies
Log-likelihood
Observations

0.402***
(8.28)
13.188***
(8.15)
-0.223***
(-3.74)
1.557*
(1.88)
-0.887***
(-4.48)
-3.585***
(-7.04)
Yes
Yes
-5,058
2,490

0.401***
(8.26)
13.179***
(8.15)
-0.223***
(-3.73)
1.550*
(1.87)
-0.887***
(-4.49)
-3.569***
(-7.02)
Yes
Yes
-5,057
2,490

2.5.3 Additional evidence
2.5.3.1 Market-to-book ratio, family control, and dividend payment
In this section, we analyze the impact of family control on dividend payment which
may stem from market-to-book ratio and performance (Chen et al. 2005). Under the
weak institutional environment and high ownership concentration in emerging markets
like Thailand, we focus in particular on our hypothesis that the extraction of private
benefits of family control becomes more costly when firms over-perform. In this regard,
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we conduct further analysis by testing whether the negative relationship between family
control and dividend payment becomes stronger when firms have higher market-tobook ratio. To test this conjecture and validate our main argument, we provide empirical
results by including an interaction term between firm value (such as the natural
logarithm of market-to-book ratio (LnMB)19 and each proxy of family control, namely
Family, ControlR and Family_CEO in the panel Tobit regression.
Table 2.8 reports the results. In column 1, the estimated coefficient of
LnMB*Family is -0.599 and statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is -2.23).
This result implies that market-to-book ratio has a negative effect on the relationship
between family ownership structure and dividend payment. The estimated coefficient of
LnMB*Family also indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in LnMB is
associated with a 31.69 percentage point reduction of dividend payment in family firms.
The estimated coefficient of Family is also -0.312 which is statistically significant at the
5% level (t-value is -2.04). Hence, the net coefficient of Family on dividend payment
with firm value is -0.312-0.599 = -0.911, holding all else constant. The results in
column 2 also confirm this outcome by showing the estimated coefficient of the
interaction between LnMB and ControlR which is -1.327 and significant at the 1% level
(t-value is -2.74). This implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in LnMB creates a
70.20 percentage point decrease in dividend payment for family firms. The estimated
coefficient of ControlR is also -0.662 which is statistically significant at the 5% level (tvalue is -2.34). Thus, the net coefficient of ControlR on dividend payment with firm
value is -0.662-1.327= -1.989 and also reflects that a one-standard-deviation increase in
ControlR induces a 52.14 percentage point fall in dividend payment for family firms.

19

To mitigate the impact of outliers, we use the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio (LnMB)
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According to the results documented in columns 1 and 2, the negative association
between family ownership structure and dividend payment become stronger when firms
have higher market-to-book ratio. These results support our hypothesis H1 and it can be
inferred that a firm’s market-to-book ratio will encourage controlling families to extract
private benefits by reducing dividends.
Column 3 shows that market-to-book ratio also magnifies the negative relationship
between family management and dividend payment. In column 3, we find that the
estimated coefficient LnMB*Family_CEO is -0.938 and statistically significant at the
1% level (t-value is -3.56). The estimated coefficient of LnMB*Family_CEO also
indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in LnMB is associated with a 49.62
percentage point decrease in dividend payment for family firms with family
management systems in place. The estimated coefficient of Family_CEO is also -0.355
which is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is -2.35). Thus, the net
coefficient of Family_CEO on dividend payment with firm value is -0.355-0.938= 1.293. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis H2.
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Table 2. 8 Effect of market-to-book ratio on the association between family control
and DPS
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS equation using a panel Tobit regression estimation.
DPS is the ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Family is a
dummy variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control
rights held by the controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family
firms that have a family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise.
LnMB is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio. Control variables are included as follows: Size,
ROA, Beta, Cycle and Growth. Definitions of all other variables are as shown in Table 2.1. Year dummy
and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively.
Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Family
LnMB
LnMB*Family

DPS
(1)
-0.312**
(-2.04)
0.095
(0.39)
-0.599**
(-2.23)

ControlR

(2)

-0.662**
(-2.34)
0.160
(0.69)
-1.327***
(-2.74)

LnMB
LnMB*ControlR
Family_CEO
LnMB
LnMB*Family_CEO
Intercept
Control variables
Industry dummies
Year dummies
Log-likelihood
Observations

(3)

-3.807***
(-7.40)
Yes
Yes
Yes
-5,055
2,490

-3.769***
(-7.35)
Yes
Yes
Yes
-5,052
2,490

-0.355**
(-2.35)
0.327
(1.37)
-0.938***
(-3.56)
-3.805***
(-7.46)
Yes
Yes
Yes
-5,047
2,490

2.5.3.2 Free cash flow, family control, and dividend payment
It has been argued that in emerging market economies, controlling families are
more likely to extract cash for their private benefits rather than pay dividends to
shareholders (Attig et al. 2016; Mulyani et al. 2016). Accordingly, one could test
whether the documented negative relationship between family control and dividend
payment is stronger when firms have a higher level of free cash flows. We run the
regression in Table 2.8 by replacing firm performance with firms’ free cash flow (FCF),
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and report the results in Table 2.9. In column 1, the estimated coefficients of Family and
FCF*Family are -0.319 and -4.024. These coefficients are statistically significant at the
5% and 1% levels each (t-values are -2.19 and -2.90, respectively). This finding implies
that free cash flow has a negative effect on the relationship between family ownership
structure and dividend payment. The coefficient of Family on dividend payment with
free cash flow is -0.319-4.024 = -4.343, holding all else constant. The estimated
coefficient of FCF*Family also indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in FCF
is associated with a 40.78 percentage points, or 44.37%, reduction of dividend payment
in family firms. The results in column 2 also confirm this amplifying effect by showing
the estimated coefficient of the interaction between FCF and ControlR which is -9.538
and significant at 1% level (t-value is -3.73). This implies that a one-standard-deviation
increase in FCF creates a 96.65 percentage point, or 105.17%, decrease in dividend
payment for family firms. The estimated coefficient of ControlR is -0.695 and it is
statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value -2.59). Thus, the coefficient of ControlR
for family firms is -0.695-9.538 = -10.233, which implies that a one-standard-deviation
increase in ControlR creates a 268.25 percentage point, or 291.89%, decrease in
dividend payment for family firms.
According to the results in columns 1 and 2, the negative association between
family ownership structure and dividend payment become stronger when firms have
more free cash flow. The results also support our hypothesis H1 and are consistent with
the view that free cash flow is able to increase controlling shareholders’ power, and
exacerbate the risk of minority expropriation by lowering dividends (Attig et al. 2016).
Column 4 shows that free cash flow amplifies the negative relationship between family
management and dividend payment. In column 3, we find that the estimated coefficients
of Family_CEO and FCF*Family_CEO are -0.413 and -4.969, and both are statistically
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significant at the 1% level (t-values are -2.87 and -3.62, respectively). The estimated
coefficient of FCF*Family_CEO also indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase
in FCF is associated with a 50.35 percentage point, or 54.79%, decrease in dividend
payment for family firms with family management systems. This finding is consistent
with our hypothesis H2. The net coefficient of Family_CEO for family firms is -0.4134.969 = -5.382. Our results suggest that when firms’ cash balances are large, the risk of
expropriation by family members who work as CEOs or the board of directors, are more
likely to increase.
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Table 2. 9 Effect of free cash flows on the association between family control and
DPS
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS equation using a panel Tobit regression. DPS is the
ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Family is a dummy variable
which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the
controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a
family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. FCF is the ratio of
free cash flow to total assets. Control variables are included as follows: Size, ROA, Beta, Cycle and
Growth. Definitions of all other variables are as shown in Table 2.1. Year dummy and industry dummy
are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2 and 3
use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Family
FCF
FCF*Family

DPS
(1)
-0.319**
(-2.19)
5.863***
(5.05)
-4.024***
(-2.90)

ControlR

(2)

-0.695***
(-2.59)
6.175***
(5.67)
-9.538***
(-3.73)

FCF
FCF*ControlR
Family_CEO
FCF
FCF*Family_CEO
Intercept
Control variables
Industry dummies
Year dummies
Log-likelihood
Observations

(3)

-3.932***
(-7.66)
Yes
Yes
Yes
-5,045
2,490

-3.871***
(-7.57)
Yes
Yes
Yes
-5,041
2,490

-0.413***
(-2.87)
6.342***
(5.60)
-4.969***
(-3.62)
-3.839***
(-7.54)
Yes
Yes
Yes
-5,039
2,490

2.5.3.3 Wedge, family control, and dividend payment
So far we have presented the results concerning the effects of family control on
dividend payment in Thailand in the context of a weak institutional environment with
no consideration for disproportional ownership structures via business groups leading to
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling families (wedge)
external financing. In emerging markets, family business groups and the pyramidal
ownership structure are prevalent under a high level of ownership concentration
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(Claessens et al. 2000; Wiwattanakantang 2001). It is evident that controlling families
implement disproportional ownership structures to maintain their control and power
such as the pyramidal structure and cross-holding (Claessens et al. 2002). The poor
legal environment and the use of families’ power via the control-ownership wedge can
exacerbate the agency conflict between controlling families and minority shareholders
(Connelly et al. 2012).Thus, we conjecture that family control may exert a stronger
influence on paying lower dividends when firms have higher wedge. In this regard, we
conduct further analysis by testing whether the negative relationship between family
control and dividend payment becomes stronger in the presence of wedge. We run the
regression in Table 2.9, by replacing firms’ free cash flow with their level of wedge, and
report the results in Table 2.10. In column 1, the estimated coefficient of Family is
negative (-0. 388) and it is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value is -2.57). The
estimated coefficient of Wedge*Family is negative (-2.897) and is statistically
significant at the 10% level (t-value is -1.85), implying that a one-standard-deviation
increase in Wedge brings about a 29.63 percentage point, or 32.24%, decrease in
dividend payment for family firms. These results support the view that wedge can
effectively rise the negative relationship between family ownership structure and
dividend payment (Mulyani et al. 2016). The net effect for a family firm on dividend
payment with external debt financing is -0.388-2.897 = -3.285, holding all else constant.
The estimated coefficient of Wedge*ControlR in column 2 is also negative (-6.155)
and is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is -2.29). This finding indicates
that a one-standard-deviation increase in Wedge is associated with a 62.95 percentage
point, or 68.50% decrease in dividend payment for family firms. Additionally, as the
estimated coefficient of ControlR is negative (-0.845), statistically significant at the 1%
level (t-value is -3.06), the net effect for a family firm on dividend payment with wedge
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is negative (-0.845-6.155 = -7.00). It means that a one-standard-deviation increase in
ControlR creates a 70.59 percentage point, or 77.90%, increase in dividend payment for
family firms with wedge. Again, the results in columns 1 and 2 support our hypothesis
H1 and it can be inferred that the level of wedge can exacerbate the negative association
between family ownership structure and dividend payment. In column 3, we find the
coefficient of the interactive variables between wedge and family family management is
negative thus suggesting that wedge rises the negative relationship between family
management and dividend payment. The estimated coefficients of Family_CEO and
Wedge*Family_CEO are -0.465 and -3.941, both statistically significant at the 1% level
(t-values are -3.11 and -2.70, respectively). The coefficient of the interaction term
indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in Wedge is associated with a 40.30
percentage point, or 43.86%, decrease in dividend payment for family firms. The net
coefficient of Family_CEO for family firms is -0.465-3.941 = -4.406 and this result is
consistent with our hypothesis H2.
In summary, the findings listed in Table 2.10 reflect the importance of
disproportional ownership structures or wedge as a mechanism to exacerbate minority
expropriation in family firms. Considering the wedge, the negative relationship between
family control and dividend payment becomes stronger and significantly negative when
firms have more wedge. This reflects that a family firm’s disproportional ownership
structure seems to matter in terms of how family control influences the payment of
dividends. Lower wedge can help to mitigate the agency problems of expropriating
minority shareholders by family firms and the payment of higher dividends. As our
results suggest, lower wedge in family firms tends to increase dividend payment and
maximize firm value.
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Table 2. 10 Effect of wedge on the association between family control and DPS
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS equation using a panel Tobit regression estimation.
DPS is the ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Family is a
dummy variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control
rights held by the controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family
firms that have a family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise.
Wedge is the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Control
variables are included as follows: Size, ROA, Beta, Cycle and Growth. Definitions of all other variables
are as shown in Table 2.1. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry
fixed effects in this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Family
Wedge
Wedge *Family

DPS
(1)
-0.388***
(-2.57)
2.522*
(1.87)
-2.897*
(-1.85)

ControlR

(2)

-0.845***
(-3.06)
2.757**
(2.23)
-6.155**
(-2.29)

Wedge
Wedge *ControlR
Family_CEO
Wedge
Wedge *Family_CEO
Intercept
Control variables
Industry dummies
Year dummies
Log-likelihood
Observations

(3)

-3.672***
(-7.19)
Yes
Yes
Yes
574.01
2,490

-3.617***
(-7.11)
Yes
Yes
Yes
580.05
2,490

-0.465***
(-3.11)
3.185***
(2.60)
-3.941***
(-2.70)
-3.649***
(-7.19)
Yes
Yes
Yes
585.31
2,490

2.5.3.4 Political uncertainty, family control, and dividend payment
To better understand the behavior of family firms, we consider not only family
firms’ behavior during normal periods, but also in the presence of external shocks that
emerge from political uncertainty. Thailand’s political system for many decades has
suffered from instability due to the vulnerability of its democratic system to military
coup d’états which leads to political turnover. The political uncertainty may change the
ways that family firms make decision on dividends from normal periods (Lins et al.
2013). Political uncertainty is proxied by the change in leadership in the provinces of
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Thailand where the headquarters of the businesses are located. In Thailand, changes in
provincial political leaders can be triggered by instability in the central government,
stemming from elected governments and coup d’états. Both new appointments from a
newly elected central government and a change in provincial leadership due to a
military coup d’etat20 can significantly increase political uncertainty in the provinces.
Table 2.11 reports the changes in provincial political leadership across the seven-year
period in our sample. Following Bo (1996), political turnover is defined as a dummy
variable: 1 is when the local politician in a province is newly appointed and 0 otherwise.
During the sample period 2009 to 2015, there are changes in leadership or political
turnovers in 27 provinces where the headquarters of Thai firms are located.

20

For example, the generals can refer to Article 44 to implement their absolute power and swiftly enforce
their legislative, administrative and jurisdictional powers. Therefore, provincial leaders can be appointed,
suspended or reshuffled swiftly by the generals if they want to intervene in events in the provinces.
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Table 2. 11 Government political turnover in Thailand by province and year over
the sample period 2009-2015
This table reports government political turnover in Thailand by province and year for the sample period
2009-2015.
Number

Province

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

1

Ayutthya

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

2

Bangkok

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

3

Buriram

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

4

Chacherngsao

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

5

Chainart

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

6

Chiang Mai

1

0

1

0

1

1

0

7

Chiang Rai

1

0

1

1

1

0

0

8

Chonburi

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

9

Chumphon

1

1

0

0

1

0

1

10

Khon Kaen

1

0

1

0

1

1

0

11

Krabi

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

12

Lampang

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

13

Lamphun

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

14

Nakhon

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

Ratchasima
15

Naknorn Sawan

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

16

Nakorn Phathum

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

17

Nonthaburi

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

18

Pathum Thani

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

19

Prachinburi

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

20

Rayong

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

21

Roi Et

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

22

Samut Prakarn

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

23

Samut Sakhon

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

24

Saraburi

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

25

Songkhla

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

26

Surat Thani

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

27

Udon Thani

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

In the first year when a new politician is appointed, controlling families have a
greater tendency to use their cash to establish political connections with newly
appointed political leaders with a view of benefitting the firm through advantageous
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financing strategies (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang 2009). Under weak legal
environment and high corruption level, politicians are more likely to extract resources
from firms for their own personal benefits (Fry & Shleifer 1997). Taken together, this
could result in less cash available for dividend payment. Therefore, during political
uncertainty, the behavior of family firms is prone to change (Lins et al. 2013). It is
possible that the negative relationship between family control and dividend payment
will be stronger during political uncertainty period. Here, we conduct further analysis
by considering political uncertainty in this study to test whether the negative
relationship between family control and dividend payment becomes stronger. In the
regression, we replace firms’ level of wedge with political turnover (i.e. Turnover), the
definition of which is provided in Table 2.1. Table 2.12 reports the effect of political
uncertainty in provincial level on the association between family control and dividend
payment. In column 1, the estimated coefficient of Turnover*Family is -0.623 and it is
statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is -2.25). This result means that political
turnover has a negative effect on the relationship between family ownership structure
and dividend payment. However, it is interesting to note that the estimated coefficient of
Turnover is 0.866 and significantly positive at the 1% level (t-value is 3.41), reflecting
that when political changes do occur at the provincial level, firms are more likely to pay
higher dividends. Thus, it is possible that family and non-family firms have a larger
cash balance to pay dividends, stemming from political uncertainty negatively affecting
the economy and firms’ investment.
The results in column 2 also confirm this effect; the estimated coefficient of the
interaction between Turnover and ControlR is -1.108 and it is significant at the 5% level
(t-value is -2.16). Moreover, the estimated coefficient of ControlR which is -0.612 is
statistically significant at the 10% level (t-value is -1.90). Taken together, the
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coefficient of ControlR for family firms is -0.612-1.108 = -1.72, which suggests that a
one-standard-deviation increase in ControlR creates a 45.09 percentage point, or
49.06%, decrease in dividend payment for family firms. Also, the estimated coefficient
of Turnover is 0.830 and statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value is 3.38). Taken
together, these results imply that although political turnover can increase firms’
dividend payment, family firms extract cash and pay lower dividends, possibly to seek
the rents of establishing political connections.
According to the results in columns 1 and 2, the negative association between
family ownership structure and dividend payment become stronger when political
turnover is present. The results also support hypothesis H1 and are consistent with the
‘grabbing hand’ hypothesis of politicians, i.e. politicians who extract resources from
firms for their own personal gain (Frye & Shleifer 1997). Column 3 shows that political
turnover also amplifies the negative relationship between family management and
dividend payment. We find that the estimated coefficients of Family_CEO and
Turnover*Family_CEO are -0.376 and -0.611, respectively. Both coefficients are
statistically significant at the 5% level (t-values are -2.21 and -2.22, respectively). The
net coefficient of Family_CEO for family firms is -0.376-0.611 = -0.987. This finding is
consistent with hypothesis H2 and support the view of Bunkanwanicha and
Wiwattanakantang (2009) that Thai family control is more likely to establish new
political connection than non-family firms. Considering the provincial level, these
findings imply that under the weak legal environment and high corruption levels in
Thailand, political uncertainty is associated with political extraction. Controlling
families in their attempt to establish political connections with newly appointed political
leaders in the form of bribes and gifts, will expropriate more from minority shareholders
by paying lower dividends. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient of Turnover is 0.863
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and this is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-value is 3.41). It leads to the view
that provincial level political changes can lead to economic downturn and risks to
investment. As a result, firms hold more cash and pay more dividends to their
shareholders.
Table 2. 12 Effect of political uncertainty at the provincial level on the association
between family control and DPS
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS equation using a panel Tobit regression. DPS is the
ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Family is a dummy variable
which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the
controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a
family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Turnover is a dummy
variable which equals one when the local politician is newly appointed and 0 otherwise. If politicians took
office from January 1 to June 30, then the current year represents the year they took office; if politicians
took office from July 1 to December 31, then the following year represents the year they took office.
Control variables are included as follows: Size, ROA, Beta, Cycle and Growth. Definitions of all other
variables are as shown in Table 2.1. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year
and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample. Robust tstatistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.

Family
Turnover
Turnover*Family

DPS
(1)
-0.245
(-1.42)
0.866***
(3.41)
-0.623**
(-2.25)

ControlR

(2)

-0.612*
(-1.90)
0.830***
(3.38)
-1.108**
(-2.16)

Turnover
Turnover *ControlR
Family_CEO
Turnover
Turnover
*Family_CEO
Intercept
Control variables
Industry dummies
Year dummies
Log-likelihood
Observations

(3)

-4.306***
(-7.81)
Yes
Yes
Yes
-5,053
2,490

-4.227***
(-7.70)
Yes
Yes
Yes
-5,051
2,490

-0.376**
(-2.21)
0.863***
(3.41)
-0.611**
(-2.22)
-4.228***
(-7.72)
Yes
Yes
Yes
-5,050
2,490
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2.5.4 Robustness
2.5.4.1 Addressing potential endogeneity issues
In this section, we apply alternative estimation methods to ascertain that our
findings are robust when considering the endogeneity issue. Family control and
dividend policy are both internal governance mechanisms and they could be related to
each other by substitution or complement (Agrawal & Knoeber 1996). In particular, not
only a specific ownership structure may affect different dividend payment, but also the
level of dividend payment may influence the decision of an owner to hold shares of
firms ( Setia-Atmaja et al. 2009; Pindado et al. 2012; Isakov & Weisskopf 2015). These
make possible a potential reverse causality between family control and dividend policy.
Furthermore, there could be some unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity at the firm
level that affects both family control and dividend policy simultaneously. In order to
address these possible endogeneity issues, first, we apply the random-effects models,
following the results derived from conducting a Hausman test. We assume that residual
is random, and we consider the variations in residual terms between different firms.
Then, we apply the two-stage least squares (2SLS) method for estimation in this section.
We use the values of the family control variables at the beginning of our sample as
instruments21, which is consistent with the method employed by Laeven and Levine
(2009) and Lin et al. (2011). 22 The results estimated using these four methods are
reported in Table 2.13. Columns 1 to 3 and columns 4 to 6 report coefficients of family
control variables which are used in the previous analysis for the full samples and

21

In the first stage, the F-statistics (unreported but available on request) show that the coefficients of the
instrument variables are significant at the 1% level and further suggest the validity of our instrument
variables. Then, the first-stage regression values are used as key independent variables in the second stage.
22 There are many instrument variables that can be used for instrument variables, but in this study, the
beginning-of-period values are applied as instrument variables to identify the impact of ownership on
dividend payment (Coles et al. 2012).
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subsamples, respectively. Three panels present the results for the different dependent
variables which are represented by DPS, Dividend and Payout.
The overall results using 2SLS and random-effects methods remain qualitatively
similar to those using the Tobit model, indicating that family control is associated with
lower dividend payment which is consistent with our main hypothesis. The empirical
evidence shows that in Thailand’s weak legal/regulatory enforcement environment and
a high level of ownership concentration, family firms are associated with lower
dividend payment via different forms of family control, namely family ownership
structure and family management.
However, the results using firm fixed-effects models are statistically insignificant in
most cases. The insignificance is expected because the coefficients of fixed-effects
models are estimated by exploiting the within-firm variations of family control. It can
be seen in Table 2.2 that the levels of family control through family ownership structure
and family management remain nearly constant in most family firms in Thailand. In
addition, during the sample period, the number of firms which change their ownership
structure from family to non-family firms and vice versa is very small relative to the
total sample size at about (124/2,490) or 4.98% of firms. Among those firms that alter
their ownership type, family members remain influential on management matters,
therefore implying that the causal effect running from dividend policy to family control
is an unlikely channel. It is also difficult to argue that the level of dividend payment
determines family control, thus, reflecting that endogeneity problems, such as reverse
causality between family control and dividend payment, poses no issue for our study.
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Table 2. 13 Effect of alternative estimation methods on the association between
family control and dividend payment
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS, Dividend and Payout equations using fixed-effects
models, random-effects models and two-stage least squares (2SLS) models. DPS is the ratio of total cash
dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Dividend is the ratio of common dividends to
the market value of equity. Payout is the ratio of the sum of cash dividends and repurchases to the market
value of equity. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms.
ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which
equals one for family firms that have a family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors
and 0 otherwise. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed
effects in this model, respectively. Definitions of all other variables are as shown in Table 2.1. Columns 1,
2 and 3 use the full sample, and columns 4, 5 and 6 use the subsample where dividend payment has nonzero values. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels, respectively.
Family
ControlR
Full sample
(1)
(2)

Family_CEO
(3)

Family
ControlR
Subsample
(4)
(5)

Family_CEO
(6)

Panel A: DPS
1. Fixed-effects
2. Random-effects
3. 2SLS

-0.008
(-0.11)
-0.215**
(-1.98)
-0.805***
(-5.76)

-0.127
(-0.64)
-0.647***
(-2.70)
-1.641***
(-6.65)

-0.007
(-0.12)
-0.257**
(-2.30)
-0.979***
(-7.10)

0.106
(0.97)
-0.167
(-1.22)
-0.811***
(-4.40)

0.107
(0.31)
-0.630**
(-2.06)
-1.709***
(-5.31)

0.029
(0.31)
-0.283**
(-2.00)
-1.047***
(-5.80)

-0.000
(-0.06)
-0.003*
(-1.67)
-0.005**
(-2.25)

0.002
(0.25)
-0.008**
(-2.12)
-0.010***
(-2.70)

0.000
(0.04)
-0.003
(-1.45)
-0.004**
(-2.01)

-0.003
(-0.74)
-0.007**
(-2.14)
-0.007***
(-2.73)

0.001
(0.05)
-0.014**
(-2.30)
-0.015***
(-3.48)

-0.004
(-1.11)
-0.007**
(-2.20)
-0.006**
(-2.50)

-0.000
(-0.01)
-0.003*
(-1.64)
-0.005**
(-2.21)

0.002
(0.28)
-0.008**
(-2.11)
-0.010***
(-2.66)

0.000
(0.10)
-0.003
(-1.43)
-0.004**
(-1.99)

-0.003
(-0.74)
-0.006*
(-1.96)
-0.006**
(-2.43)

0.001
(0.10)
-0.013**
(-2.15)
-0.014***
(-3.23)

-0.004
(-1.11)
-0.006**
(-2.02)
-0.005**
(-2.20)

Panel B: Dividend
4. Fixed-effects
5. Random-effects
6. 2SLS
Panel C: Payout
7. Fixed-effects
8. Random-effects
9. 2SLS
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2.5.4.2 Matching sample
We are also concerned that family control might be correlated with other firm
characteristics. In this regard, we apply a matched sample approach by using propensity
score matching (PSM) method as a robustness check. In Panel A of Table 2.14, we
control for industry and year that can affect the relationship between family control and
dividend payment, and we estimate propensity scores in logit models to match each
treated firm (a family firm) to a control firm (a non-family firm) with the same control
variables used in Table 2.5, and control firms are selected by one-to-one matching
strategy. Hence, in Panel A of Table 2.14, we have two groups of firms with exact
matching of fundamentals, but the treated firms are firms with family ownership while
the control firms are firms with non-family ownership. In Panel B of Table 2.14,
Columns 1 to 3 report coefficients of family control variables which are used in the
previous analysis but use a match sample. The results remain qualitatively similar to
those using a full sample in Table 2.5, indicating that there is no difference between
using a full sample or a matched sample, the family control including family ownership
structure and family management. They continue to significantly reduce firms’ dividend
payment when compared to a control firm, and this is consistent with our main
hypothesis and the expropriation view.
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Table 2. 14 Using the propensity score matching approach (PSM) to examine the
relationship between family control and DPS
This table reports the estimation results of the DPS equation using a panel Tobit regression by using the
propensity score matching approach. In Panel A, the control sample is for firms in the same industry and
year, and the propensity scores are estimated by using logit regressions of treatment status on Size, ROA,
Beta, Cycle and Growth, and control firms are selected by one-to-one matching strategy. In Panel B,
Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the matching sample. Definitions of all variables are as shown in Table 2.1. DPS
is the ratio of total cash dividends to total number of common shares outstanding. Family is a dummy
variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held
by the controlling families. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have
a family member as the chairman, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural
logarithm of firm total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Beta is the firm’s beta value
reflecting systematic risk. Cycle is the ratio of retained earnings to total equity. Growth is the percentage
change of total sales. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry
fixed effects in this model, respectively. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Treatment
sample
Mean
Panel A: Matching sample difference tests
DPS
0.532
Size
ROA (%)
Beta
Cycle (%)
Growth (%)
Observations

8.662
4.134
0.857
7.357
7.337
988

Panel B: Matching sample analysis
DPS
(1)
Family
-0.390***
(-2.59)
ControlR

Control sample
Mean
1.283

-0.751***(-6.00)

8.723
4.471
0.820
7.368
7.650
988

-0.061 (-0.88)
-0.337% (-0.81)
0.037 (1.54)
-0.011% (-0.01)
-0.313% (-0.19)

(2)

Control variables
Industry dummies
Year dummies
Log-likelihood
Observations

-4.286***
(-7.93)
Yes
Yes
Yes
-3,877
1,976

(3)

-0.830***
(-2.91)

Family_CEO
Intercept

Difference (t-value)

-4.252***
(-7.87)
Yes
Yes
Yes
-3,876
1,976

-0.543***
(-3.62)
-4.224***
(-7.86)
Yes
Yes
Yes
-3,874
1,976

2.5.4.3 Alternative proxies and alternative sample
We further consider alternative definitions of controlling families for robustness
check. Consistent with La Porta et al. (1999), and Faccio and Lang (2002), we reestimate regression (1) by changing the threshold from 25% of control rights to 20% of
control rights. In addition, we use alternative control variables such as different
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definitions of firm size and growth. Instead of using the natural logarithm of firm total
assets to measure firm size, following Mulyani et al. (2016), we apply the natural
logarithm of firm total sales (Sale). Referring to the growth of a firm, we replace
percentage change of total sales by percentage change of total assets (Asset), which is
consistent with Huang et al. (2012). The findings are mostly consistent with those
documented in Table 2.5.
Finally, following Isakov and Weisskopf (2015), we use a balanced panel sample
by excluding companies that have missing data in some years of the sample period.
These missing data can occur as a result of companies being unable to pay dividends
due to an accumulated loss or having a retain earning that is less than 10 percent of the
registered capital, which is governed by the Public Limited Companies Act B.E. 2535
(A.D. 1992) and the Securities and Exchange Act B.E. 2535. In some cases, the missing
data are due to bankruptcies or takeovers. Failing to remove these companies from the
dataset would imply that the behavior of these companies which fail to pay dividends in
some years might bias our results. We estimate the Tobit regression for a balanced panel
sample comprising 261 listed firms and 1,827 firm-year observations. The results are
not presented here for brevity but they are available from the authors upon request, and
they show that the exclusion of such firms does not affect our findings.
2.6 Conclusion
We examine the association between the three key dimensions of family control
and dividend policy, and provide insights into corporate decision-making of family
firms. Using panel data of non-financial companies listed on the Stock Exchange of
Thailand (SET) between 2009 and 2015, we find that family control is associated with
lower dividend payment compared to non-family firms. These results become more
pronounced when family firms have a larger level of ownership and are influenced on
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family management decisions. The results suggest that controlling families have
incentives to expropriate minority shareholders by using excess cash for their private
benefits, which point to potentially more severe agency problems in family firms than
non-family firms. Our results are robust when we take into consideration stock
repurchase in addition to cash dividends. Further, our results are robust to alternative
estimation methods, alternative sampling methods and alternative proxies of family
control, dividends and different control variables. We also indicated that the extraction
of private benefits of family control becomes more costly when firms have higher
market-to-book ratio. Finally, we find that the effect of family control on dividend
payment weakens when firms have smaller wedge, when firms have less free cash flows
or political uncertainty is absent. Overall, there is evidence to suggest that family firms
are prone to engage in expropriation of minority shareholders through curtailing of
dividend payment, particularly for a country like Thailand which has weak protection
systems in place for investors and high disproportional ownership structures such as the
pyramidal structure and cross-holding via business groups.
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Chapter 3: Family control and cost of debt: Evidence from Thailand

3.1 Introduction
To the extent that financial policy is crucial for firm survivorship and growth in
both the short- and long-term, it is meaningful to understand controlling shareholders’
financial decisions particularly for family firms, who assert dominance in most
countries especially in emerging markets (Claessens et al. 2000; Fan & Wong 2002;
Williams et al. 2018; Hearn & Filatotchev 2019). Many studies have investigated the
performance of firms controlled by families relative to other types of controlling
shareholders by focusing on the agency conflicts between controlling families and other
investors (Anderson & Reeb 2003; King & Santor 2008; Lins et al. 2013; De Massis et
al. 2018; Kotlar et al. 2018; Hearn & Filatotchev 2019). While extant literature has
examined the financial implications of family control from the perspective of equity
holders (Villalonga & Amit 2006; Isakov & Weisskopf 2015; Dawson et al. 2018), the
literature on the consequences of controlling families on creditors is sparse, which
motivates this study. These issues are pertinent in emerging markets where the
institutional environment is underdeveloped, and the arm’s length market-driven system
is deficient. In such an environment, lending relationships and long-term affinities
between controlling families and creditors are important for firms’ ability to access
external debt financing. In this paper, we identify an important channel through which
family control wields influence on the cost of debt in emerging markets.
Theoretical predictions on the relationship between family control and firms’ cost
of debt is ambiguous with inconclusive empirical evidence. On the one hand,
controlling families pursue their personal benefits and use their power to expropriate
other investors (Johnson et al. 2000). These expropriation incentives can reduce the
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ability of family firms to pay off debt, and raise the expected costs associated with
financial distress and bankruptcy (Purnanandam 2008). As a result, creditors
incorporate these cost expectations into their lending decisions, and thus require higher
financing costs of debt (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Lin et al. 2011). On the other hand,
controlling families might be concerned about long-term survivorship, maintaining the
family’s reputation, and passing on wealth to descendants (Anderson et al. 2003), since
they have a large and highly undiversified investment in the firms (Shleifer & Vishny
1986). Accordingly, family firms often maintain long-lasting and mutually beneficial
relationships with creditors. In so doing, family firms can access lower cost of debt
financing (Anderson et al. 2003; Behr & Güttler 2007; Ellul et al. 2007; Croci et al.
2011).

Between family firms’ propensity to expropriate incentives which leads to

higher costs of debt and their concerns for reputation and long-term survivorship which
leads family ownership to adopt policies that improve firm value leading to favorable
credit terms, the net impact of family control on cost of debt is difficult to predict
theoretically, and instead becomes a matter of empirical investigation.
In the case of Thailand, its institutional environment presents a number of
interesting dimensions which motivates our investigation of this important issue. First,
family firms play an important role in Thailand’s economy. Our sample shows that by
the end of 2015, there are 212 family firms which accounts for 63.28% of total sample
firms, and 202 of these family firms have family members involved in managing the
business. Thai family firms have been listed on the stock exchanges for more than 30
years and have made significant contribution to the Thai economy. Specifically by the
end of 2015, Thailand’s 50 richest people who own large family business groups
contribute more than 25% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), and
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constitute 33% of market capitalization of listed companies. 23 Taken together, the
significant presence of family control in the Thai economy warrants an investigation of
the financial conditions of these family firms which are linked to their long-term
survivorship and reputation.
Second, Thailand is a typical emerging market featured with less developed
regulatory and legal system, opaque information environment and weak investor
protection (Wiwattanakantang 2001; Anuchitworawong et al. 2003). Consequently,
controlling families may also have strong incentives to pursue their private benefits at
the expense of debtholders (La Porta et al. 2000a; Connelly et al. 2012). As such, the
disparity in the behavior of family firms in emerging markets like Thailand from those
in developed markets deserves further investigation.
In addition, the Thai equity markets are underdeveloped to the extent that Thai
firms rely heavily on external debt financing (Anuchitworawong et al. 2003;
Charumilind et al. 2006; Mahathanaseth & Tauer 2012). By the end of 2015, bank loans
are considered to be the most important source of new capital and it constitutes 54% of
new external financing and bond financing constitutes 15%24, while equity financing
constitutes 30% 25 . To access external debt financing in Thailand, the arm’s length
market-driven system implies that relationship with debtholders plays an important role
in providing external finance for firms, which presents as an informal governance
mechanism (Charumilind et al. 2006; Schwert 2018). However, after 2004, the Thai
government launched reforms in the banking sector to increase the number of banks and
financial institutions controlled by non-family entities (such as the government and

23

See more details at Forbes Thailand, https://www.forbes.com/thailand-billionaires/list/.
Thai Bond Market Association, http://www.thaibma.or.th/Doc/annual/SummaryMarket2016.pdf.
25
Bank of Thailand,
https://www.bot.or.th/Thai/FinancialInstitutions/Publications/FSR_Doc/FSR2015.pdf.
24
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foreigners) to dilute the concentrated family control of financial institutions (Lu &
Mieno 2018). Such a policy change presents an interesting setting to evaluate how these
non-family banks provide financial support to family firms, where the basic objective is
to ensure their sustained growth and contribution to the economy. On these issues, an
examination of the relationship between controlling families and creditors can provide
new insights into the literature on agency conflicts and inform regulators on the design
of sustainable financial policies in emerging markets.
Expanding on earlier analyses, we focus on three dimensions of family control,
namely family ownership structure, control-ownership wedge and family management,
and their respective effects on the cost of debt. The first type of family control is the
family ownership structure which is measured by two proxies. Following
Wiwattanakantang (2001) and Villalonga and Amit (2006), we define the first proxy by
a family firm dummy which equals one if the founder and/or family members by either
blood or marriage is the blockholder. Another proxy is family ownership, which is
defined as the control rights held by the controlling families. The second type of family
control is control-ownership wedge, which is defined as the divergence between control
rights and cash flow rights of controlling families (Claessens et al. 2002; Villalonga &
Amit 2006; Lin et al. 2011). The third type of family control is family management,
which is defined by a dummy that equals one when a family member acts as a chairman,
CEO or director (Villalonga & Amit 2006).
When measuring the cost of debt, we consider the interest rate of all debt
outstanding as an indicator of cost of debt. Due to data paucity on the different types of
debt instruments employed by Thai firms, data on costs relating to each class of debt
contract are not available. Nevertheless, bank loans make up for more than half of new
capital and thus dominate the external debt financing of Thai firms. As such the total
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cost of debt is expected to be dominated by the costs of bank loans. Using a sample of
2,167 firm-year observations in Thailand from 2009 to 2015, we discover that cost of
debt is significantly lower for family firms relative to non-family firms. Further analysis
shows that agency cost of debt is lower in family firms when they have a greater degree
of family ownership, have larger control-ownership wedge, and have family members
on the board and/or management team. These results continue to hold true even when
we control for possible confounding effect of lenders who are related to family business
groups. Using firms’ profitability as a proxy for firm’s reputation and long-term
survivorship (Anderson & Reeb 2003), we find that highly profitable family firms tend
to enjoy lower cost of debt. These results suggest that Thai controlling families are
concerned about long-term survivorship and reputation to the extent that they seek to
establish long-term relationships with creditors as they stand to benefit, and are less
likely to expropriate other investors. Our main findings are robust to using alternative
estimation methods, alternative sampling methods, the use of exogenous events such as
political uncertainty caused by turnover of political leaders and coup d’état, alternative
measurements of family control, and alternative control variable by using different
definitions of firm size. Our findings emphasize that family control is vital and can
determine sustainable financing decisions which is consistent with Anderson et al.
(2003).
Our study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, we
contribute to studies on the financial implications of family ownership structure and its
influence on external financing costs. In general, existing research presents two views
whereby family ownership is deemed to be either beneficial or detrimental. In the US
where ownership is dispersed and investor protection is stronger, family ownership can
enhance firm value by reducing financing costs (Shleifer & Vishny 1986; Anderson et
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al. 2003; Anderson & Reeb 2003; Ellul et al. 2007). In other international context,
especially emerging markets where ownership is concentrated and controlling families
have incentives to expropriate other investors, family ownership could lead to higher
financing costs (Purnanandam 2008; Lin et al. 2011; Pan & Tian 2016). Our study
chooses an emerging market – Thailand – where family ownership is prevalent, the
institutional environment is underdeveloped and investor protection is weak
(Charumilind et al. 2006), and we provide interesting evidence that family control is an
efficient institution that mitigates such conflict of interest resulting in lower financing
cost. This is also in direct contrast to the evidence in other emerging markets arguing
that family firms are likely to engage in expropriation of other investors (Pan & Tian
2016). Taken together, our study shows evidence that, under these conditions, a very
strong interest of Thai controlling families to survive in the long-run may motivate them
to manage the firms by safeguarding their long-term survivorship and reputation to the
extent that these could lead to lower cost of debt. Our study enriches the literature on
agency theory with reference to the agency conflict between controlling families and
creditors. This work has important implications for practitioners and policy-makers in
emerging markets to develop sustainable economic policies.
Second, we provide greater insight into literature about the behavior of family firms
and firm decision-making. Previous studies have considered the effects of general
corporate governance and the impact of family ownership structure on business
performance (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006; Connelly et al. 2012).
However, they do not examine the channels through which firm performance is affected.
In our study, we identify an important channel affecting such performance by
empirically examining the impact of family control on firms’ cost of debt financing.
Unlike Connelly et al. (2012) who study the relationship between ownership structure
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and corporate governance practices on firm performance in Thailand, we focus on the
role of family control directly in more detail. To provide more insights into family
control, we focus on three dimensions: family ownership structure, control-ownership
wedge and family management. Unlike Pan and Tian (2016) who examine the impact of
family control on loan collateral in China where state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are
more likely to access debt financing than private firms, which stems from the
intervention of state-owned banks to the allocation of loans, we study the institutional
setting of Thailand where SOEs are not dominant like China. Furthermore, we
document the empirical evidence of lower cost of debt resulting from family control by
considering the channels in which Thai controlling families take a long-term
survivorship and reputation approach. Specifically, we use firms’ profitability as a
proxy for firms’ reputation and long-term survivorship and we show the negative
association between family control and cost of debt predominates in highly profitable
firms. In this way our study provides a complementary perspective to the literature
about the behavior of family firms and the influence of family control on their financing
decision-making.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly describes
the ownership structure of family firms in Thailand and institutional background.
Section 3.3 reviews the current and relevant literature on which the hypotheses are
established. Section 3.4 describes the data and methodology. Section 3.5 presents the
empirical results and section 3.6 concludes this paper.
3.2 Institutional background
3.2.1 Family control in Thailand
Family control is prevalent in Thailand and important for the country’s economic
development, particularly in capital markets. Based on ownership structure, family
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firms are dominant players in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), and they comprise
about 60.27% of Thai non-financial listed companies by the end of 2015. Family firms
which are typically controlled and managed entirely by founding families (Claessens et
al. 2000) tend to rely on external equity financing for additional capital and growth
opportunities (Connelly et al. 2012). The relationships between people in family firms
can still be tracked by surnames of controlling families, which are unique and protected
by Thai law (Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). These types of firms contribute to the
country’s GDP growth and total market capitalization of listed companies in Thailand,
by more than 25% and 33%, respectively (Forbes Thailand 2015).
Thai firms are characterized by dominant ownership concentration (Claessens et al.
2000). Under the country’s weak law enforcement environment and high ownership
concentration, controlling families maintain their influence and control firms directly by
holding firms’ shares and/or indirectly via disproportional ownership structures. These
can include a pyramidal structure and cross-holding via business groups (Connelly et al.
2012). A point in case is Southern Concrete Pile Public Company Limited (see Figure
3.1). The company is a part of Thai business groups referred to as the Chinteik Brothers
Group, which was founded by the Nganthavi family. Based on ownership information
for 2015, the Nganthavi family owns 11.15% of Southern Concrete Pile Public
Company Limited directly and controls 31.16% of Southern Concrete Pile Public
Company Limited indirectly through the group’s privately held holding companies. The
family also enjoys more votes concerning the management of Southern Concrete Pile
Public Company Limited indirectly through this pyramidal structure. It holds 12.79% of
shares in Thai Wire Products Public Company Limited, which is the publicly traded
company that owns 1.19% of Southern Concrete Pile Public Company Limited. In total
the Nganthavi family controls 43.50% of Southern Concrete Pile Public Company
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Limited. At the same time, there are cross-holdings because Southern Concrete Pile
Public Company Limited also holds 9.99% of Thai Wire Products Public Company
Limited.
Figure 3. 1 Southern Concrete Pile Public Company Limited

Nganthavi family

12.79
%
Thai Wire Products (PLC)

100%
Holding companies of
the Chinteik Brothers Group

1.19%
11.15
%

9.99%
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%

Southern Concrete Pile (PLC)
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It is a common practice in Thailand for businesses to be closely tied to extensive
families and this link is established through marriages, which are considered to be the
most trustworthy form of family connections. Thus, family members, typically, are
involved in firm management by serving on the board of directors or as CEOs in Thai
family firms rather than hiring external professional managers (Wiwattanakantang 2001;
Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). For instance, about 96.40% of family firms listed on the
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) have members working on the board of directors or
management team in 2015. These imply that families can exert power over listed
companies, and it is difficult for the board of directors to be independent.
3.2.2 Financial system in Thailand
In Thailand, the financial sector mainly consists of domestic commercial banks and
financial companies. Originally, most domestic commercial banks and financial
companies were established by family groups. Based on family connections via blood
ties, imprudent lending by financial institutions is evident, mainly in the form of credit
loans granted at low interest rates and without any collateral or guarantees. This has led
to a high ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs) which, amongst other factors, gave rise
the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Charumilind et al. 2006). Since then, the Bank of
Thailand (BOT, the central bank in Thailand) actively strengthened the regulation of
financial institutions via implementing a series of reforms, such as the imposition of
upper limits of shareholding for banks and financial companies (at 5% and 10 % for
individual shareholders respectively), abolition of the interest rate ceiling, the
requirement to have bank reserves and the abrogation of restrictions on foreign
ownership of commercial banks. Furthermore, after 2004, the BOT launched the
financial sector Master Plans to reforms in the finance industry to improve its efficiency
and corporate governance practices. For instance, the ownership of some Thai financial
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institutions was transferred from Thai families to foreigners or the government. Banks
are required to reduce outstanding loans to connected companies otherwise they are
required to have their senior executives surrender their company directorships if they
held more than 1% of the company equity. The members of the board in both financial
and non-financial listed companies are also required to have at least one-third ratio of
independent directors who are unrelated to firms’ major shareholders or who are not
employed by the companies. The reforms also cover granting new banking licenses for
both domestic and foreign commercial banks and broadening the scope of commercial
bank business. Consequently, the number of commercial banks increased from 13 in
2003 to 19 in 2015, and 6 out of 19 banks have foreigners as the largest shareholders by
the end of 2015.
However, Thailand’s financial sector remains concentrated and far from competing
fairly. Based on the financial stability report issued by the BOT, the five largest banks
still account for about 69% of total assets in the banking system in 2015.
3.3 Literature review and hypotheses development
3.3.1 Literature review
The separation of ownership and control, which can lead to conflict of interest
between managers and shareholders, has long been viewed as the key to analyzing
modern corporations (Jensen & Meckling 1976). However, in other economies where
controlling families assert dominance, especially in emerging markets (La Porta et al.
1999; Faccio & Lang 2002; Anderson & Reeb 2003; De Massis et al. 2018; Hearn &
Filatotchev 2019), the primary agency conflict is between large shareholders and other
investors (Villalonga & Amit 2006). Interestingly, due to economic firm goals and noneconomic family goals (such as family harmony and social status), family firms have
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unique characteristics and agency problems compared to non-family firms (Villalonga
& Amit 2006).
Empirical evidence on the relationship between family control and cost of debt
remains inconclusive. On the one hand, family control can increase the expropriation of
other investors by pursuing personal benefits and engaging in tunneling and moral
hazard, for instance transferring a firm’s resources out or committing funds to
unprofitable projects that provide private benefits which bear financial risk (Johnson et
al. 2000). As a result, these can exacerbate the risk of agency conflicts between
controlling families and creditors and raise the cost of debt associated with the expected
costs of financial distress and bankruptcy (Purnanandam 2008). Additionally, bank loan
spread is higher for firms experiencing a wider divergence between control rights and
cash flow rights of ultimate shareholders, which is due to: the entrenchment incentive of
shareholders able to reduce efficiency; and the ability of firms to pay debt, and increase
financial distress and bankruptcy (Lin et al. 2011). Also, compared to non-family firms,
family firms are required to offer more collateral since creditors incorporate the credit
risk of expropriation of family control via control-ownership wedge and family
management (Pan & Tian 2016).
Conversely, family control can mitigate agency conflicts and reduce cost of debt
because controlling families are concerned with the firms’ reputation, long-term
commitment, and ensuring the descendants inherit their wealth (Shleifer & Vishny 1986;
Anderson et al. 2003; Ellul et al. 2007). These can lead to lower monitoring costs for
banks and less asymmetric information (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Furthermore,
lending relationship and long-term affinities between controlling families and creditors
can bring benefits to family firms such as more capital (Schwert 2018), longer
investment horizons (Faccio 2010), more access to long-term debt (Charumilind et al.
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2006), efficient investment (James Jr 1999) and better monitoring of managerial
activities (Fama & Jensen 1983). It is possible that family firms often maintain longlasting and trustworthy relationships with their banks to access debt funding and survive
for many years to come (Behr & Güttler 2007; Croci et al. 2011). As a result, creditors
view the incentive structure of family firms as being less prone to expropriation of
creditors, thereby leading to reduced agency cost of debt (Charumilind et al. 2006).
As can be seen from the tension of the arguments above, to understand the impact
of family firms on financial policy, specifically how family control affects cost of debt
remains an important topic worthy of investigation.
3.3.2 Hypotheses development
Thailand is an emerging market characterized by an underdeveloped institutional
and regulatory environment, poor control of corporate practices, and weak protection of
investors. Yet it is dominated by family firms who make substantial contribution to the
country’s economy (Wiwattanakantang 2001). This is different from other typical
emerging markets such as China where government-owned firms dominate, and family
firms usually face discrimination against accessing external finance (Pan & Tian 2016).
Thus, we contend that family firms in Thailand could access external finance potentially
at a lower cost.
Moreover, Thai family firms have been established for a very long time and
expanded their businesses rapidly. For many decades now, family firms have been and
will continue to be very concerned about their long-term survivorship and long-lasting
relationships with other stakeholders, such as creditors, to maintain continuous access to
external finance (Anuchitworawong et al. 2003; Charumilind et al. 2006). Such a
lending relationship plays a vital role as an informal mechanism of governance via a
network of social relationships (Faccio 2010; Schwert 2018), so that family firms have
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lower default risks and lower costs associated with financial distress or bankruptcy
(Wiwattanakantang 2001; Connelly et al. 2012; Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). This can
mitigate credit concerns raised by creditors when lending to family firms, which is
likely to result in lower cost of debt. As such, we formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Cost of debt is lower in family firms than in non-family firms.
In Thailand, controlling families can reinforce their control via holding more
control rights and are likely to implement control-ownership wedge via pyramidal and
cross-holding structures in their firms (Wiwattanakantang 2001). Connelly et al. (2012)
opine that in a weak legal environment, controlling families can exert their influence on
firms through a control-ownership wedge in order to reduce any dilution of family
control. Family members’ authority is preserved through blood ties and marriages,
which are considered to be a highly trusted form of family connection (Bunkanwanicha
et al. 2013). In addition, controlling family involvement in management can further
exert a strong influence on the board of directors (Claessens et al. 2002). Overall, we
argue that families are more concerned about their survivorship and thus have even
lower credit risks when controlling families have a larger control-ownership wedge or
have family members on the boards. Thus, we form the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2: Cost of debt is lower in family firms with a larger control-ownership
wedge.
Hypothesis 3: Cost of debt is lower in family firms when family members are the
chairperson, CEO or directors.
3.4 Sample and methodology
3.4.1 Data and sample selection
Our sample comprises non-financial firms listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand
(SET) from 2009 to 2015. The firm financial data are collected from Bloomberg. Firm
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ownership data are hand-collected by searching the information from SET Market
Analysis and Reporting Tool (SETSMART) which is produced by the SET. This
database provides information on the stakes of shareholders with at least 0.5%. For each
firm in each year, we manually collect the ownership of controlling shareholders
including both control rights and cash flow rights. We also collect information on the
identity of the controlling shareholders to identify family firms, and for family firms, we
manually collect information of whether their members work in the management team.
To verify that the information on family control is reliable and accurate, we compare the
information we collected with firms’ homepages on their websites, the commercial
register and newspapers. We are able to identify all recorded shareholders for each year
throughout the sample period. Then we merge the ownership data with each company’s
financial data. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% to
reduce the impact of outliers. We exclude firms with irregular financial reporting habits
and missing data for the variables employed in our baseline empirical specification. Our
final sample comprises 2,167 firm-year observations for 335 listed firms.
3.4.2 Measurement of variables
Cost of debt
Previous studies measure the cost of debt using proxies like the yield spread, the
difference between the weighted-average debt yield and U.S. treasury yield (Anderson
et al. 2003) or the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) (Lin et al. 2011) as a
benchmark. However, in emerging markets, the debt market is not as developed.
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Following Zou and Adams (2008), we measure the cost of debt as the ratio of interest
expense to total debt.26

Family ownership structure
Following the work of Villalonga and Amit (2006), we define a firm as a family
firm if a founder and/or family member by either blood or marriage is the blockholder.
Despite an extensive literature on family firms, there is no consistent cut-off point of
family ownership structure due to different degrees of ownership concentration in
developed and developing countries (Wiwattanakantang 2001; Fan & Wong 2002). In
accordance with the Thai legal system and implemented in the SET, a shareholder with
25% of the voting rights has substantial control over the firm, thus we use 25% cut-off
point of control rights, which is consistent with Wiwattanakantang (2001) who
examines family ownership in Thailand. In this study, we use two different measures of
family ownership structure. The first is a dummy variable, Family, capturing the
presence of controlling families and takes the value of one if a family owns more than
25% of the control rights, and zero otherwise. The second is a continuous variable,
ControlR, measuring the control rights held by the controlling families, following
Anderson et al. (2009).

Control-ownership wedge
To measure the presence of controlling and powerful families, we use Wedge to
measure disproportional ownership structure or control-ownership wedge. This variable
is calculated as the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling

26

Thai company accounting disclosures do not give a breakdown of interest charges relating to each class
of debt contract (e.g. bank loans, bonds, notes payable, and borrowing from non-bank institutions).
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shareholders (Claessens et al. 2002; Villalonga & Amit 2006). Accordingly, control
rights are defined as the weakest link of the ownership chain while cash flow rights are
defined as the products of all ownership levels along the ownership chain. For example,
if firm A owns 35% of firm B directly, and firm B owns 50% of firm C directly, then
the control rights held by firm A on firm C is 35% (the weakest ownership level) and
the cash flow rights is 10.5% (= 35% * 50%, the products of all the ownership levels).

Family management
In this study, following Villalonga and Amit (2006), we create a dummy variable
Family_CEO which proxies for family management. It is equal to one if the firm has a
family member who acts as a chairperson, CEO or director, and zero otherwise.

Control variables
Firm characteristics, beside family control, can wield a potential impact on the cost
of debt (Anderson et al. 2003; Pittman & Fortin 2004; Lin et al. 2011). Following the
literature, we include a set of firm characteristics as control variables in our regression.
We include Size which is calculated as the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets,
following Petersen and Rajan (1994). Larger firms tend to be more established, are
stronger financially and with lower default risk, and, thus enjoy lower interest rates than
smaller businesses (Petersen & Rajan 1994). For the robustness check, we replace Size
with Size_growth which is another proxy to measure firm size. Size_growth is defined as
the natural logarithm of firms’ debt and equity, following Anderson et al. (2003).
We include tangible assets intensity (Tangible), measured as tangible assets divided
by total assets. Firms with more tangible assets may provide more collateral which
decreases the cost of debt (Zou & Adams 2008; Kim et al. 2011)
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Leverage (Lev), calculated as total debt/total assets, is included in the model to
control for the risk of bankruptcy (Chava et al. 2008). Firms that have lower debt
intensity present lower risk to debt providers, and, thus, are more likely to have lower
cost of debt (Chava et al. 2008; Graham et al. 2008).
Current ratio (Current), measured by current assets over current liabilities, is
controlled as a proxy of liquidity because firms with more liquidity tend to enjoy lower
cost of debt (Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca 2011).
We also control for profitability (EBITDA) which is calculated as earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets, following Graham et al.
(2008). Debt providers are more likely to charge a lower interest rate to firms with
higher profits (Graham et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2011).
In addition, firms with better growth opportunities can have lower borrowing cost
(Graham et al. 2008; Kim et al. 2011). Such firms may be vulnerable to financial
distress or be associated with information asymmetry (Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca
2011). For this reason, we include two variables to measure the growth opportunities of
firms. MB is measured as the market value of equity plus book value of debt, divided by
the book value of total assets, following Graham et al. (2008). Another variable to
measure growth opportunities is Growth which is defined as percentage change of total
sales, following Kim et al. (2011). The year dummy and industry dummy are also
included.27 The definitions for these variables, as well as all other variables used in this
study, are presented in Table 3.1.

27

The industry dummy is based on the industry classification of the Stock Exchange of Thailand.
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Table 3. 1 Variable Definitions
Variable name
Variable definition
Panel A: cost of debt and ownership structure
Cost of debt
Interest expense/ total debt.
Family
Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms and 0 for non-family
firms
ControlR
The control rights held by the controlling families
Wedge
Divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of
controlling shareholders
Family_CEO
Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms that have a family
member as the chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors
and 0 for family firms that do not have a family member as the
chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors
Family 25-50%
Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms that have a member
of the family who holds between 25% and 50% of control rights
and 0 for family firms that do not have a member of the family
who holds between 25% and 50%
Family 50% or more
Dummy variable equals 1 for family firms that have a member
of the family who holds more than 50% of control rights and 0
for family firms that do not have a member of the family who
holds more than 50%
Panel B: firm characteristics
Firm size (Size)
Tangible assets intensity (Tangible)
Leverage (Lev)
Current ratio (Current)
EBITDA
MB
Growth
Size_growth
Return of assets (ROA)
Beta
Free cash flow (FCF)
Operating cash flow (OCF)
Return on equity (ROE)
Industry dummy
Panel C: Political uncertainty events
Political turnover (Turnover)

Coup

Natural log of firm total assets
Tangible assets/ total assets
Total debt/ total assets
Current assets/ current liabilities
Earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization/
total assets
Market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value
of debt) divided by the book value of total assets
Percentage change of total sales
Natural log of firms’ debt and equity
Net income/total assets
Firm’s beta value reflecting systematic risk
Free cash flow/ total assets
Operating cash flow/ total assets
Retained earnings/total equity
Dummy variable equals 1 for firms in a given industry and 0
otherwise
Dummy variable equals 1 when the local politician is newly
appointed and 0 when the local politician is not newly
appointed. If politicians took office from January 1 to June 30,
then the current year represents the year they took office: if
politicians took office from July 1 to December 31, then the
following year represents the year they took office
Dummy variable equals 1 when Thailand in 2014 is governed
by the 2014 coup leaders and 0 otherwise

3.4.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.2 reports the distributions of family control including family ownership
structure, control-ownership wedge and family management. Panel A shows the
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distribution of our sample firms between family firms and non-family firms; there are
1,306 firm-year observations for family firms and 861 firm-year observations for nonfamily firms. The percentage of family firms increases slightly from 59.11% (170/286)
in 2009 to 63.28% (212/335) in 2015. Panel B shows the average percentage of controlownership wedge within family firms is 5.77% and the percentage of family firms with
family management is 96.40% (1,259/1,306), respectively. In the sample period, there
are a few changes in the levels of control-ownership wedge and family management in
Thailand each year. Additionally, amongst those firms that change their ownership type,
family members often maintain their involvement in management as the board of
directors, CEO and/or chairperson.
Panel C of Table 3.2 reports the distribution of family firms and non-family firms
by industry. The number and percentage of family firms vary significantly from
industry to industry. The consumer products industry group has by far the largest
number of family firms at about 78%. Compared to non-family firms, family firms
dominate in most of the industry groups in Thailand, particularly in property &
construction, which represents the largest industry according to the total number of
listed firms.
Panel D of Table 3.2 reports the number and percentage of firm-year observations
by bank-connected lending within family firms in our sample. Consistent with the post2004 banking sector reform which increases the number of banks and financial
institutions controlled by non-family entities and the dilution of concentrated family
control of financial institutions, our sample contains only a small proportion of
connected lending via family business groups (i.e. 5.2% of the total sample which
amounts to 68 firm-year observations).
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Table 3. 2 Sample Distribution
This table reports sample constituents Panel A shows the number and percentage of Thai listed companies
which can be divided into family and non-family firms for each year. Panel B shows the percentage of
control-ownership wedge and the number of family firms with family management within family firms
for each year. Panel C shows the number and percentage of firm-year observations by industry for family
and non-family firms for the sample period. Panel D shows the number and percentage of firm-year
observations by bank-connected lending via family business groups. Definitions of all variables are based
on those listed in Table 3.1.
Year
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Total
Panel A: Number of firm-year observations
1. Family firms
170
172
167
174
199
212
212
1,306
2. Non-family firms
116
121
130
125
123
123
123
861
Total
286
293
297
299
322
335
335
2,167
Panel B: Within family firms
(N=1,306)
1. Control-ownership wedge
5.81
5.39
5.41
5.84
6.08
6.03
5.69
5.77
(mean in %)
2. Family management
165
167
164
170
189
202
202
1,259
(number of firms)
Panel C: Number and percentage of firm-year observations by industry
Industry group Industry description
All
Family NonPercentage
firms firms
family of family
firms
firms (%)
Agro & Food
Agribusiness, food & beverage
222
161
61
72.53
Industry
Consumer
Fashion, home & office products,
164
128
36
78.05
Products
personal products & pharmaceuticals
Industrials
Automotive,
419
260
159
62.05
industrial materials & machinery,
packaging,
paper & printing materials,
petrochemicals & chemicals,
steel
Property &
Construction materials,
520
321
199
61.73
Construction
construction services,
property development,
Resources
Energy & utilities,
193
80
113
41.45
mining
Services
Commerce,
442
259
183
58.60
health care services,
media & publishing,
professional services,
tourism & leisure,
transportation & logistics
Technology
Electronic components,
207
97
110
46.86
information & communication
Total
2,167
1,306
861
60.27
Panel D: Number and percentage of firm-year observations by bank-connected lending within
family firms (N=1,306)
Number of firm-year
Percentage of total
observations
firm-year observations
1. Connected lending via family business groups 68
5.2%
2. Non-connected lending via family business
1,238
94.8%
groups
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Table 3.3 provides the summary statistics for our sample. Panel A indicates that the
mean (median) of the cost of debt is 6.04% (4.50%). This is higher than the mean
(median) cost of debt in China which is 3.40% (3.3%) as reported by Zou and Adams
(2008). In addition, most firms in our sample are family firms which make up 59.9% of
the sample. The average percentage of control rights held by family firms is 28.84%
while the median is 33%; these statistics indicate the high concentration of business
ownership in Thailand. The average percentage of control-ownership wedge held by
families is 5.77%, which reflects a high disproportional ownership in Thailand.
Interestingly, the number of firms with family management is 96.6% of the sample.
Panel B shows that the average firm size is 8.54. The average tangible assets intensity is
37.72%. Leverage for the median firm in our sample is 47.15%, while the average
current ratio is about 2%. On average, profitability (EBITDA) and growth opportunity
are nearly 9% and around 7%, respectively. The average market-to-book ratio is 1.43.
Panel C summarizes the distribution of our sample firms by owners. There are 1,306
family firm-year observations, which make up 60.27% of the total sample. These
statistics are slightly higher than Wiwattanakantang (2001) which reflects the growing
presence of family firms in the Thai economy. The remaining 39.73% of our total
sample are non-family firms comprising 861 non-family firm-year observations. For
those non-family firms, there are 125 government firms, 321 foreign investor firms, and
15 co-founder firms. In addition to this, 400 firms are classified as widely held nonfamily firms in our sample.
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Table 3. 3 Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics. Cost of debt is the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a
dummy variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control
rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the divergence between control rights and cash flow
rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms
that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or is on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is
the natural log of firm total assets. Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Lev is the ratio of
total debt to total assets. Current is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of
earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets. Growth is the percentage
change of total sales. MB is the market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt)
divided by the book value of total assets. Definitions of all other variables are based on those listed in
Table 3.1. For Wedge and Family_CEO, summary statistics are reported for the sample of firm-year
observations within family firms, whereas in the regressions, firm-year observations include total firms.
25th
percentile

Median

75th
percentile

Standard
deviation

Panel A: Cost of debt, ownership structure factors
Cost of debt (%)
2,167
6.044

3.073

4.503

6.617

5.389

Family
ControR (%)
Wedge (%)
Family_CEO

Observation

Mean

2,167
2,167
1,306
1,306

0.599
28.845
5.774
0.966

0
0
0
1

1
33.000
0
1

1
50.229
7.982
1

0.490
26.032
10.945
0.181

Panel B: Firm characteristics
Size
2,167
Tangible (%)
2,167
Lev (%)
2,167
Current
2,167
EBITDA (%)
2,167
Growth (%)
2,167
MB
2,167

8.542
37.717
47.150
1.991
8.740
7.106
1.430

7.515
18.148
32.721
0.962
3.695
-7.541
0.917

8.349
35.931
47.353
1.392
8.350
5.523
1.156

9.409
54.830
61.615
2.355
13.648
18.316
1.629

1.463
22.776
20.170
1.774
9.050
25.115
0.864

Panel C: Number and percentage of firm-year observations in our sample
Number of firm-year
observations
1. Family firms
1,306
2. Non-family firms
861
2.1 Government
125
2.2 Foreign investor
321
2.3 Group
15
2.4 Widely held
400
Total
2,167

Percentage of total firmyear observations
60.27%
39.73%
5.77%
14.81%
0.69%
18.46%
100%

Table 3.4 reports the results of the univariate analysis of key variables between
family and non-family firms in order to provide some preliminary evidence for our
hypotheses. The results show that family firms on average pay lower cost of debt (i.e.
0.731% lower) than non-family firms. The difference is statistically significant at the
1% level (t-value is 2.99). Also, family firms are, on average, significantly smaller in
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size than non-family firms by 0.32 points. Furthermore, family firms have significantly
higher current ratio and profit than non-family firms by 0.29 points and 1.52%,
respectively, implying that family firms may prefer a low-risk capital structure. Again,
these differences are statistically significant. Compared to non-family firms, family
firms also have significantly higher growth potential as measured by Growth and MB by
2.52% and 0.14 points, respectively. There is no statistically significant difference in
tangible assets intensity and leverage ratio between family and non-family firms.
Table 3. 4 Univariate Analysis
This table reports the univariate analysis. Cost of debt is the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Size is
the natural log of firm total assets. Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Lev is the ratio of
total debt to total assets. Current is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of
earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets. Growth is the percentage
change of total sales. MB is the market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt)
divided by the book value of total assets. Definitions of all other variables are based on those listed in
Table 3.1. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels, respectively.

Cost of debt (%)

Family firms
(N=1,306)
Mean
5.750

Non-family firms
(N=861)
Mean
6.481

Size

8.412

8.736

Tangible (%)

37.589

37.909

Lev (%)

46.568

48.020

Current

2.107

1.818

EBITDA (%)

9.351

7.829

Growth (%)

8.115

5.599

MB

1.480

1.354

Difference tests
(t-Stat)
-0.73%***
(2.992)
-0.32***
(4.890)
-0.32%
(0.3092)
-1.45%
(1.586)
0.29***
(-3.602)
1.52%***
(-3.714)
2.52%**
(-2.208)
0.14**
(-3.218)

3.5 Empirical results
3.5.1 Family control and cost of debt
In Section 3.3.2, we hypothesize that, in Thailand, the three types of family control
are more likely to have a negative relationship with the cost of debt. To test this
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conjecture, we estimate the below linear model, following Anderson et al. (2003),
Charumilind et al. (2006) and Lin et al. (2011), which makes our results directly
comparable with prior empirical evidence:

The definitions for these variables, as well as all the other variables employed in
this study, are presented in Table 3.1.28 To determine how controlling families exert their
influence on the cost of debt and establish causality, we use one-year lagged values of
family control as well as other control variables in our empirical estimation. Thus, the
number of observations used in the regression analysis reduced to 1,806.
The multivariate analysis of this regression is reported in Table 3.5. The
relationship between family ownership and cost of debt are reported in columns 1 and 2.
Looking at column 1, the estimated coefficient of Family is -0.07 and significant at the
1% level (t-value is -2.65). In column 2, we also find that the estimated coefficient of
ControlR is -0.17 and is significant at the 1% level (t-value is -3.23), which implies that
a one-standard-deviation increase in ControlR is associated with a 4.4 percentage point
decrease in the cost of debt. The results in columns 1 and 2 indicate that Thai listed
firms have a lower cost of debt when controlling families are present and when
controlling families hold more shares. These results support our hypothesis H1. Our
results are qualitatively similar to those of Anderson et al. (2003) who attribute the
lower cost of debt of family firms relative to non-family firms to reputational concerns.
The difference in institutional environment can shape the behavior of family firms

28

Correlations amongst the variables are not presented but are available upon request. The results report
that firm’s cost of debt has a negative correlation with all three types of family control: family ownership
structure (as denoted by Family and ControlR); control-ownership wedge (as denoted by Wedge); and
family management (as proxied by Family_CEO).

91

differently (Lin et al. 2011). Anderson et al. (2003) focuses on the U.S., which has a
much stronger law enforcement environment, so the property rights of family firms can
be better protected and controlling families are thus more concerned about long-term
survivorship and reputation. This can be confirmed by Anderson and Reeb (2003) who
further find fewer agency conflicts between families and other investors.
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Table 3. 5 The Effects of Family Control on Cost of Debt
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using an OLS model. Cost of debt is
the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms
and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a
dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or
on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural log of firm total assets. MB is the market
value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt) divided by the book value of total assets.
Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Current is the ratio of current assets to current
liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total
assets. Growth is the percentage change of total sales. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Year
dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model,
respectively. Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Family

Cost of debt
OLS
(1)
-0.07***
(-2.65)

ControlR

(2)

(3)

-0.17***
(-3.23)

Wedge

-0.16*
(-1.88)

Family_CEO
Size
MB
Tangibility
Current
EBITDA
Growth
Lev
Intercept
Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations

(4)

-0.05***
(-5.64)
-0.11
(-1.12)
-0.51**
(-2.34)
-0.01
(-0.35)
-0.01
(-0.17)
-0.07
(-1.35)
0.02***
(4.41)
0.12***
(10.73)
Yes
Yes
0.059
1,806

-0.05***
(-5.74)
-0.10
(-1.04)
-0.50**
(-2.29)
-0.01
(-0.34)
-0.01
(-0.09)
-0.07
(-1.30)
0.02***
(4.42)
0.10***
(14.41)
Yes
Yes
0.061
1,806

-0.04***
(-5.37)
-0.13
(-1.31)
-0.55**
(-2.54)
-0.01
(-0.62)
-0.02
(-0.31)
-0.09
(-1.53)
0.02***
(4.87)
0.11***
(10.43)
Yes
Yes
0.055
1,806

-0.07**
(-2.50)
-0.05***
(-5.61)
-0.10
(-1.06)
-0.50**
(-2.32)
-0.01
(-0.34)
-0.01
(-0.18)
-0.08
(-1.38)
0.02**
(4.26)
0.12***
(10.67)
Yes
Yes
0.058
1,806

However, under a weak institutional environment, and deficient arm’s length
market-driven system in Thailand, controlling families are inclined to establish
trustworthy relationships with their creditors because they stand to benefit from this
relationship.

As such Thai controlling families are prone to taking a long-term
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survivorship and low-risk approach in their business activities. Our results are different
from the findings of Ellul et al. (2007), who document that family firms in countries
with weak institutional environment experience higher cost of debt than non-family
firms. However, Ellul et al. (2007) focus on financial markets in both developed and
developing economies. Our results pertain to Thailand, a single economy, and control
for the unique institutional environment and financial market characteristics that may
not be representative of the sample of emerging economies in the study by Ellul et al.
(2007). As such the results from this study demonstrate the unique relationship that
exists between Thai family firms and their lenders. Our results corroborate the findings
documented by Petersen and Rajan (1994), who indicate that ties between firms and
their lenders can affect the availability and cost of funds to the firms.
Column 3 focuses on firms with control-ownership wedge. The estimated
coefficient of Wedge is -0.16 and is statistically significant at the 10% level (t-value is 1.88). This implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in Wedge induces a 1.7
percentage point decrease in cost of debt. It is a result suggesting that Thai family firms
have lower cost of debt with larger control-ownership wedge. This supports our
hypothesis H2. Our results are different from the findings of Lin et al. (2011), who
show that firms with a larger control-ownerhsip wedge experience higher cost of debt.
The results demonstrated in Lin et al. (2011) could stem from the cross-country analysis
to the extent that their results could be driven by cross-country variation in institutional
environments including legal systems, political economies and security laws. In contrast,
our results are based on a single country, Thailand. Further, our results contrast the
views of Peyer (2002) who finds that firms may use internal financing via their business
group affiliations that lead to weaker incentive to access external finance and lower cost
of external financing. We show in the next sub-section that lenders who are connected
94

to family business groups do not exert a statistically significant influence on the cost of
debt.
Column 4 shows the results of firms with family involvement in management. We
observe a statistically significant and negative coefficient of Family_CEO (-0.07) at the
5% level (t-value is -2.50). This finding supports our hypothesis H3 and complements
the findings of Claessens et al. (2002), who find that controlling families can exert a
strong influence on the board to manage financial decisions via family management.
However, our results are different from those of Pan and Tian (2016); family
management requires higher loan collateral in China while family management in
Thailand enjoys a lower cost of debt. A notable difference is that the credit market in
China is dominated by state-owned banks which tend to discriminate against private
loans so that more loans are allocated to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) than to
privately owned firms. As such, the latter firms are required to provide higher loan
collateral than state-owned enterprises (SOEs) when debt financing is granted. This
scenario is not present in Thailand and consequently our results are different to those of
Pan and Tian (2016).
Regarding the effects of firm characteristics on the cost of debt, the results are
generally consistent with the literature on cost of debt (Petersen & Rajan 1994; Chava et
al. 2008; Zou & Adams 2008; Kim et al. 2011). However, somewhat surprisingly, the
coefficient estimates associated with three firm characteristics, namely size, tangible
assets intensity and leverage are significant. We find that firms are more likely to have
lower cost of debt when they are larger in size; this is consistent with the findings of
Petersen and Rajan (1994). Similarly, Kim et al. (2011) and Zou and Adams (2008) find
a negative association between cost of debt and tangible assets. Following Chava et al.
(2008), cost of debt is also positively related to leverage. As well as size, tangible assets
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and leverage, other firm characteristics are often found to be empirically important
determinants of cost of debt in developed economies, like the U.S. and the U.K., which
may not have any statistically significant effect on the cost of debt of Thai firms. The
lack of significance of other variables in explaining the cost of debt in our regression
could in part be due to differences in institutional environment and ownership structure.
To provide more insights into the behavior of family ownership on cost of debt, we
further examine the distribution of control rights of controlling families and those in
firms with family management. Here, we consider the ownership of families between
25% and 50% of control rights, families which hold more than 50% of control rights,
and family management. We generate a dummy variable for Family 25-50% (Family
50% or more) which equals 1 for family firms and have a member who holds between
25% and 50% (50% or more) of control rights and 0 otherwise. We also generate the
dummy variable for Family_CEO which equals 1 for family firms which have a
member who serves as chairperson, CEO or the board of directors and 0 otherwise. To
differentiate the effect of the different degrees of control ownership on the cost of debt,
family management on the cost of debt and the interaction between family management
and control ownership, we incorporate interactive dummies and include them in the
regression as follows:

The definitions of the other variables are presented in Table 3.1. To determine how
family ownership and management exert their influence on the cost of debt and
establish causality, we use one-year lagged values of family ownership and management
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as well as other control variables in our empirical estimation.
The results for regression (2) are reported in Table 3.6. Column 1 shows that the
ownership concentration of families may influence cost of debt in different ways. We
find a negative relationship between family ownership concentration and cost of debt.
The estimated coefficient is -0.01 when families hold 25-50% of control rights and this
is statistically significant at the 5% level (t-value is -2.32). The estimated coefficient is 0.06 for family control rights of 50% or more of control rights and it is statistically
significant at the 1% level (t-value is -8.05). These results indicate that family firms
have lower cost of debt as controlling families hold more shares. They also further
support hypothesis H1. We also consider the distribution of control rights of controlling
families in firms with family management by interacting the dummy variable of
Family_CEO with the control rights dummy variable of 25-50%, and 50% or more. The
results are reported in column 2. We find that Thai family firms have a negative impact
on the cost of debt when family members are involved in firm management. The
estimated coefficients of Family 25-50% of control rights and Family_CEO are -0.10
and -0.38, respectively. They are, respectively, statistically significant at the 5% and 1%
levels (t-value are -2.32 and -4.98 each). The estimated coefficients of the interactive
variables

between

Family

25-50%*Family_CEO,

and

Family

50%

or

more*Family_CEO are -0.40 and -0.32, respectively. They are statistically significant at
the 1% levels where the t-values are -4.77 and -3.40. These findings suggest that the
negative relationship between family ownership and cost of debt becomes stronger
when controlling families hold more shares and are involved in their firm’s
management. The net coefficient of Family_CEO on cost of debt with family ownership
is -0.38-0.40-0.32 = -1.10. The net coefficient of Family 25-50% of control rights on
cost of debt with family management is -0.10-0.40 = -0.50 holding all else constant.
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These results support our hypotheses H1 and H3. They show that, in Thailand,
controlling families through their involvement in firms’ management and control rights
can reduce the cost of debt.
Table 3. 6 Family Ownership Structure, Family Management and Cost of Debt
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using an OLS model. Cost of debt is
the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family 25-50% is a dummy variable which equals one for
family firms that have a member of the family who holds between 25% and 50% of control rights and 0
otherwise. Family 50% or more is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a
member of the family who holds more than 50% of control rights and 0 otherwise. Family_CEO is a
dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or
on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for
year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. Definitions of all other variables are based on
those listed in Table 3.1. Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Family 25-50%
Family 50% or more

Cost of debt
OLS
(1)
-0.01**
(-2.32)
-0.06***
(-8.05)

Family_CEO
Family 25-50%*Family_CEO
Family 50% or more*Family_CEO
Intercept
Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations

0.10***
(15.03)
Yes
Yes
0.057
1,806

(2)
-0.10**
(-2.32)
-0.06
(-1.01)
-0.38***
(-4.98)
-0.40***
(-4.77)
-0.32***
(-3.40)
0.12***
(10.80)
Yes
Yes
0.069
1,806

3.5.2 Reputational effect and long-term survivorship
To establish that controlling families are concerned with their long-term
survivorship and will manage their firms through their control and by establishing their
creditors’ trustworthiness thereby allowing them to borrow at a lower interest rate, we
draw on the existing literature which documents that family control has a significant
effect on firm performance and profitability (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Villalonga &
Amit 2006). Firms which are concerned with their long-term survivorship tend to be
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profitable and are also more likely to be reputable. These attributes may reduce credit
concerns and the cost of debt. To further assess the channel governing the results, we
test whether the lower cost of debt is more pronounced in family firms with higher
profitability, which suggests that reputational effect and long-term survivorship
characteristics of family firms are important governing factors. We classify firms into
two categories of firm profitability based on three criteria: operating cash flow, return
on assets and return on equity. The first category is for firms with high profitability,
which is defined as firms with above-median operating cash flow (OCF), above-median
return on assets (ROA), or above-median return on equity (ROE). The second category
is for firms with low profitability, and these are firms with below-median operating cash
flow (OCF), below-median return on assets (ROA), or below-median return on equity
(ROE). We then perform the regression Eq. (1) on the subsamples for these two
categories of firms.
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Table 3. 7 The Effects of Family Control on Cost of Debt and Firm Profitability
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using an OLS model. Cost of debt is
the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms
and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a
dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or
on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. OCF is the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets. ROA is
the ratio of net income to total assets. ROE is the ratio of retained earnings to total equity. Year dummy
and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively.
Definitions of all other variables are based on those listed in Table 3.1. Columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 use the
sub-sample with low profitability firms. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 use the sub-sample with high profitability
firms. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
Profitability sub-sample
Low
High
Low
OLS
(1)
(2)
(3)
Panel A: OCF
Family

-0.04
(-1.14)

High

Low

High

Low

High

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.25
(0.98)

-0.48***
(-3.99)
-0.02
(-0.67)
Yes
Yes
0.089
906

-0.09**
(-2.20)
Yes
Yes
0.085
900

-0.02
(-0.76)
Yes
Yes
0.108
912

-0.09**
(-2.17)
Yes
Yes
0.078
894

-0.01
(-0.00)

0.12***
(-2.97)
Yes
Yes
0.086
922

-0.08**
(-2.03)

ControlR

-0.07
(-1.01)

-0.19***
(-2.66)

Wedge
Family_CEO
Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations
Panel B: ROA
Family

Yes
Yes
0.090
906

Yes
Yes
0.084
900

-0.05
(-1.30)

-0.08*
(-1.93)

ControlR

Yes
Yes
0.089
906

Yes
Yes
0.087
900

-0.08
(-1.10)

-0.19***
(-2.62)

Wedge

Yes
Yes
0.089
906

Yes
Yes
0.085
900

0.29
(1.25)

-0.61***
(-4.50)

Family_CEO
Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations
Panel C: ROE
Family

Yes
Yes
0.109
912

Yes
Yes
0.077
894

-0.01
(-0.41)

-0.11***
(-2.79)

ControlR

Yes
Yes
0.109
912

Yes
Yes
0.080
894

-0.04
(-0.65)

-0.26***
(-3.42)

Wedge

Yes
Yes
0.110
912

Yes
Yes
0.081
894

0.06
(0.26)

-0.33**
(-2.17)

Family_CEO

Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations

Yes
Yes
0.077
884

Yes
Yes
0.085
922

Yes
Yes
0.077
884

Yes
Yes
0.088
922

Yes
Yes
0.077
884

Yes
Yes
0.078
922

Yes
Yes
0.077
884
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Table 3.7 reports the results for low and high profitability firms in accordance to the
three criteria: operating cash flow (Panel A), return on assets (Panel B) and return on
equity (Panel C). In columns 1, 2, 3 and 4, we find that the lower cost of debt for family
ownership structure is concentrated in firms with high profitability. In column 2, the
estimated coefficients of Family range from -0.08 to -0.11, and they are statistically
significant at the 10%, 5% or 1% levels (t-value are between -1.93 and -2.79,
respectively). The results in column 4 confirm these effects; the estimated coefficients
of ControlR range from -0.19 to -0.26, and they are statistically significant at the 1%
levels (t-value are between -2.62 and -3.42, respectively). The estimated coefficients of
ControlR in column 4 indicate that when firm profitability is above the median, a onestandard-deviation increase in ControlR brings about a reduction in the cost of debt in
the 4.9-6.8 percentage points range. It can be seen in columns 2 and 4 that these results
are similar to those reported in Table 3.6. However, the coefficients of Family and
ControlR in columns 1 and 3, which represent the sample of firms with low profitability,
are not only insignificant, but they are also smaller than those in columns 2 and 4.
Taken together, these results suggest that the negative association between family
ownership structure and cost of debt is more pronounced in firms with high profitability.
These results provide strong support for our hypothesis H1 and are consistent with the
view that firms’ profitability is akin to enhancing firms’ reputation and families’ longterm survivorship which make lower cost of debt possible (Anderson et al. 2003;
Anderson & Reeb 2003).
In columns 5 and 6 we find that the lower cost of debt associated with greater
control-ownership wedge is also concentrated in firms with high profitability. In column
6, the estimated coefficients of Wedge range from -0.33 to -0.61, and they are
statistically significant at the 5% or 1% levels (t-value are between -2.17 and -4.50,
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respectively), thus implying that when firm profitability is above the median, a onestandard-deviation increase in Wedge creates between 3.6 and 6.7 percentage points
reduces the cost of debt. These results again are similar to those reported in Table 3.6.
However, the coefficients of Wedge in column 5, which represent low-profitability
firms, are insignificant and smaller in magnitude. Taken together, these results are
consistent with our hypothesis H2 and extend the work of Villalonga and Amit (2006),
who find that control-ownership wedge is associated with U.S. firm performance.
In columns 7 and 8, the estimated coefficients of Family_CEO range between -0.09
and -0.12, and they are statistically significant at the 5% or 1% levels (t-value are from 2.17 to -2.97, respectively). Again, these results are similar to those reported in Table
3.5. In contrast, in column 7, the coefficients of Family_CEO are not statistically
significant, and they are smaller in magnitude for firms with low profitability. These
results reflect the fact that when firms are highly profitable, creditors view family firms
to be less likely to expropriate them, which translates into a reduction in agency cost of
debt.
3.5.3 Bank-connected lending of family firms
The established results on the reduced cost of debt effect of family firms could be
also driven by an alternative explanation that firms borrow from a lender that is
controlled by or connected to the same family business groups. Should the borrower and
the lender belong to the same family business group, it is probable that the borrower
could obtain lower cost of debt. To ameliorate this concern, we estimate regression (1)
by incorporating an extra control variable, Fambank which is a dummy variable equal to
one for family firms that have connected lending with banks via family business groups
and 0 otherwise. The results are reported in Table 3.8. Family firms that have connected
lending with banks is broadly defined as family firms whose surname appears in the
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board of directors and who owns 5% or more of the banks’ shares. This definition is
broad enough to capture the possibility that family-related connections with lenders
could grant family firms the benefits of lower cost of debt.
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Table 3. 8 The Effects of Family Control on Cost of Debt (Controlling for BankConnected Lending of Family Firms)
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using an OLS model. Cost of debt is
the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms
and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a
dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or
on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural log of firm total assets. MB is the market
value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt) divided by the book value of total assets.
Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Current is the ratio of current assets to current
liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total
assets. Growth is the percentage change of total sales. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
Fambank is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have connected lending with banks
via family business groups and 0 otherwise. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for
year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 use the full sample.
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.

Family

Cost of debt
OLS
(1)
-0.07***
(-2.73)

ControlR

(2)

(3)

-0.16***
(-3.29)

Wedge

-0.17**
(-1.97)

Family_CEO
Size
MB
Tangibility
Current
EBITDA
Growth
Lev
Fambank
Intercept
Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations

(4)

-0.05***
(-5.63)
-0.11
(-1.17)
-0.51**
(-2.33)
-0.01
(-0.34)
-0.01
(-0.10)
-0.07
(-1.32)
0.02***
(4.78)
0.10
(1.26)
0.12***
(10.72)
Yes
Yes
0.061
1,806

-0.05***
(-5.72)
-0.10
(-1.09)
-0.50**
(-2.28)
-0.01
(-0.33)
-0.01
(-0.01)
-0.07
(-1.28)
0.02***
(4.78)
0.10
(1.22)
0.12***
(10.76)
Yes
Yes
0.062
1,806

-0.04***
(-5.35)
-0.13
(-1.36)
-0.55**
(-2.54)
-0.01
(-0.62)
-0.02
(-0.25)
-0.09
(-1.52)
0.02***
(5.24)
0.10
(1.16)
0.11***
(10.42)
Yes
Yes
0.057
1,806

-0.07**
(-2.58)
-0.05***
(-5.59)
-0.11
(-1.11)
-0.50**
(-2.31)
-0.01
(-0.33)
-0.01
(-0.11)
-0.08
(-1.36)
0.02**
(4.61)
0.10
(1.25)
0.12***
(10.66)
Yes
Yes
0.060
1,806

It can be seen in Table 3.8 that across columns 1 to 4 for the different measures of
controlling families, the coefficients of interest for Family, ControlR, Wedge and
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Family_CEO continue to be statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels,
respectively, with little changes in the magnitude of these coefficients. These results are
by and large confirming the robustness of our results to the confounding effect of
business lending arising from family related lenders. We do not find any evidence to
support the view that bank-connected lending of family firms is associated with lower
cost of debt. To further validate that controlling families long-term survivorship and
reputation are the factors that lead to lower cost of debt conditional on possible family
related business lending, we perform regression (2) by incorporating the dummy
variable Fambank. The results remain qualitatively unchanged from those shown in
Table 3.7, justifying that reputational concerns and long-term survivorship are the
possible channels through which family firms could benefit from lower cost of debt.
These results are not presented here for brevity but are available from the authors upon
request.
3.5.4 Robustness analyses
3.5.4.1 Alternative estimation methods concerning endogeneity issue
Endogeneity might be a problem when examining family control. There could be
one endogeneity concern that borrowers with certain ownership structures might have
other firm-specific characteristics which have been unobserved in our previous
regression models and may influence the relationship between family control and the
cost of debt (Lin et al. 2011). Another endogeneity concern is that the association
between family control and the cost of debts could be simultaneously determined. It is
possible that while family control affects the level of cost of debt, the levels of cost of
debt influence the decision of controlling families to retain their control of the firm (Ma
et al. 2017). Therefore, the reverse causality between family control and cost of debt,
and/or the joint determination of family control and other unobserved factors could
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potentially bias our previous study. To mitigate these endogeneity issues and ascertain
our results from the previous models, we exploit an exogenous shock, the political
uncertainty occurring in Thailand that influences the relationship between family
control and cost of debt. In addition, we apply the random effect model and two-stage
least squares (2SLS) method with instrument variables, to check the results’ robustness.
First, following the results derived from a Hausman (1978) test, we use the random
effect model to address the potential endogeneity issue of unobserved, time-invariant
heterogeneity29. We rerun regression (1) by using the random effect model, and report
the results of our key variables in columns 1 to 4 of Table 3.9. We find that the
coefficients of Family and ControlR in columns 1 and 2, respectively, are significantly
negative which indicate that Thai listed firms enjoy a lower cost of debt when
controlling families are present and when controlling families hold more shares.
Column 3 focuses on firms with control-ownership wedge; we find that the estimated
coefficient of Wedge is significantly negative, suggesting that the cost of debt is lower
in Thai family firms with higher control-ownership wedge. Column 4 highlights firms
with family members’ involvement in management matters; we observe a statistically
significant and negative coefficient of Family_CEO, implying that Thai family firms are
associated with lower debt cost when members are involved in the firm’s management.
The results of the family control variables based on the random effect model show that
the signs of the coefficients and levels of significance are consistent with the results

29

To test the robustness of the results, we estimate the results using fixed effects models and discover that
the results are statistically insignificant in all cases for the relationship between family control and cost of
debt. This was expected because the family control variables are time-invariant variables that do not
change within firms. The results are available from the authors upon request. In addition, the levels of
family control remain nearly constant in most of Thai family firms. From 2009 to 2015, there are small
changes in ownership structure from family firms to non-family firms and vice versa (3.37% of firms in
the total sample size). Furthermore, changes in the level of family management and control-ownership
wedge are nearly the same during the sample period. Taken together, the results suggest that endogeneity
concern may not be prevalent in our study.
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reported in Table 3.5. Thus, the results of the random effect confirm the robustness of
our main findings, and family control potentially influences the cost of debt when the
endogeneity issue of unobserved characteristics is considered.
Further, we apply a 2SLS approach to address simultaneity and reverse causality
between family control and the cost of debt. Following Laeven and Levine (2009), we
use the values of the family control variables at the beginning of our sample as
instruments. In the first stage, we regress each endogenous family control variable on
the instrument variables and all the other control variables from equation (1). The Fstatistics30 illustrate that the coefficients of the instrument variables are significant, thus
confirming our instrument variables are valid. In the second stage, we apply the
predicted values from the first-stage regressions as key independent variables and we reestimate regression (1). Results of the second stage regression are reported in columns 5
to 8 of Table 3.9. The key variables of interest are negatively and significantly related to
cost of debt, which are consistent with the results documented in Table 3.5. Taken
together, our findings are consistent with our main hypotheses.

30

In the first stage, the F-statistics are unreported but they are available on request.
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Table 3. 9 The Effects of Family Control on Cost of Debt (Addressing Endogeneity
Concerns)
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using random effect and 2SLS models.
Cost of debt is the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for
family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families.
Wedge is the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders.
Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member as the
chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural log of firm total assets.
MB is the market value of assets (market value of equity plus book value of debt) divided by the book
value of total assets. Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. Current is the ratio of current
assets to current liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and
amortization to total assets. Growth is the percentage change of total sales. Lev is the ratio of total debt to
total assets. Year dummy and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects
in this model, respectively. Columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 use the full sample. Robust t-statistics are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

Family
ControlR

Cost of debt
Random effects
(1)
(2)
-0.05***
(-4.29)
-0.15**
(-1.93)

Wedge

(3)

2SLS
(5)
-0.06**
(-1.99)

(6)

-0.24*
(-1.86)

Yes
Yes
0.034
1,806

Yes
Yes
0.058
1,806

(7)

(8)

-0.14**
(-2.55)

Family_CEO
Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations

(4)

Yes
Yes
0.031
1,806

-0.11
(-0.65)
-0.04**
(-2.10)
Yes
Yes
0.033
1,806

Yes
Yes
0.058
1,754

Yes
Yes
0.060
1,754

Yes
Yes
0.055
1,754

-0.06**
(-2.15)
Yes
Yes
0.058
1,754

3.5.4.2 Matching sample
Another concern is that the association between family control and cost of debt
could be determined by other firm characteristics used as control variables in our main
equation. To address this issue, we construct a new sample using propensity score
matching, following Dehejia and Wahba (2002). We control for industry and year that
influence the impact of family control on cost of debt by matching across industry and
year. Based on the literature, we also control for firm characteristics that affect family
control, which are Size, ROA, Beta, Lev, FCF and MB. All variables are defined as per
Table 3.1. A logit model is estimated to obtain propensity scores for each treated firm (a
family firm) and its matched control firm (a non-family firm). We match each treated
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firm to one control firm in the same industry and year with the nearest propensity score.
The mean differences of the firm characteristics are reported in Panel A of Table 3.10. It
can be seen that for all the firm characteristics, the treated firms and control firms show
no statistically significant difference in their mean values.
In Panel B of Table 3.10, we regress Eq. (1) based on the sample of treated and
control firms. The coefficients of family control variables, namely family ownership
structure, control-ownership wedge and family management are reported in columns 1
to 4. It is apparent that the results remain qualitatively unchanged when compared to
those based on the whole sample (in Table 3.5).
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Table 3. 10 The Effects of Family Control on Cost of Debt (Propensity Score
Matching Approach)
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using the propensity score matching
approach (PSM) and an OLS model. In Panel A, the control sample is for firms in the same industry and
year, and is based on firm characteristics like Size, ROA, Beta, Lev, FCF and MB. In Panel B, Columns 1,
2, 3 and 4 use the matching sample. Cost of debt is the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a
dummy variable which equals one for family firms and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control
rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the divergence between control rights and cash flow
rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms
that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Size is
the natural log of firm total assets. MB is the market value of assets (market value of equity plus book
value of debt) divided by the book value of total assets. Tangible is the ratio of tangible assets to total
assets. Current is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before
interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization to total assets. Growth is the percentage change of total
sales. Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Beta is
firm’s beta value reflecting systematic risk. FCF is the ratio of free cash flow to total assets. Year dummy
and industry dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively.
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Treated sample
Mean
Panel A: Matching sample difference tests
Size
8.494
ROA (%)
4.344
Beta
0.825
Lev (%)
48.600
FCF (%)
1.179
MB (%)
1.320
Observations
742
Panel B: Matching sample analysis
Cost of debt
OLS
(1)
Family
-0.08**
(-2.45)
ControlR

Control sample
Mean
8.570
3.776
0.879
48.542
1.565
1.370
742

(2)

-0.076 (-1.01)
0.568% (1.11)
-0.054 (-1.60)
0.058% (0.05)
-0.386% (-0.69)
-0.05% (-1.23)

(3)

-0.03*
(-1.71)

Family_CEO

Industry dummies
Year dummies
R2
Observations

(4)

-0.19***
(-3.12)

Wedge

Intercept

Difference (t-value)

0.11***
(7.65)
Yes
Yes
0.075
1,272

0.11***
(7.74)
Yes
Yes
0.077
1,272

0.11***
(7.28)
Yes
Yes
0.069
1,272

-0.07**
(-2.26)
0.11***
(7.60)
Yes
Yes
0.074
1,272

3.5.4.3 Exogenous shock of political uncertainty and the effect of family control
We use the political uncertainty in Thailand as an exogenous shock to test whether
our main results are not driven by endogeneity concerns. Specifically, we conjecture
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that controlling families might use internal resources to establish connections with new
political elites during political uncertainty to the extent that creditors may impose higher
cost of debt. Empirically, we construct two dummy variables to capture political
turnovers. The first is Turnover which equals 1 for turnovers of political leaders at the
province level and 0 otherwise. The second is Coup, which equals 1 for the year 2014
when the coup d’état occurred and 0 for other years. Data on Turnover are presented in
Appendix A. We incorporate in regression (1) the interaction terms between these two
dummy variables and different measures of family control. The estimation results are
reported in Table 3.11. Across the four regression specifications, the interaction terms
are our focus of interest. The results show that the coefficients of the interaction terms
are positive and statistically significant, indicating that the lower cost of debt enjoyed
by family firms is less pronounced during political uncertainty, which is consistent with
our expectation.
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Table 3. 11 The Effects of Political Uncertainty at Provincial and National Levels
on the Relationship between Family Control and Cost of Debt
This table reports the estimation results of the cost of debt equation using an OLS model. Cost of debt is
the ratio of interest expense to total debt. Family is a dummy variable which equals one for family firms
and 0 for non-family firms. ControlR is the control rights held by the controlling families. Wedge is the
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Family_CEO is a
dummy variable which equals one for family firms that have a family member as the chairperson, CEO or
on the board of directors and 0 otherwise. Coup is a dummy variable which equals one when Thailand in
2014 was governed by the coup leaders and 0 otherwise. Turnover is a dummy variable which equals one
when the local politician is newly appointed and 0 otherwise. If politicians took office from January 1 to
June 30, then the current year represents the year they took office: if politicians took office from July 1 to
December 31, then the following year represents the year they took office. Year dummy and industry
dummy are included to control for year and industry fixed effects in this model, respectively. Definitions
of all other variables are based on those listed in Table 3.1. Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 use the full sample.
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
Cost of debt
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Family
ControlR
Wedge
Family_CEO
Family control proxies
-0.09***
-0.12***
-0.04
-0.09***
(-8.79)
(-19.25)
(-0.23)
(-17.11)
Coup
-1.02***
-0.10***
-0.08
-1.00***
(-12.68)
(-12.83)
(-1.47)
(-12.92)
Coup*Family control proxies
0.01*
0.04***
0.07
0.03***
(1.65)
(4.74)
(0.73)
(5.02)
Turnover
-0.02*
-0.01*
-0.01
-0.03**
(-1.95)
(-1.65)
(-0.22)
(-2.39)
Turnover*Family control proxies 0.06***
0.09**
0.10
0.06***
(4.58)
(2.50)
(0.06)
(3.55)
Intercept
0.12***
0.12***
0.11***
0.12***
(10.02)
(10.04)
(9.67)
(10.01)
Industry dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Sum test (F-value)
5.89***
6.07***
6.50***
5.82***
R2
0.071
0.072
0.068
0.070
Observations
1,737
1,737
1,737
1,737

3.5.4.4 Alternative proxies for controlling families, firm size and samples
We conduct a number of additional analyses to test the robustness of the results.31
To explore whether our definition of controlling families matters for our results, we
consider different definitions of family ownership structure by changing the cut-off
point from 25% of control rights to 20%, following La Porta et al. (1999), and Faccio
and Lang (2002). We also apply alternative measure of firm size in our control variable.
Referring to Anderson et al. (2003), firm size can be defined as the natural logarithm of

31

All results are available from the authors upon request.
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firms’ debt and equity (Size_growth). Furthermore, we explore the sensitivity of our
results by excluding utilities companies; it is often argued these companies are
government regulated and are not entirely able to set their own policies, such as capital
structure. All results remain qualitatively unchanged.
3.6 Conclusion
Traditionally, Thai firms have relied heavily on bank debt for their external
finances. Equally, family control has played a very crucial role in many Thai businesses
which have traditionally formed the backbone of the country’s economy. In this paper
we examine the link between family control and cost of debt when family firms obtain
external debt finance. Using cost of debt to measure firms’ ability to secure debt
finances externally, we find that family control benefits from lower cost of debt
compared to non-family firms. The benefits of lower cost of debt are more pronounced
when family firms have larger family ownership, larger control-ownership wedge, and
are involved in day-to-day management. We fail to find any evidence that bankconnected lending of family firms leads to lower cost of debt. We show that the
reputation and long-term survivorship characteristics of family firms as proxied by their
high profitability are the channels which give rise to lower cost of debt. The evidence is
consistent with the view that Thai controlling families have incentives to take a longterm and low risk approach in running firms, and they are less prone to expropriating
other investors despite Thailand’s weak institutional environment.
Our results are also robust to possible endogeneity issues and continue to hold for
different proxies of family control and control variables, and for matched samples. We
further document that the negative relationship between family control and cost of debt
becomes weaker in the presence of political uncertainty engendered by the 2014 coup
d’état and changes in the provincial level politicians over the sample period. By and
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large, our findings may be generalized to other economies and markets with weak
institutional environments and a lack of arm’s length market-driven system. The low
cost of debt enjoyed by family firms is instrumental in their continued success and for
the vital role they play in the Thai economy.
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Chapter 4: The value of family control during political uncertainty: Evidence
from Thailand’s constitutional change in 2014
4.1 Introduction
Family firms dominate in many economies (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Williams Jr et
al. 2018). Prior studies have investigated the effect of family control on firms’ policies
and performance, and recognized the distinction between family firms and other types
of firms, which is a crucial factor for firms’ survivorship (Anderson & Reeb 2003;
Villalonga & Amit 2006; King & Santor 2008; Dyer 2018; Fattoum-Guedri et al. 2018;
Villalonga et al. 2019). These studies typically utilise a setting in normal periods and
focus on the agency problem between controlling families and other investors. However,
the effect of family control on firm value during periods of political uncertainty is
unclear.
Prior literature has documented that firm value declines when political uncertainty
emerged (Bailey & Chung 1995; Beaulieu et al. 2005; Pástor & Veronesi 2012; Baker
& Bloom 2013). Other studies have also documented negative effects of political
uncertainty on stock returns (Bailey & Chung 1995; Beaulieu et al. 2005; Pástor &
Veronesi 2012) and on firms’ policies such as financing and investment decisions
(Huang et al. 2015; Xu et al. 2016; Colak et al. 2017; Jens 2017; Amore & Minichilli
2018). This is particularly so for firms which operate in economies that are politically
less stable and are characterized by weak economic fundamentals and significant
government interventions. In contrast, little is known about the role played by family
control during periods of political uncertainty. In particular, to what extent does family
control benefit investors? Or does family control serve the family’s interests at the
expense of minority shareholders during times of political uncertainty?
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We argue that uncertainty stemming from a political crisis tends to disturb a firms’
equilibrium, and any uncertainty in business environment can amplify the benefits or
costs of family control in influencing corporate valuation. Accordingly, whether the
effect of family control on firm value during political uncertainty will prevail as that in
normal periods is pertinent for academic and policy-makers alike. Political uncertainty
can magnify the benefits of family control given that controlling families have
incentives to preserve the firm’s reputation, leading to reduced agency conflict between
controlling families and minority shareholders (Anderson & Reeb 2003). During
political uncertainty, family control could add value to their company as a result of
granting greater access to finance and profits engendered by government policies
bestowed upon family firms due to their network and political connections (Faccio 2010;
Liu et al. 2013). On the other hand, families’ private benefits of control can be affected
negatively by political uncertainty. To the extent that political uncertainty might
threaten the survivorship of family firms, family firms are prone to preserve their
private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. The survival-oriented actions
of family firms are associated with tunneling (Johnson et al. 2000) including political
pressure via taxes, regulations or bribery during times of political uncertainty (Frye &
Shleifer 1997; Caprio et al. 2011; Xu et al. 2016). Given these two contrasting effects, it
remains an empirical question on how political uncertainty affects the behavior of
family firms.
The empirical evidence of family firms’ behaviors during political uncertainty is
scant, especially in emerging markets where high family ownership concentrations are
common and controlling shareholders usually influence businesses’ policies and market
value (La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2000). Furthermore, in emerging markets,
the institutional environment is less developed, investor protection is weaker, and
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corruption is more prevalent32 (La Porta et al. 2000a; Wiwattanakantang 2001; Leuz &
Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang 2009). Consequently,
political power and connections are critical to securing guarantees and business
opportunities, which lead firms to expend extensive resources in establishing personal
relationships with government officials and powerful politicians through friendship,
board nominations and campaign contributions (Fisman 2001; Li et al. 2008;
Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang 2009; Xu et al. 2015; Liu et al. 2018). Due to
institutional weakness of emerging markets, the net effect of controlling families on
firm value may not be apparent, as it is predicted that firms’ behaviors during periods of
political uncertainty are likely to magnify both the benefits (to enhance firms’
survivorship) and costs (of minority shareholders’ expropriation) of family control.
This paper fills this gap in the literature by examining the impact of family control
on firm value during political uncertainty in Thailand. In Thailand, the government
plays an active role in promoting economic development, yet Thai politics have been
marked by intense political uncertainty between an unstable democracy and coups d’état,
in which the military seizes control and replaces elected governments.33 We focus on
the constitutional change arising from the 2014 coup d’état, which stemmed from a
prolonged political crisis that led to a change in the political system with extensive
social and economic ramifications. This political unrest started in November 2013, and
has an adverse effect on Thailand socially and economically. In particular, between
November 2013 and May 2014, about 28 people died and more than 700 were injured.34
Thailand’s gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 2.1 percent in 2014 and by 1.3

32

For example, according to Transparency International, in 2015, Thailand scored only 38 out of 100
(where 100 is ideal) on corruption, and ranks 76 out of 167 countries worldwide.
33
Between 1932 and 2015, Thailand’s political system is characterized by an unstable democracy which
led to 20 constitutional changes and 20 coups d’état.
34
Time, http://time.com/108719/thai-army-declares-military-coup/ (May 22, 2014).
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percent in 2015.35 The SET Index (SET) falls from a peak of 1,597.86 on the 30th April
2013 to a low of 1,288.02 on the 30th December 2015. The focus on Thailand stems
from the fact that family firms have historically dominated the Thai economy.
According to the report by Forbes Thailand, as of 2015 the Thai top 50 richest people
who own big family businesses contributed more than 25% of Thailand’s GDP and
made up for 33% of market capitalization in the stock market. Additionally, in our
sample, 60.2% of firms listed on the Thai stock market are family firms. As such, our
findings provide insights into the costs and benefits of family control on firm value in
such times of political turmoil.
Our study is motivated by existing literature which contends that the inefficient use
of firms’ resources by controlling shareholders can increase the expected agency costs
of minority shareholders (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Villalonga & Amit 2006; Zhang &
Cao 2016). Since firm value can be determined by minority shareholders who would
expect more risk of tunneling by controlling families (La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta et
al. 2000a), we contend that the agency costs are more likely to affect the value of a
family controlled business during political uncertainty, since higher expected agency
costs can give controlling families more incentives to extract resources from their own
firms (Johnson et al. 2000). Our study thus complements these existing studies by
considering the influence of controlling families on firm value when investors face
different levels of expected agency costs during political uncertainty.
We use a number of empirical approaches to test our conjecture and draw
meaningful causal inferences. Notably, we exploit the constitutional change by the 2014
coup d’état as an exogenous shock that triggered (but was also caused by) political

35

Time, http://time.com/4448655/thailand-constitutional-referendum/ (August 11, 2016)
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uncertainty in Thailand. It is possible that a systematic relationship between family
control and other firm characteristics might occur during political uncertainty, thereby
affecting the relationship between family control and firm value, and the association
between family control and firms’ financial decisions in our study. On this issue, we
apply a matched sample approach by using the propensity score matching (PSM)
method, following Lins et al. (2013). We also use a difference-in-difference framework
and control for firm fixed effects. These two approaches might be sufficiently robust to
establish causality and ensure that firm value and decision-making are causally affected
by family control during political uncertainty in Thailand.
Based on a sample of 2,156 firm-year observations for 365 firms in Thailand from
2010 to 2015, we find that family control has a significantly negative effect on firm
value over the period when political uncertainty peaked. This effect is more pronounced
in the presence of controlling families and when controlling families hold more shares
in the firms but less than 75%. These results suggest that given Thailand’s weak
institutional/regulatory environment in which corruption is prevalent and investor
protection is weak, investors tend to discount the value of family control; during
political uncertainty the costs of family control outweigh the benefits leading to a
decline of firm value. Our main findings are robust to using alternative estimation
methods, alternative sampling methods, alternative measurements of family control, and
alternative control variables.
Additionally, we hypothesize that the effect of family control on firm value during
political uncertainty relies on the level of expected agency costs. We find that the
underperformance of family firms is concentrated in those firms with high expected
agency costs, which are associated with the inefficient use of internal resources. The
negative effect of family control on firm value is more significant when firms have high
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cash holdings, high operating profits and more free cash flows. Also, family firms with
low expected agency costs do not underperform significantly. These results suggest that
investors are concerned about the risk associated with tunneling and the use of firms’
resources to establish political connections, which tend to escalate during political
uncertainty. For this reason, they discount the value of family control more heavily
when they expect that family firms have higher agency costs as they use internal
resources tentatively to establish new political connections instead of maximizing firm
value.
Next, we establish that the cause of underperformance of family firms stem from
investment and financing decisions during political uncertainty. We find a larger decline
in the investment of family firms during political uncertainty relative to non-family
firms, indicating that family firms tend to delay their investment in such times. In
addition, family firms tend to abstain from undertaking financial activities such as
paying dividends and accessing debt financing during heightened political uncertainty
compared to non-family firms. Taken together, these imply that the relative
underperformance of family firms can be explained in part by the reduction in
investment and financing activities during political uncertainty in an effort to preserve
family funds and enhance the survivorship of family firms. Overall, all findings in our
study reflect that in Thailand, the underperformance of family firms during political
uncertainty mainly stems from the strong incentive of controlling families to survive in
the long run at the expense of minority shareholders to establish political connections.
Our study contributes to the literature on corporate performance during political
uncertainty and the literature on corporate finance and family control. First, prior studies
investigate the performance of family firms during normal periods (Anderson & Reeb
2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006; King & Santor 2008), while our study provides insights
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into the role of family control by examining the net effect of family control on firm
value during turbulent periods of heightened political uncertainty. We document the
impact of prolonged political uncertainty arising from a change in the political system
between an unstable democracy and coup d’état on the way family control affects firm
value. Our study also views the political uncertainty as a natural experiment which
addresses the endogeneity concerns and potential simultaneity bias between family
control and firm value (Lins et al. 2013; Beuselinck et al. 2017). Furthermore, our study
differs from Connelly et al. (2012) and Wiwattanakantang (2001), who explore the
behavior of Thai firms on firm performance by considering Tobin’s q and ROA.
Additionally, we make a contribution to the literature through manually collecting
ownership information for each year over the sample period 2010-2015.
Second, our study adds to the literature with regard to the determinants of firm
value during political uncertainty in emerging markets. Most existing literature suggests
that political uncertainty reduces firm value in both developed and developing markets
(Bailey & Chung 1995; Beaulieu et al. 2005; Pástor & Veronesi 2012; Baker & Bloom
2013). We complement these studies by showing that during political uncertainty the
effect of family ownership on firm value differs from that of other blockholders in
emerging markets. We provide empirical evidence to explain the underperformance of
family firms relative to non-family firms during political uncertainty in emerging
markets. Further, we show that the underperformance of family firms is associated with
the level of expected agency costs incurred when controlling families use firms’
resources to establish political connection, and in so doing expropriate from minority
shareholders.
Finally, we provide additional insights into how family firms’ behaviors are
affected by political uncertainty in terms of investment and financing decisions.
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Previous studies document that during political uncertainty firms cut their investment
(An et al. 2016; Jens 2017) and reduce their financing activities (Fan et al. 2008; Huang
et al. 2015; Xu et al. 2016). We extend these studies by considering the incentives of
controlling families to engage in certain investment and financing policies, and show
that family firms reduce investment and financing activities than other firms during
political uncertainty indicating that families are more conservative during uncertainty.
Our results complement Lins et al. (2013) suggesting family control is probably
associated with concerns about the survival of the family network. Our study also
confirms that lower dividend payment and lower debt level reflect that family firms are
more risk-averse, which extends the findings of González et al. (2013). These results
relate to the literature focusing on the risk-taking incentives of family firms. Some
studies have documented that family firms are risk-averse because they have invested
all of their human capital and financial capital in the firms so they are more concerned
about their market reputations and long-term survival (Anderson et al. 2003; Ellul et al.
2007). Other studies contend that families have significant ownership and thus are likely
to expropriate minority shareholders and undertake risky behaviors (Boubakri &
Ghouma, 2010; Lin et al. 2011). In addition, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) has reconciled
these two conflicting views and argued that family firms value their “socioeconomic
wealth” such that they choose an optimal risk level to avoid losing this wealth based on
the trade-off between improving performance and increasing risk.36 Jiang et al. (2015)
also suggest that besides socioemotional reasons, family firm risk-taking is associated
with differences in families’ personal values such as religion. The lessons learnt about
how family control influences firm value and firms’ decisions during political

Socioeconomic wealth is defined by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) as “nonfinancial aspects of the firm
that meet the family's effective needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family influence, and the
perpetuation of the family dynasty.”
36
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uncertainty, are directly applicable to other emerging economies where family firms are
dominant and their influence is subject to the stability of external environment.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 4.2 briefly describes
Thailand’s institutional framework. Section 4.3 reviews the current and relevant
literature and establishes the hypotheses. Section 4.4 discusses the data, variables and
methodologies. Section 4.5 presents the empirical results and section 4.6 concludes with
a summary of the main themes covered here.
4.2 Institutional background
The ownership structure of Thai firms is concentrated, and families are the largest
controlling shareholders in Thailand (Wiwattanakantang 2001). Since family firms have
operated since the introduction of a constitutional monarchy in 1932, most families who
are the founders (or descendants of founders) of business empires, own extensive
businesses in Thailand such as agriculture, food and beverage, automotive, industrial
materials, steel, construction materials, and commerce (Polsiri & Wiwattanakantang
2006; Bertrand et al. 2008). Typically, Thai families have long established connections
and long-term relationship with banks (Charumilind et al. 2006) and powerful
politicians including traditional, bureaucratic and military elites (Polsiri & Jiraporn
2012) to favor their firms. Taken together, family firms contribute significantly to
economic growth in Thailand. According to the report by Forbes Thailand (2015), the
country’s top 50 richest people who own family businesses contribute more than 25% of
the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 33% of market capitalization in the
stock market. By the end of 2015, 63.82% of non-financial listed firms on the Stock
Exchange of Thailand (SET) were family firms which are on average 30 years old in
our sample.
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Despite the introduction of a constitutional monarchy in 1932, Thai politics have
long been marked by intense political uncertainty and scandal. Frequently, coups d’état
have been implemented by the country’s generals to seize control and replace elected
governments. From 1932 to 2015, Thailand’s political system could be best described as
an unstable democracy in which 20 constitutions and 20 coups (13 were successful)
occurred. Since the 1980s, Thailand has had a semblance of a more stable democracy,
during which time military interventions became less frequent. However, during the
past decade, Thailand has experienced worsening political uncertainty leading to high
tensions, intermittent violence, and regular street protests. In Thailand, the level of
ethical corporate governance is also clearly underdeveloped, and the degree of
corruption remains high. According to Transparency International, in 2015, Thailand
scored only 38 out of 100 (where 100 is ideal) on corruption, making it 76 th out of 167
countries. Firms’ bosses employ their resources to establish personal relationships
through friendships, board nominations and campaign contributions with government
bureaucrats and politicians (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang 2009).
Given the opportunities afforded by political uncertainty, controlling families are
more likely to seek access to political power and patrons, and use their political
connections to get favors for their firms. Under the weak institutional setting as
discussed above, the impacts of family control could be more pronounced to firms when
firms face political uncertainty. Thus, it is important to investigate benefits and costs of
family control during political uncertainty in Thailand.
4.3 Literature review and hypotheses development
4.3.1 Literature review
The interest conflicts between controlling families and other investors significantly
influence firm value, especially when there is political uncertainty. Thus, based on
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family ties, controlling families are more likely to have incentives to expropriate wealth
from other investors (Bertrand et al. 2008). However, if controlling families keen to
preserve their business for their next generations, it is possible that family control can
have a long-term horizon and better alignments between controlling families and other
investors, leading to a competitive advantage and creating firm value (Anderson et al.
2003; Villalonga & Amit 2006). Prior studies have noted that from a resource
perspective, family network and their political connections bring about bail out from
their government (Faccio 2006), and provide greater access to debt financing from
banks and other state institutions (Li et al. 2008; Liu et al. 2011). For instance,
politically connected firms significantly increase in firm value and stock price (Faccio
2006). Thus, preserving families’ connection is incrementally beneficial to firm
performance.
However, during political uncertainty, the behavior of family firms may be different
from normal periods. Previous literature suggests that political uncertainty can move
firms out of equilibrium and amplify the benefits and costs of family control on firm
value (Lins et al. 2013). Obviously, during political uncertainty the prior established
political connections of controlling families are weakened or even broken. For instance,
a sudden break in political connections (such as sudden deaths of politicians) can reduce
firm value and it is more pronounced in family firms (Faccio & Parsley 2009). In
addition, due to higher risks in government policies, stock price drop during political
uncertainty (Pástor & Veronesi 2012, 2013). Political uncertainty also leads to a
reduction in investment (An et al. 2016; Jens 2017), debt financing (Fan et al. 2008),
and dividend payment (Huang et al. 2015). Consequently, to maintain political
connections, controlling shareholders are more likely to extract firms’ resources from
minority shareholders to establish personal relationship with new government officials
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and politicians (Fan et al. 2007) via taxed, regulations or bribery (Frye & Shleifer 1997;
Caprio et al. 2011). These imply that the interest conflicts between controlling families
and minority shareholders will be increased which can lead to the underperformance in
family firms.
4.3.2 Hypotheses development
In Thailand, family firms are common and play an important role in economy
(Wiwattanakantang 2001). They also establish for long time and expand their business
groups (Bertrand et al. 2008). Furthermore, Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang
(2009) indicate that political connections and political power play an important role
influencing firm value, particularly under the prevalence of corruption and weak
institutional environment in this country. Thus, to access resources, controlling families
seek

to

create

and

maintain

close

connections

with

powerful

politicians

(Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). During political uncertainty, family firms do not want to
lose their abilities to access resources. Prior studies note that Thai families are more
likely to extract firms’ resources from minority shareholders to manipulating family
members’ networks (Bertrand et al. 2008; Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013) and establish
personal relationships with new government officials and politicians (Bunkanwanicha &
Wiwattanakantang 2009). Taken together, firm value is more likely to lower for family
firms (Claessens et al. 2002). We posit our first testable hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 1. Family firms experience a larger decline in firm value during
political uncertainty than non-family firms.
The effect of family control on firm value during political uncertainty in
Thailand is more likely to rely on the level of expected agency costs since family
control can erode firm value by tunneling resources out of family firms at the expense
of minority shareholders. It has been well documented that firm value can be
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determined by minority shareholders who would expect risk of tunneling in family
firms when it becomes evident that firms’ resources are being used for corrupt purposes
and where investor protection is weak and corporate governance is poor (La Porta et al.
1999; La Porta et al. 2000a). Connelly et al. (2012) indicate that family control leads to
underperformance stemming from the use of internal resources via the Thai family
business group. This is also confirmed by the findings of Bertrand et al. (2008) who
investigate Thai family businesses and their affiliations. It is possible that during
political uncertainty, Thai family firms with higher expected agency costs are more
likely to tunnel resources out of firms to establish political connections, rather than firm
value maximization. Based on this claim, our next hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2. The negative relationship between family control and firm value
during political uncertainty is more pronounced in firms with higher expected agency
costs by minority shareholders.
4.4 Data and sample
4.4.1 Data
For accurate information on ownership data in Thailand, we manually collect timeseries ownership data between 2010 and 2015 from various sources. Typically, we
gather the data from the SET Market Analysis and Reporting Tool (SETSMART)
database of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) which is a well-established national
information collector. This database provides ownership data, with at least 0.5% of
stakes owned by shareholders for companies listed on the SET. To confirm our
information is correct, we also retrieve ownership data from companies’ websites, the
commercial register in Thailand and newspaper articles. Since the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC) which erupted in 2008 and some of our variables are based on one-year
lagged values, we use a sample starting from 2010 to avoid any potential effects on
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companies’ accounting and ownership data during this uncertainty period. Regarding
various dependable sources of information, we can identify all shareholders who are
recorded for each year in our study. The ownership shareholding data consist of both
control rights and cash flow rights. Based on ownership categories reported by
Wiwattanakantang (2001) who pioneered the analysis of equity ownership structure in
Thai firms, we then identify family shareholders by tracking Thai last names which are
relatively unique and protected by law (Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013).
We collect accounting data of companies from Bloomberg database and match it
with the manually collected ownership data which are obtained from SETSMARTS
database. We further restrict our sample to non-financial companies. We exclude firms
with negative total assets, negative book equity, and negative debt. To estimate standard
errors clustered by firms, we require each firm to have at least two continuous year
observations. Our final sample for the panel data regressions comprises 2,156
observations for 365 firms. Importantly, this sample selection process does not suffer
from survivorship bias since we include firms that are delisted or go bankrupt in a
specific year during our analysis.
4.4.2 Family ownership and control
In our analysis, the identification of a family firm is essential. Following La Porta et
al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000) and Wiwattanakantang (2001), we use the control
rights of the controlling shareholders to define the ultimate control. The threshold level
is debatable since it can be influenced by factors such as the difference of ownership
concentration and institutional environment. According to the SET, a shareholder can be
considered as a controlling shareholder with more than 25% of control rights to exert a
significant influence on firm behaviors and decisions. Consequently, we use 25% of the
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control rights as the threshold in our analysis, and firms are defined as widely held firms
if the largest shareholder’s control right is less than 25%.
We follow Anderson and Reeb (2003), and Villalonga and Amit (2006) to identify
family firms in our study. In particular, a firm is identified as a family firm if the
founder/ultimate owner or a member of his/her family, by either blood or marriage, is
the controlling shareholder with at least 25% of the control rights, either individually or
as a group. This definition allows us to capture all the control rights held by members of
the same family in Thailand.
In this study, following Wiwattanakantang (2001) and Villalonga and Amit (2006),
we create a variable FamilyDummy, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s
controlling family owns at least 25% of control rights, and 0 otherwise. We also use
another measure of family ownership which is FamilyStake. This is a continuous
variable used to capture the level of family ownership, and it is measured by the
percentage of control rights held by controlling families.
Table 4.1 summarizes the information on ownership distribution of the sample
across industries using the SET classification. The sample consists of 365 firms and
2,156 firm-year observations. 60.25% of firms are family firms, and the remaining firms
are non-family firms. It is interesting to note that there are more family firms than nonfamily ones in our sample, reflecting the historical dominance of family ownership in
Thailand. Specifically, the biggest family firms operate in the consumer products
industry, and in agriculture & food industry; in fact these families control about 75% of
both industries. Also, family firms own more than half of the service industry, which
has the largest number of family firms. Conversely, the resources industry is run by the
smallest percentage of family firms (38.47%), which is not surprising since this industry
is monopolized by state-owned enterprises.
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Table 4. 1 Industry Distribution of Family Ownership
This table reports the distribution of firm-year observations across industries for family and non-family
firms during the full sample period from 2010 to 2015.
Industry
group
Agro & Food
Industry
Consumer
Products

Industrials

Property &
Construction

Resources
Services

Technology

Industry
description
Agribusiness, food
& beverage
Fashion, home &
office products,
personal products
& pharmaceuticals
Automotive,
industrial
materials &
machinery,
packaging,
paper & printing
materials,
petrochemicals &
chemicals,
steel
Construction
materials,
construction
services,
property
development,
Energy & utilities,
mining
Commerce,
health care
services,
media &
publishing,
professional
services,
tourism & leisure,
transportation &
logistics
Electronic
components,
information &
communication
Total

All
firms
221

Family
firms
160

Non-family
firms
61

Percentage of
family firms (%)
72.40

Percentage of nonfamily firms (%)
27.60

201

152

49

75.62

24.38

436

259

177

59.40

40.60

454

284

170

62.56

37.44

170

62

108

38.47

63.53

471

286

185

60.72

39.28

203

96

107

47.29

52.71

2,156

1,299

857

60.25

39.75

4.4.3 Firm performance and other firm characteristics
To measure firm performance, we use the market-to-book ratio, following
Beuselinck et al. (2017). The market-to-book ratio is measured as market value of assets
(market value of equity plus book value of debt) divided by the book value of total
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assets. This ratio is expressed in natural logarithm in the regression analysis because we
want to mitigate the impact of outliers. The variable is represented by LnMB in this
study.
To consider the effects of other factors on firm performance during the political
uncertainty period, we include a set of control variables following existing studies
(Beuselinck et al. 2017). LnSize represents firm size and is measured as the natural
logarithm of a firm’s total assets. FixedAsset is calculated as the ratio of fixed assets to
total assets. OCF is the ratio of operating cash flows to total assets. Lev is leverage and
is defined as the ratio of long-term debt at time t to total debt at time t-1. We also
include the indicators of two other controlling shareholders. The first one is GovDummy,
equal to 1 for government controlled firms. Another is ForeignDummy equal to 1 for
foreigner controlled firms. To reduce the effect of outliers we winsorize all continuous
variables at the 1% and 99% levels.
Table 4.2 summarizes the statistics for the main variables used in our empirical
analysis. Panel A shows that the mean of the average natural logarithm of market-tobook ratio is 0.267. Interestingly, FamilyDummy has a mean value of 0.602, indicating
that 60.25% of firms in our sample are family-owned firms. The average percentage of
control rights held by a controlling family is 29.05% with the largest ownership is
87.63%. The natural logarithm of firm total assets is 8.51, on average, while the average
ratio of fixed assets to total assets is 36.77%. The leverage has a mean value of 37.45%.
The average operating cash flows to total assets ratio is approximately 6.91%. Panel B
shows the distribution of firms in our sample. In our sample, 4.9% of observations are
government controlled firms and 12.3% are foreigner controlled firms.
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Table 4. 2 Summary Statistics
Panel A of this table reports the summary statistics of all variables for the full sample from 2010 to 2015.
The definition of all these variables are provided in Appendix B.
Panel B of this table reports the distribution of the firms according to the types of the controlling
shareholders.
Variable
Observation
Mean
Median
Min
Max
SD
Panel A: Firm performance, ownership and firm characteristics
LnMB

2,156

0.267

0.165

-1.422

3.793

0.520

FamilyDummy

2,156

0.602

1

0

1

0.489

FamilyStake (%)

2,156

29.055

34.140

0.000

87.636

26.018

LnSize

2,156

8.514

8.267

4.297

14.626

1.511

Lev (%)

2,156

37.452

4.333

0

1,315.588

117.87

FixedAsset (%)

2,156

36.772

35.075

0.598

94.344

22.783

OCF (%)

2,156

6.915

6.758

-13.746

26.310

9.866

Tobin’s Q (%)

2,156

1.506

1.180

0.487

6.535

0.986

ROA (%)

2,156

5.149

5.114

-34.658

31.490

8.913

Cash holding (%)

2,156

7.484

4.655

0.061

47.880

8.300

EBITDA (%)

2,156

5.456

5.069

-28.868

33.110

8.778

FCF (%)

2,156

1.997

2.341

-35.108

36.993

11.645

CapEx (%)

2,156

4.959

3.180

0

33.66

5.721

Dividend

2,156

0.730

1

0

1

0.444

GovDummy

2,156

0.049

0

0

1

0.216

ForeignDummy

2,156

0.123

0

0

1

0.329

Panel B: Number and percentage of firm-year observations in our sample
Number of firm-year observations

Percentage of total firm-year
observations

1. Family firms

1,299

60.25%

2. Non-family firms

857

39.75%

2.1 Government

106

4.92%

2.2 Foreign investor

267

12.38%

2.3 Widely held

484

22.45%

Total

2,156

100%
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Table 4.3 summarizes the mean differences between family and non-family firms
for the full sample. All variables use the data between 2010 and 2015. On average,
family firms are significantly smaller in size; however, they have higher market-to-book
ratio and ROA, compared to non-family firms.
Table 4. 3 Univariate Analysis
This table reports the mean values for family firms and non-family firms, and the t-statistics of the
difference for the full sample with the data from 2010 to 2015. LnMB is the natural logarithm of marketto-book ratio of total assets. LnSize is the natural logarithm of total assets. Lev is the ratio of long-term
debt at time t to total debt at time t-1. FixedAsset is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. OCF is the
ratio of operating cash flows to total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of firm market value to firm book value.
ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust
standard error clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
Family ownership

Full Sample
Yes

No

Difference (t-stat)

LnMB

0.284

0.241

0.043*(1.866)

LnSize

8.353

8.757

-0.404*** (-6.116)

Lev (%)

34.552

41.847

-7.295% (-1.406)

FixedAsset (%)

36.840

36.668

0.172 (0.171)

OCF (%)

7.156

6.548

0.608 (1.400)

Tobin’s Q (%)

1.544

1.448

0.096%** (2.200)

ROA(%)

5.550

4.541

1.009**(2.575)

4.5 Empirical results
4.5.1 Baseline results
To examine the influence of family ownership on firm performance around the
political uncertainty, we follow Duchin et al. (2010) and Garcia-Appendini and
Montoriol-Garriga (2013) to set up the following difference-in-differences (DID)
specification with the firm fixed effects model:
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This approach enables us to make use of the full sample and examine the role of
family control before and during the political uncertainty period. In particular in
equation (1), LnMB is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio for firm i in year t,
which is used to measure firm performance. Family_Ownership is the proxy for family
control, measured by both FamilyDummy and FamilyStake at the end of 2012 which is
one year prior to the occurrence of political uncertainty. FamilyDummy is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the firm’s controlling family owns at least 25% of control rights,
and 0 otherwise. FamilyStake is the percentage of control rights held by controlling
families if they own over 25% of controlling shareholding. In the regression, we enter
these two variables separately. This identification is to address the potential endogeneity
issue in the DID design that family firms may change their control after the political
uncertainty, in which case the family control is endogenously determined. It could also
stem from reverse causality which may arise on the relationship between family control
and firm performance and its policies (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Hence, to avoid
potential endogeneity issues, we apply the identification strategy to measure family
ownership at year end of 2012 prior to the political uncertainty, in the spirit of Duchin et
al. (2010) and Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013). The relationship
between firm ownership and firm performance also suffers the issue of omitted or
unobservable variables, so we include the firm fixed effects to address this issue. The
inclusion of firm fixed effects also incorporates the Family_Ownership in the regression.
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PoliticalYearDummy represents political uncertainty period which is measured as a
dummy variable that equals 1 for observations in years 2013 to 2015, capturing the full
period of political uncertainty. Then the interaction term reflects the DID effect of
family control on firm performance before and after the political uncertainty. To control
for the time-varying performance, we also include year fixed effects. However, as we
already include the PoliticalYearDummy, and to avoid the problem of dummy variable
trap, we only include selected year dummies (i.e., 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014).
Based on previous evidence, firm characteristics are included as the set of control
variables, which are LnSize, Lev, FixedAsset, OCF. To consider the other types of
controlling shareholders, we also include two dummies to indicate both government
controlled firms and foreigner controlled firms (GovDummy and ForeignDummy) and
their interaction with the PoliticalYearDummy, which also allow us to compare the
effect of family ownership with other controlling ownership. All of these variables are
described in Section 4.4. Robust standard errors are calculated by clustering at the firm
level.
The results of estimating Equation (1) are reported in Table 4.4 using various
family ownership proxies. In particular, the interaction terms between family ownership
and political uncertainty are our main concerns. As can be seen from the results, the
estimated

coefficients

of

FamilyDummy*PoliticalYearDummy

and

FamilyStake*PoliticalYearDummy are -0.069 and -0.108, and statistically significant at
the 5% levels in columns 1 and 2. Economically in column 1, the coefficient indicates
that during the political uncertainty occurrence, the average logarithm of market-tobook ratio decreases by 25.84% for family firms compared with non-family firms for
the entire sample. In column 2, the coefficient indicates that a one-standard-deviation
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increase in FamilyStake is associated with a 2.84 percentage point, or 10.64%, decrease
in natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio during the political uncertainty.37
We further investigate the distribution of family ownership by considering the
ownership

between

25%

and

75%

(FamilyStake25to75),

and

over

75%

(FamilyStake75more) in Column 3. We find that the coefficient of the interaction term
is negative and statistically significant for FamilyStake25to75*PoliticalYearDummy.
These results indicate that family firms with relatively lower ownership perform more
poorly during the political uncertainty. The consistency in these three specifications
support our hypothesis 1 that firm performance during political uncertainty are lower in
family firms than in non-family firms and suggest that in Thailand, listed firms perform
worse during the political uncertainty period when controlling families hold more shares.
All control variables exhibit the expected signs and significant levels that are
consistent with prior literature on firm value (Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Lins et al. 2013;
Beuselinck et al. 2017). In particular, operating cash flows is positively related to firm
market-to-book ratio, while the firm size is negatively related to market-to-book ratio.

37

The standard deviation of FamilyStake in 2012 is 26.278% and its mean is 28.329%.
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Table 4. 4 The Effects of Family Ownership on Firm Performance during the
Political Uncertainty
This table reports the firm fixed effects regression with DID design. Dependent variable is LnMB, which
is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of total assets for firm i in year t. Family_Ownership is
measured by two proxies which are FamilyDummy and FamilyStake. FamilyDummy is a dummy variable
equal to 1 for family firms and 0 otherwise, measured at the end of 2012. FamilyStake is the percentage of
control rights held by family owners, measured at the end of 2012. FamilyStake25to75 is a dummy
variable that equals one if a family holds 25%-75% of their firm’s control rights at the end of 2012 and 0
otherwise. FamilyStake75more is a dummy variable that equals one if a family holds more than 75% of
their firm’s control rights at the end of 2012 and 0 otherwise. PoliticalYearDummy represents political
uncertainty period and is a dummy variable that equals one in the years 2013 to 2015. Due to the
inclusion of this variable, we are only able to include selected year dummies for year 2011, 2012, 2013,
and 2014. All other variables are defined as before. Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample from 2010 to
2015. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

FamilyDummy*PoliticalYearDummy

Full sample
(1)
-0.069**
(-2.39)

FamilyStake*PoliticalYearDummy

(2)

-0.108**
(-2.04)

FamilyStake25to75*PoliticalYearDummy
FamilyStake75more*PoliticalYearDummy
PoliticalYearDummy
LnSize
FixedAsset
OCF
Lev
GovDummy*PoliticalYearDummy
ForeignDummy*PoliticalYearDummy
Intercept
Firm fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Adjusted R2
Observations

(3)

0.168***
(6.52)
-0.054**
(-2.47)
-0.285***
(-4.05)
0.248***
(2.74)
0.006
(1.11)
-0.223***
(-3.73)
-0.117***
(-2.89)
0.768***
(4.11)
Yes
Yes
0.051
2,156

0.156***
(6.54)
-0.054**
(-2.44)
-0.283***
(-4.01)
0.253***
(2.79)
0.006
(1.15)
-0.212***
(-3.58)
-0.105***
(-2.67)
0.762***
(4.07)
Yes
Yes
0.050
2,156

-0.070**
(-2.42)
-0.024
(-0.28)
0.168***
(6.51)
-0.054**
(-2.44)
-0.286***
(-4.06)
0.249***
(2.75)
0.006
(1.11)
-0.223***
(-3.73)
-0.117***
(-2.89)
0.763***
(4.07)
Yes
Yes
0.051
2,156

4.5.2 Firm-level expected agency costs and family ownership
In this section, we further explore whether a possible cause of the family firms’
underperformance involves the level of expected agency costs, to test our hypothesis 2.
To examine the influence of expected agency costs, we first split our sample into low
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and high expected agency cost subsamples. Following Dothan (2006), Lins et al. (2013),
Moro Visconti (2013) and Badawi and Fontenay (2019), the subsample of low expected
agency costs includes firms if they have below-median cash holdings (Cash), belowmedian operating profits measured by earnings before interest-based taxes, depreciation,
and amortization to total assets (EBITDA), or below-median free cash flow (FCF). The
subsample partition is based on yearly data.
We re-estimate equation (1) using FamilyDummy and report the results of the key
variables in Table 4.5. We find that the estimated coefficient of the interaction term
FamilyDummy*PoliticalYearDummy is negative and statistically significant for the high
expected agency cost subsamples (columns 2, 4, and 6). In particular, the coefficients
are -0.093, -0.100, and -0.116 (t-values are -2.01, -2.50 and -2.59, respectively).
However, we do not find statistically significant coefficients on the interactions for the
low expected agency cost subsample. Again, all our results confirm that during political
uncertainty, family control experiences a larger decline in firm value with the outcome
being more pronounced in firms with high expected agency costs via cash holdings
balance, operating profits and free cash flows. The results remain qualitatively similar if
we use FamilyStake in place of FamilyDummy in the regressions.
Taken together, these results provide strong support for our hypothesis 2 that during
the political uncertainty period the negative association between family ownership and
firm value is more pronounced in firms with high expected agency costs. These results
agree with the view espoused by Villalonga and Amit (2006), who find that the
performance of family firms is associated with agency conflicts. This is evident when
considering the period of political uncertainty, and when controlling shareholders
expropriate firms’ resources at the expense of minority shareholders during the political
uncertainty.
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Table 4. 5 Firm-level Differences in Expected Agency Costs
This table reports the firm fixed effects regressions with DID design. Dependent variable is LnMB, which
is the natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio of total assets for firm i in year t. Cash is the ratio of cash
to total assets. EBITDA is the ratio of earnings before interest taxes, depreciation, and amortization to
total assets. FCF is the ratio of free cash flow to total assets. All other variables are included and defined
as before. Columns 1, 3 and 5 use the subsample of firms with low Cash, EBITDA, and FCF. Columns 2,
4 and 6 use the subsample of firms with high Cash, EBITDA, and FCF. Due to the inclusion of
PoliticalYearDummy, we are only able to include selected year dummies for year 2011, 2012, 2013, and
2014. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
LnMB

FamilyDummy*PoliticalYear
Dummy
PoliticalYearDummy
GovDummy*PoliticalYear
Dummy
ForeignDummy*PoliticalYear
Dummy
Control variables
Firm fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Adjusted R2
Observations

Cash
Low
(1)
-0.041
(-1.06)
0.145***
(4.10)
0.032
(0.37)
-0.156**
(-2.25)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.052
1,078

High
(2)
-0.093**
(-2.01)
0.174***
(4.22)
-0.380***
(-4.50)
-0.076
(-1.37)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.077
1,078

EBITDA
Low
(3)
-0.064
(-1.37)
0.221***
(5.32)
-0.251**
(-2.02)
-0.219***
(-3.12)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.088
1,077

High
(4)
-0.100**
(-2.50)
0.115***
(3.17)
-0.160**
(-2.17)
0.008
(0.15)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.062
1,079

Free cash flow (FCF)
Low
High
(5)
(6)
-0.014
-0.116***
(-0.32)
(-2.59)
0.168*** 0.174***
(4.44)
(4.21)
-0.173
-0.248***
(-1.30)
(-3.38)
-0.175**
-0.085
(-2.33)
(-1.52)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.074
0.109
1,078
1,078

4.5.3 Additional analyses
4.5.3.1 Matching sample
Regarding the correlation between family ownership and other firm characteristics
in our observational data, we maintain family ownership exerts a nonparametric causal
effect on firm performance by using propensity score matching. We split our sample
into two subgroups. The treatment group includes firm-year observations with family
ownership, while the control group consists of firm-year observations without family
ownership. To construct the matching sample, we match the observations based on
family ownership for each year and industry classified by the SET. Then we employ the
multivariate analysis by using a logit model as shown below:
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Based on prior literature (Beuselinck et al. 2017), firm characteristics that are
deemed to wield effects on family ownership are included in the logit regression. The
definitions of all variables are as before. The predicted values from this logit model are
the propensity score for a family firm. Each treatment firm is then matched with one
control firm that has the nearest propensity scores, following Dehejia and Wahba (2002).
This process leaves us with 857 of family firms and 857 control non-family firms.
The differences in means for family firms and control firms of the matched sample
are reported in Panel A of Table 4.6. It shows that the differences in all the firm
characteristics are statistically insignificant between these two samples, which validate
our matching process. In Panel B of Table 4.6, we examine the relationship between
family ownership and firm performance by re-estimating the regressions in both Tables
4 and 5 using the matched sample.
The coefficients of all the interaction terms between family control proxies and
PoliticalYearDummy are negative and the significance levels are consistent with the
results reported in Table 4.4, indicating that during the period of political uncertainty
the costs of family control are greater than the benefits. In Panel C of Table 4.6, we
investigate the level of expected agency costs influencing the negative relationship
between family control and firm value during the political uncertainty by re-estimating
equation

(1)

using

the

matched

sample.

The

coefficient

of

FamilyDummy*PoliticalYearDummy is negative and significant at 1% (in columns 4
and 6) and 5% levels (in column 2), while the coefficient is insignificant in columns 1, 3,
and 5. These results are also qualitatively similar to those based on the full sample
analysis reported in Table 4.5, indicating that the negative and significant relationships
between family ownership and firm performance are concentrated in those firms with
high expected agency costs.
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Table 4. 6 Results using the PSM sample
This table reports the results of empirical analysis using the PSM sample. The matched sample is
constructed on the one-to-one matching. In Panel A, we illustrate the t-statistics of the difference for the
matched sample with the data from 2010 to 2015. In Panel B, we conduct regression analysis of the
relationship between family ownership and firm performance. In Panel C, we conduct subsample analysis
to examine the effects of expected agency costs on the relationship between family control and firm
performance. Columns 1, 3 and 5 of Panel C use the subsample of firms with low agency conflicts.
Columns 2, 4 and 6 of Panel C use the subsample of firms with high agency conflicts. The t-statistics (in
parentheses) are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Family
ownership
LnMB
LnSize
Lev (%)
FixedAsset (%)
Observations

One-to-one matched sample
Yes
0.294
8.713
41.728
36.230
857

No
0.241
8.757
41.848
36.669
857

Difference (t-stat)
0.053**(2.17)
-0.044(-0.59)
-0.120%(-0.02)
-0.439%(-0.39)

Panel B: The Effects of Family Ownership on firm value during the Political Uncertainty
(1)
(2)
FamilyDummy*PoliticalYearDummy
-0.077**
(-2.49)
FamilyStake*PoliticalYearDummy
-0.145**
(-2.50)
FamilyStake25to75*PoliticalYearDum
my
FamilyStake75more*PoliticalYearDu
mmy
Control variables
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Adjusted R2
0.035
0.035
Observations
1,714
1,714
Panel C: Firm-level Differences in Expected Agency Costs
Cash
EBITDA
Low
High
Low
(1)
(2)
(3)
FamilyDummy*Political -0.037
-0.123** -0.062
YearDummy
(-0.90)
(-2.42)
(-1.27)
Control variables
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Adjusted R2
0.045
0.072
0.072
Observations
841
873
828

High
(4)
-0.129***
(-3.02)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.062
886

(3)

-0.077**
(-2.48)
-0.064
(-0.57)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.035
1,714

Free cash flow (FCF)
Low
High
(5)
(6)
0.013
-0.198***
(0.30)
(-3.94)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.069
0.124
889
825

4.5.3.2 Family control and corporate decisions in investment and financing activities
To give a more complete picture of how firms’ behavior is affected by controlling
families during political uncertainty, we examine these families’ decisions concerning
investment and financing, which can lead to underperformance of family firms. We
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hypothesize that private benefits of family control become more costly to minority
shareholders during the political uncertainty due to controlling families’ incentive for
firms’ survivorship through using firm resources, particularly over investment (Julio &
Yook 2012; An et al. 2016) and/or financing decisions (Francis et al. 2014; Huang et al.
2015; Waisman et al. 2015; Xu et al. 2016). To test this, we consider the impact of
family control on capital expenditure, leverage and dividends, by estimating the
following firm fixed effects model for the full sample during the period 2010 to 2015:

Decisionit is investment and financing decisions for firm i in year t. In our study, the
investment decision is measured as capital expenditure to assets and represented by
CapEx whereas the financing decision is measured by two proxies, i.e. Lev and
Dividend. Lev is firm leverage that is the ratio of long-term debt at time t to total debt at
time t-1. Dividend is a dummy variable equals to 1 if firm pays dividends and 0
otherwise. Following the literature (Lemmon & Lins 2003; Lins et al. 2013; Beuselinck
et al. 2017), firm characteristics are included as the set of control variables which are
LnSize, Lev, FixedAsset, OCF, ROA and LnMB. All of the other variables are described
before, except ROA which is the ratio of net income to total assets. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level.
Table 4.7 reports the results of estimating equation (3). Our primary interest is the
estimated

coefficient

on

the

interaction

between

FamilyDummy

and

PoliticalYearDummy which measures the impact of family control on firm decisions
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around the political uncertainty. The estimated coefficients are all negative and
statistically significant at the 10% (in columns 2 and 3) and 1% levels (in column 1).
Considering the investment policy via capital expenditure (CapEx) in column 1, the
estimated coefficient of FamilyDummy*PoliticalYearDummy is negative (-0.012) and
significant at the 1% level (t-value is -2.92), indicating that family firms reduce the
capital expenditure by 1.2 percentage points, or 24.19%, more than that of non-family
firms during the political uncertainty. This finding implies that families behave more
conservatively during the political uncertainty, probably due to concerns about the
survival of the family network and uncertainty about the future.
For debt financing (Lev) in column 2 and dividend payment (Dividend) in column 3,
the estimated coefficients are -0.213 and -0.052, respectively and significant at the 10%
levels (t-values are -1.80 and -1.76, respectively). These results indicate that family
firms reduce their external debt financing and dividend payment probability by 21.3 and
5.2 percentage points, or 56.87% and 7.12%, more than those of non-family firms
during the political uncertainty. Our finding suggests that the reduction in leverage
amongst controlling families could be due to the increase in conflict of interest between
controlling families and creditors arising from family firm tendency to enhance their
political connection during periods of high political risk. In addition, family firm
reduction in dividend payment exacerbates the conflict of interest between controlling
families and minority shareholders during periods of high political risk. Taken together,
all of the findings show that political uncertainty can trigger a marked reduction in
financing activities in family firms, paying smaller dividends and having poorer access
to finance that could relieve debt.
In summary, our findings point out that family control matters during political
uncertainty. It is plausible that the decisions made by controlling families to reduce their
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investment and financing activities during political uncertainty may at least partially
account for the underperformance of family firms. The private benefits of control
become more costly to minority shareholders since the primary interests of controlling
families to survive become the driving factor of utilising firms’ resources.
Table 4. 7 Investment and Financing Decisions During Political Uncertainty
This table reports the regression result of firm investment and financing decisions. Dependent variables
are shown in the column titles for firm i in year t. CapEx is the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets.
Lev is the ratio of long-term debt at time t to total debt at time t-1. Dividend is a dummy variable equal to
1 if a firm pays dividend and 0 otherwise. All other observations are defined as before. Control variables
in Column 2 excludes leverage and replaces operating cash flows to total assets ratio (OCF) with total
cash to total assets ratio (Cash). Columns 1, 2 and 3 use the full sample. The t-statistics (in parentheses)
are computed using robust standard error clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

FamilyDummy*PoliticalYearDummy
PoliticalYearDummy
Control variables
Firm fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Adjusted/Pseudo R2
Observations

CapEx
Full sample
(1)
-0.012***
(-2.92)
0.004
(1.26)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.133
2,156

Lev
(2)
-0.213*
(-1.80)
0.041
(0.39)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.031
2,156

Dividend
(3)
-0.052*
(-1.76)
0.022
(0.82)
Yes
Yes
Yes
0.087
2,156

4.5.3.3 Alternative proxies and sample
We further test the robustness of the results by conducting a number of additional
analyses, which are available from the authors upon request. According to Faccio and
Lang (2002), we further consider the threshold of controlling families based on 10% of
control rights, instead of 25% of control rights. Moreover, consistent with Villalonga
and Amit (2006), we use alternative control variables by including firm age in our
analysis. Following Anderson and Reeb (2003), we change the measure of firm size
which is the natural logarithm of firms’ debt and equity (Size_growth). We have also
conducted the regression analysis by using the ROA and Tobin’s Q as the proxy for
firm performance. Finally, since companies in the resource industry group may be
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sensitive to government regulations and are not entirely free in making and
implementing their own policies, we exclude firms in this industry group. Again, the
results are largely consistent with our prior findings, and confirm the robustness of our
main results. For brevity these results are not reported here but they are available from
the authors upon request.
4.6 Conclusion
Thai politics have been marked by intense political volatility. Frequently, military
coups d’état have seized control of government and replaced elected government
leaders, thus initiating authoritarian rule. Family firms that dominate the Thai economy
have long played an important role and sought to gain favor with government leaders
and bureaucrats. As in many other economies around the world, they want to retain their
influence in periods of political uncertainty and beyond, and this motivates us to
investigate the implication of family control on firm valuation and financial decisions
during such periods.
We find that during the political uncertainty, family firms underperform in
comparison to non-family firms. The effect is more pronounced when controlling
families hold higher ownership. We also find that poor performance is more pronounced
in family firms with higher expected agency costs. Family firms also delay or change
their investment and financing decisions/activities during the political uncertainty,
which partially explains the underperformance of these firms. Our main findings are
robust to using alternative estimation methods, alternative sampling, alternative
measurements of family control, and control variables.
Our findings can be generalized to other countries and markets where the institutional
environment is weak, corruption remains high, and corporate governance is
underdeveloped. Overall, our results support the view that, to survive during political
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uncertainty, family control can lead to tunneling costs with little benefits for
shareholders. This is possibly due to the controlling families’ desire to survive in the
long-run and tentatively by establishing favorable political connections.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion

Researchers have attempted to mitigate agency problems occurring within
businesses and determine the mechanism from the perspective of corporate governance.
One of the important mechanisms is ownership structure and concentration which is an
internal governance mechanism. It is essential for family firms which are prevalent in
both developed and developing nations. The ownership and control of family firms can
affect their performance and policies, especially in emerging markets where the
institutional environment is unique and corporate governance is weaker than that in
developed economies. Most existing studies have been done in developed markets and
highlight the relationship between family ownership and firm performance.
Additionally, the findings reported in prior studies on the role of family control in
emerging markets are inconclusive.
This thesis investigates the role played by family control and the institutional
environment of emerging markets in explaining the relationship between controlling
families and other investors and reflecting controlling families’ incentives influencing
the implications for firms’ decisions in emerging markets like Thailand. While the
thesis aims at this broad objective, the specific goals of the study are:
1. To investigate the importance of family control and expand on earlier analyses
by examining three different dimensions of family control, namely: family ownership
structure, control-ownership wedge and family management. Also investigated here are
the respective effects on dividend payment in Thailand’s listed firms,
2. To identify an important channel through which family control wields influence
on the cost of debt in Thailand where lending relationships and long-term affinities
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between controlling families and creditors are important for firms’ ability to access
external debt financing,
3. To examine the effect of family control on firms’ market value during political
uncertainty stemming from a prolonged political crisis during the constitutional change
in 2014.
This thesis summarizes the role of family control via family ownership, controlownership wedge and family management, and describes the unique institutional
environment as being crucial in emerging markets like Thailand. Under the weak
institutional environment and poor investor protection, controlling families pursue their
private benefits and expropriate minority shareholders by distorting dividend policy in
Thai listed firms. This is unlike what happens in developed countries such as the U.S
and the U.K which have much stronger law enforcement environments regarding the
property rights of family firms. However, this thesis reveals that family firms benefit
from the strong and trustworthy relationships they established with creditors, which
help to alleviate information asymmetry in Thailand’s weak law enforcement
environment. Moreover, during political uncertainty, family control is associated with
the firms’ survivorship at the expense of minority shareholders to establish political
connection among the high level of corruption. The findings from this thesis are
outlined in more detail below.
5.1 Family control and dividend payment
In Chapter 2, this thesis investigates the relationship between dividend policy and
the three key dimensions of family control in Thailand, i.e. family ownership structure
and family management. Prior studies note that dividend policy can be used to mitigate
agency cost of excess cash flow between controlling families and minority shareholders.
However, this thesis argues that, under an underdeveloped institutional environment,
148

controlling families use excess cash flow to pursue their private benefits by paying low
dividends to minority shareholders, indicating the high level of agency cost in family
firms.
The empirical evidence in Chapter 2 shows that family control has a negative effect
on dividend payment, and this finding confirms the above expectation that family
control is associated with lower dividend payment. These results become more
pronounced when family firms dominate the ownership and are involved in virtually all
management matters. This is direct empirical evidence for the argument that lower
dividend payment can be used as a channel for controlling families to expropriate
minority shareholders. This chapter further supports this contention and finds that the
extraction of private benefits for family control becomes more costly when firms do too
well, indicating there are more severe agency problems in family firms relative to nonfamily firms.
Furthermore, the findings in Chapter 2 support the argument that controlling
families’ incentive for expropriation depends on disproportional ownership or wedge.
Controlling families’ incentive for expropriation is significantly diminished when firms
have lower wedge, and is enhanced when firms have more excess cash flow. The
findings also provide supportive evidence for the argument that institutional
environment like political uncertainty is important and can affect the behavior of family
firms. Controlling families’ incentive for expropriation is heightened due to political
turmoil such as the constitutional change in Thailand.
Overall, these results confirm the expectations and suggest that in emerging
markets with underdeveloped legal systems and the lack of investor protection
mechanisms for minority shareholders, controlling families are more likely to extract
firms’ resources for their private benefits, and subsequently paying minority
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shareholders lower dividends. Unlike strong institutional environments and dispersed
ownership concentration in developed nations, the serious agency conflict between
controlling families and minority shareholders in Thai listed family firms continue to
undermine the country’s institutional environment.
5.2 Family control and cost of debt
Chapter 3 further examines the impact of family control on the cost of debt in Thai
listed firms. Since the Thai equity market is underdeveloped, the country’s firms rely
heavily on bank debt for their external financing which is a unique characteristic of
Thailand’s financial system. This chapter assesses the impact of family control on
firms’ ability to secure debt finances externally. Specifically, how do creditors respond
to the behavior of family firms by requiring interest rate, as an indicator of the cost of
debt? In the presence of information asymmetry in Thailand, strong and trustworthy
relationships between controlling families and creditors play an important role in firms’
ability to access external debt finance sources. The chapter hypothesizes that controlling
families have incentives to use their control and blend it with their lending relationships
with creditors to enjoy less cost of debt financing.
The findings in Chapter 3 confirm the above hypothesis and illustrate that
compared to non-family firms, family firms in Thailand have lower cost of debt. The
results can be explained by Thailand’s weak institutional environment and the lack of an
arm’s length market-driven system. Since family firms have operated there for a long
time and extended their business groups and interests, they exercise control via family
ownership structure, control-ownership wedge and family management, and maintain
their lending relationship with creditors to secure lower cost of external debt financing
for long-run survivability.
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The empirical evidence finds that the lower cost of debt enjoyed by familycontrolled firms is particularly pronounced in highly profitable firms. However, this
impact of family control becomes weaker during the 2014 coup d’état possibly due to
the act of establishing political connections. These findings confirm the argument that
country-level institutional environment in terms of political instability can affect the
behavior of family firms. Overall, the chapter suggests that in emerging markets with
weak institutional environments and lacking an arm’s length market-driven system,
family control significantly affects the cost of debt. Strong lending relationship between
controlling families and creditors is beneficial in securing lower financing costs.
5.3 The value of family control during political uncertainty
Chapter 4 advances the work in Chapter 3 by investigating the behavior of family
firms during periods of intense political uncertainty in Thailand. In particular, it looks
the effects of the constitutional change experienced by 2014 coup d’état to provide
greater insights into what family control can do in the Thai capital market. This political
uncertainty avoids the endogeneity concern about the relationship between family
control and firm value. This uncertainty tends to amplify the incentives of controlling
families in influencing corporate market valuation.
This chapter asserts that firms’ market value and especially that of family firms
declines with political uncertainty. It is probable that family firms could use their
internal resources to establish new political connections during such periods of political
uncertainty. The findings here confirm this argument and reveal that Thai family firms
perform poorly relative to non-family firms during a political upheaval, and the effect is
more pronounced with increasing controlling family ownership. The decline in firm
value is associated with high expected agency costs of family firms which expend
internal resources to establish political connections. There is evidence that investors
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heavily discount the value of these firms due to perceived tunnelling behavior,
particularly in companies which are characterized by high cash holdings, operating
profits, and free cash flow.
Additional empirical evidence shows that family control can be influenced by
uncertainty in terms of their financial and investment policies. This is most evident
when firms operate in nations that are less stable politically and have weak economic
fundamentals and firms’ decision-making are influenced by the public sector, i.e. the
government. Chapter 4 finds that regarding survivorship during the periods of political
uncertainty, family firms delay their investment, hold less cash, pay lower dividends
and have poorer access to debt financing compared to non-family firms. These results
suggest that families are more conservative during political uncertainty. The reduction
in investment and financing activities may at least partially account for the
underperformance of family firms.
Overall, these results confirm the above hypothesis and furthermore, family control
reduces investment and financing activities which are associated with greater
underperformance of family firms. Taken together, due to the institutional weakness of
Thailand, family firms tend to expend resources to maintain or establish new political
connections so that they survive.
5.4 Summary and implications
This thesis demonstrates that from a governance perspective the essentials of family
control and institutional environment affect corporate policies and market value in the
Thai financial and capital markets. Controlling families have incentives to expropriate
minority shareholders by paying lower dividends. The levels of expropriation also
depend on firms’ wedge, indicating the serious agency conflict between controlling
families and minority shareholders in family firms.
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Furthermore, to offer greater insights into the role of family control in financerelated policies and firms’ abilities to access external debt financing and growth in the
long-term, the policy on cost of debt is analysed in this study. Due to the lack of an
arm’s length market-driven system in emerging markets, controlling families establish
strong and trusting lending relationships with creditors. Consequently, this relationship
helps to mitigate information asymmetry and lower the cost of debt for family firms
relative to non-family firms. The lower cost of external debt financing is more
pronounced in highly profitable family firms, suggesting that controlling families are
concerned about their long-term survival.
Moreover, to further understand the influence of institutional environment on the
behavior of family firms, political uncertainty is considered in this study. The empirical
evidence shows that political uncertainty can significantly affect the relationship
between family control and firm value. Family firms are more conservative during the
uncertainty, probably due to the concerns about the survival of the family network
because they reduce financial and investment activities, resulting in worsening the
family firms’ value during a period of political uncertainty.
There are some important implications for market participants in these kinds of
developing economies. First, due to the agency conflict between controlling families
and minority shareholders, family control is associated with expropriation and
tunnelling via lower dividend payment. Due to the weak institutional environment and
poor investor protection, expropriation and tunnelling are more severe in emerging
markets which is consistent with Liu et al. (2015) and Ashwin et al. (2015) who
examine the role of family firms in China and India, respectively. For this reason,
regulators need to develop legal systems and regulations that can remove the agency
problem. To higher levels of investor protection, a number of dimensions should be
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developed such as the rights of shareholders, disclosure and transparency, the role of
stakeholders and et cetera. The Thai corporate governance code should be stricter and
changed from “comply or explain” basis to “Mandatory” approach resulting in stronger
investor protection and corporate governance. Second, lending is in part based on
personal ties and allocating loans to affiliated firms at preferential terms, rather than on
the basis of expected future cash flows. Hence, the standard of corporate governance
and financial system in Thailand should be reformed by regulators. For instance,
transferring the ownership of some Thai financial institutions from families to other
types of controlling shareholders such as foreigners or the government should be
expansively applied leading to increase in an arm’s length market-driven system and
mitigate information asymmetry. Additionally, banks should be required to reduce
outstanding loans to connected companies. Granting new banking licenses for both
domestic and foreign commercial banks should be disclosed on standard practices.
Third, the value of family control needs to be recognized by both investors and policymakers in terms of firms’ ability to access external debt financing as well as in the times
of political uncertainty, since family control plays an critical role to enhance firms’
future prospects. Fourth, lower disproportional ownership structure and financing
conditions such as more profitability can reduce controlling families’ propensity for
tunnelling. Investors and creditors need to realise the importance of this issue before
making investment decisions. Fifth, political uncertainty leads to establishing
connections between family firms and politicians during political uncertainty periods,
but this needs to be guarded against given the prevalence of corruption in emerging
countries like Thailand.
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5.5 Limitations and suggestions for future research
This section considers some limitations of this study and offers suggestions for
future research concerning family control of businesses. First, this research focuses on
family control such as ownership structure, control-ownership wedge and management.
However, other types of family control can be considered in future studies, namely the
different influences that exist between founders and heirs in family firms. This research
highlights the influence of family control on dividend payment, the cost of debt as well
as on firm value during political uncertainty in Thailand while other financing and
investment decisions in family firms should be explored. Another limitation of this
thesis is the sample selection. This thesis uses only companies listed on the Stock
Exchange of Thailand (SET) but the role of corporate governance in Thai’s unlisted
companies, which are generally small to medium-sized, is unclear. Therefore, future
research should employ both publicly traded and privately owned Thai firms in order to
explore the value of family control in greater detail.
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Appendix

Appendix A Chapter 3: Turnover of Politicians in Thailand by Province and Year
(2009-2015)
This table reports the turnover of politicians in Thailand by province and year over the sample period
2009-2015.
Number

Province

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

1

Ayutthya

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

2

Bangkok

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

3

Buriram

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

4

Chacherngsao

1

0

1

1

0

1

0

5

Chainart

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

6

Chiang Mai

1

0

1

0

1

1

0

7

Chiang Rai

1

0

1

1

1

0

0

8

Chonburi

1

0

1

1

0

0

0

9

Chumphon

1

1

0

0

1

0

1

10

Khon Kaen

1

0

1

0

1

1

0

11

Krabi

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

12

Lampang

1

1

1

1

0

1

0

13

Lamphun

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

14

Nakhon Ratchasima

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

15

Naknorn Sawan

1

1

1

1

1

0

1

16

Nakorn Phathum

0

1

1

1

1

0

1

17

Nonthaburi

0

1

0

0

0

1

1

18

Pathum Thani

1

0

1

1

1

1

0

19

Prachinburi

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

20

Rayong

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

21

Roi Et

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

22

Samut Prakarn

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

23

Samut Sakhon

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

24

Saraburi

1

1

0

0

0

1

0

25

Songkhla

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

26

Surat Thani

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

27

Udon Thani

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

Total change

23

14

16

18

15

15

11
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Appendix B Chapter 4: Variable Definitions
Variable name
Variable definition
Panel A: firm performance and family ownership
LnMB
Natural logarithm of market-to-book ratio
FamilyDummy
Dummy variable equals 1 if a family holds more than 25% of
their firm’s shares and 0 otherwise
FamilyStake
Percentage of control rights controlled by the family owners
FamilyStake25to75
Dummy variable equals 1 if a family holds 25%-75% of their
firm’s shares and 0 otherwise
FamilyStake75more
Dummy variable equals 1 if a family holds more than 75% of
their firm’s shares and 0 otherwise
Panel B: other variables
PoliticalYearDummy
GovDummy
ForeignDummy
Firm size (LnSize)
Leverage (Lev)
Fixes asset (FixedAsset)
OCF
Cash
EBITDA
Free cash flow (FCF)
Return of assets (ROA)
Tobin’s Q

CapEX
Dividend

Dummy variable equals 1 in the years 2013 to 2015 (during
political uncertainty) and 0 otherwise
Dummy variable equals 1 if the government hold more than
25% of their firm’s shares and 0 otherwise
Dummy variable equals 1 if foreign investors hold more than
25% of their firm’s shares and 0 otherwise
Natural logarithm of firm total assets
Long-term debt at time t/ total debt at time t-1
Fixed assets/ total assets
Operating cash flow/ total assets
Total cash/ total assets
Earnings before interest-related taxes, depreciation, and
amortization/ total assets
Free cash flow/ total assets
Net income/total assets
(Market value of equity + Book value of debt)/ total asset.
Market value of equity equals price per share times total
number of shares outstanding. Book value of debt equals total
assets minus book value of equity
Capital expenditure/ total assets
Dummy variable equals 1 if a firm pays dividends and 0
otherwise
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